Bamako/Genève (CICR) – Un atelier sur la prise en charge des blessés par armes à feu et engins explosifs organisé par le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) s’ouvre aujourd’hui à Bamako.

« Les blessures de guerre doivent être traitées d’une manière spécifique, qui n'est habituellement pas enseignée dans les écoles de médecine », explique Günter Wimhöfer, chirurgien du CICR et formateur dans le cadre de cet atelier. « Cette formation permettra aux participants d’apprendre des méthodes simples qui peuvent être utilisées même dans un contexte où les moyens à disposition pour soigner ce genre de blessures sont très limités ».

Pendant trois jours, une trentaine de chirurgiens, d’anesthésistes et d’infirmiers spécialisés venus du nord du Mali et du Niger voisin échangeront leurs expériences et aborderont des thèmes tels que la balistique, la prise en charge chirurgicale des blessures abdominales et des traumatismes cranio-cérébraux ou thoraciques causés par des armes ou des mines, la gestion d’afflux massifs de blessés, la prévention des infections, ou encore la réadaptation physique des blessés de guerre.

« L’atelier permettra de sensibiliser les participants à la nature spécifique de la chirurgie de guerre, dont beaucoup ont peu d'expérience, voire aucune, ainsi que des soins aux blessés dans les conditions difficiles qui prévalent dans les zones de conflit armé», précise M. Wimhöfer.

Au Mali, le CICR soutient plusieurs structures de santé dans le nord du pays, dont l'hôpital régional de Gao, un des deux établissements de soins les plus importants de la région, qui bénéficie du renfort d’une équipe médicale du CICR spécialisée dans la prise en charge des blessés de guerre.

Informations complémentaires :
Valery Mbaoh Nana, CICR Bamako, tél. : +223 76 99 63 75
Wolde-Gabriel Saugeron, CICR Genève, tél : +41 22 730 31 49 ou +41 79 244 64 05

Bamako/Geneva (ICRC) – A workshop on the treatment of patients injured by firearms or explosive devices, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is opening today in Bamako.

"War injuries have to be treated in a special way that is not usually taught in medical schools," said ICRC surgeon Günter Wimhöfer, in charge of training at the workshop. "The participants will have the opportunity to learn simple methods that can be used even in situations where the resources available for treating this kind of injury are very limited."

Over three days, some 30 surgeons, anaesthetists and specialized nurses from northern Mali and neighbouring Niger will share their experience with one another and discuss topics such as ballistics, the surgical treatment of abdominal injuries and of chest or brain trauma caused by weapons or mines, mass casualty management, the prevention of infection, and the physical rehabilitation of war-wounded patients.

"The workshop will raise awareness among the participants of the special nature of war surgery – a kind of surgery that many of them have little or no experience with – and of the treatment of casualties in the difficult conditions of a war zone," said Dr Wimhöfer.

The ICRC is providing support for several health-care facilities in northern Mali. For example, an ICRC medical team specializing in the treatment of war-injured people has reinforced the staff at Gao Regional Hospital, one of the two most important facilities in the region.

For further information, please contact:
Valery Mbaoh Nana, ICRC Bamako, tel: +223 76 99 63 75
Wolde-Gabriel Saugeron, ICRC Geneva, tel: +41 22 730 31 49 or +41 79 244 64 05

te Lintelo, D.J.H., Haddad, L.J., Lakshman, R. and Gatellier, K.
IDS Evidence Report 78
Publisher IDS
See details of this publication

This report presents the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) 2013. It seeks to:

Rank governments on their political commitment to tackling hunger and undernutrition;
Measure what governments achieve and where they fail in addressing hunger and undernutrition – providing greater transparency and public accountability;
Praise governments where due, and highlight areas for improvement;
Support civil society to reinforce and stimulate additional commitment towards accelerating the reduction of hunger and undernutrition;
Assess whether improving commitment levels leads to a reduction in hunger and undernutrition. The report builds on the HANCI 2012, first launched in April 2013, and incorporates new data collated until December 2013. It also presents new primary research findings on political commitment in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.

Read the full IDS Evidence Report

Hunger season has arrived in the Sahel region of West Africa, where millions of people are at risk of food insecurity each year. This year, the U.N. estimates that 20 million people—nearly 13 percent of the region’s population—will be at risk of hunger and will lack enough food for a healthy and productive life. Decreased food availability, inefficient markets, high prices, and improper nutrition all contribute to an ongoing cycle of hunger and poverty.

Building upon lessons learned from the 2012 Sahel crisis—one of the worst food crises in Africa the past decade—USAID is actively addressing the underlying causes of hunger while also focusing on saving lives and helping communities withstand future shocks.

Here are five ways our teams are curbing the hunger season in the Sahel:

1. By Building Resilience

Drought, climate change, conflict and bad harvests are examples of the shocks that families throughout West Africa face every year. Throughout the Sahel, USAID is committed to helping households and communities mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks. In 2013, USAID launched Resilience in the Sahel-Enhanced (RISE), a five-year initiative to address root causes of vulnerability in the region and better integrate relief and development programming. Interventions will include transfers (food, cash or vouchers) for activities that improve communities such as land regeneration, reforestation and water development; social investments — such as those in education, nutrition, and family planning; and investments that increase economic opportunities, such as livelihood diversification, value chain development, and market facilitation. Through this initiative, RISE aims to reach 1.9 million people facing recurrent crises and chronic poverty, and help ensure that these communities stay firmly on the path to development.

2. By Providing Access to Banking

For many people, one disaster can mean a spiral into extreme poverty. Banking services allow people the chance to financially prepare by giving them the opportunity to save for unexpected expenses. In Burkina Faso, we are working with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to reach vulnerable people through the establishment of savings and internal lending communities. As a result, more than 9,000 people will have access to small loans that will help them earn a living through activities like growing and selling peppers, or making their own peanut paste to bring to market. In addition, CRS is hosting small animal and seed voucher fairs where people can access healthy livestock and high-quality seeds for household planting.

3. By Teaching about Health and Sanitation

Each year, approximately 575,000 children in the Sahel die of malnutrition and its health-related illnesses—underscoring the urgent need to help these communities prepare for the hunger season. In Chad, we are partnering with World Vision to reduce acute malnutrition and enhance the resilience of 8,500 households in Guera Region. According to a 2012 study conducted in the region by the International Rescue Committee, diarrhea and fever are more significant factors in malnutrition than lack of food alone. The majority of the population lacks appropriate knowledge, attitude, and practice of sanitation, hygiene and hand-washing, all essential to avoiding illness and preventing malnutrition. To address this, the program provides trainings to vulnerable families on hygiene and nutrition to improve the health of young children, and pregnant women and new mothers. In exchange for participating in trainings, households receive cash-based food vouchers, giving families the liberty to choose their foods while promoting key proteins and micronutrients required for children under 5 and pregnant women.

4. By Using Innovative Food Aid Tools

Ongoing violence in northern Mali throughout the past year has exacerbated hunger and impeded food aid efforts. In Mali, we are working with the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) to reduce overall food insecurity through food assistance delivered from the U.S. in addition to cash transfers and food vouchers throughout Gao, Mopti, Tombouctou, and Kidal regions. Market assessments have shown a favorable environment for cash transfers and food vouchers in urban and semi-urban areas, which help families increase access to more diverse, nutritious foods in local markets. We are also supporting food-assistance-for-asset activities, in which families work to build community assets in exchange for food assistance. By using varied food assistance interventions, USAID is able to respond appropriately and best address the food needs of vulnerable families affected by conflict.

5. By Preventing Child Malnutrition

Malnutrition is the underlying cause of one out of three deaths of children under 5 in the developing world. Often, families have access to healthy foods, but are unaware of how to feed their children properly. In Mauritania, we are working with Action Contre la Faim (ACF) to prevent malnutrition and improve food security in the Guidimaka Region. ACF, alongside local organizations, will promote appropriate feeding practices for infants and young children through cooking demonstrations and nutrition education for community members, including mothers, fathers, religious leaders, and local health workers. Community volunteers will conduct frequent screenings to identify children at risk of malnutrition and refer those in need of treatment to health centers.

So far this year, we have already provided more than $205 million in humanitarian assistance to the region to ensure food is available and ready to be distributed to people in need before the height of the agricultural lean season — which ranges from June through September depending on the country.

But humanitarian assistance will not solve the larger problem. USAID remains committed to helping people across the Sahel build longer-term resilience and providing them with the knowledge and tools to break the cycle of crisis—and hopefully one day, avoid the hunger season altogether.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dina Esposito is the Director of USAID’s Office of Food for Peace and Jeremy Konyndyk is the Director of USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

RELATED LINKS

Check out more on our work in the Sahel Read how USAID supports agricultural and food security interventions Follow @theOFDA; On Facebook

By Monde Kingsley Nfor

GUIWA, Cameroon, Jun 24 2014 (IPS) - Central African Republic refugees living in Cameroon’s East Region are increasingly becoming frustrated about their deteriorating living conditions and their inability to support themselves as conflict between them and and local villagers has escalated over depleting resources.

They say they have been denied access to farm tools as aid agencies fear they may use them as arms against the local population.

Clay-Man Youkoute, head of refugees in Guiwa camp, told IPS that aid agencies showed the refugees pieces of land that they could cultivate.

“Before starting work on the land, aid agencies refused to give us the right farm tools. They say if they give us machetes we will use as weapons against local population. This is very insulting.

“We went further to toil in the bushes with unsuitable farm tools just to be denied access to the farms later,” Youkoute said, explaining that “the local chief and his population drove us from the land saying that we have no right to their land.”

Now Rosaline Kusangi, a mother of three, has resorted to harvesting wild forest fruits to earn a living. She walks five kilometres to a nearby forest to harvest wild mangoes daily. She then sells the mangoes at the Guiwa market square.

“I cannot have a farm, so I depend on wild fruits for survival but the locals still think I have no right to the fruits because I am a refugee,” Kusangi told IPS.

About 1,500 refugees have settled in Guiwa, eastern Cameroon as part of the first influx from CAR after the April 2013 coup d’état that ousted President François Bozizé. However, in May 2013 a number of refugees began abandoning the border camps because of the poor living conditions there and made their way to Guiwa village. It is estimated that over 200,000 refugees from CAR are currently in Cameroon.

But even in Guiwa refugees live in squalid conditions and in tents that are wearing out quickly. There is a lack of water and proper waste treatment facilities.

“We have been here for more than a year still living in worn-out shelters. During the dry season it is very hot inside and it leaks when it rains. Moreover, insects and snakes find their way easily into the tents,”Jodel Tanga, a CAR refugee, told IPS.

In addition to poor living conditions, infections and malaria has increased during the first two months of the rainy season.

“Each day, about 10 people are sick with malaria and stomach disorders since the rains started. All the wells that were dug by the United Nations Refugee Agency [UNHCR] have dried up or are unclean, so we have to go two kilometres to fetch water,” Juliana Manga, a CAR refugee who has taken responsibility as health assistant in the Guiwa camp, told IPS.

Access to health care is difficult, Manga said.

“When we go to the clinic, we are always the last to be served. They say we should allow the people of the land first. The nurses in hospitals make comments and gestures that are insulting.”

Manga also complained that local school authorities did not allow their children to attend school because of limited space in classrooms.

The number of refugees crossing from CAR into Cameroon has dropped from more than 10,000 a week before March to about 1,000 weekly.

But the influx has already changed the make-up of most towns in East Region.

According to Guiwa local councillor, Joseph Kwette, the local community are concerned about their own security and livelihoods since the start of the refugee influx.

“These refugees were a disgruntled group who had forcefully made their way into Guiwa despite attempts by the local population to push them back [to remain in the camps on Cameroon’s border towns]. This made the tension with the local population to subsist until today,” Kwette told IPS.

The locals’ water supply has been severely compromised. Local children are forced to travel long distances to fetch water and fire wood. The cassava tuber, which is the most consumed food in the region, has also become scarce and sells for double its price on the market.

“Lack of water in the refugee camps and deforestation by refugees has also threatened the food security of the Guiwa population who also depend on forest products and water for survival. Prices of goods has increased and petty theft is common,” Kwette said.

According to the police commander in Guiwa village, criminal activities have increased over the last year.

Refugees have been accused of being behind the recent spate of armed robberies and increasing sex trade.

In January, CAR refugees had taken hostage two United Nations aid workers to protest a lack of needed aid. In early May, a group of armed men from CAR abducted 18 civilians who were travelling in east of Cameroon.

But the refugees argue that they are simply victims of circumstances and are not given some of the basic human right to freedom of movement.

“We are seen as criminals because we don’t have identification papers. The police incriminate us and many refugees find themselves in Bertoua prison just because they attempted to move and search for jobs in the urban area. There is no paper to identity us as CAR refugees registered by the UNHCR,” said Youkoute, head of refugees at Guiwa camp.

Aid agencies in Cameroon have declared the current situation an emergency and have called for more aid.

The World Health Organisation has declared that health facilities are terribly understaffed and lack water and electricity. Humanitarian workers on the ground are over stretched and medical supplies are also running out.

The U.N. World Food Programme’s food stores are running empty and there is urgent need for funds to buy more food and nutritional supplements for malnourished children.

“The needs of refugees are colossal, the most pressing needs is that that of housing, food and health. Many more sites have been identified to host the refugees camped in villages,” Faustian Tchimi, Cameroon Red Cross director in East region, told IPS.

Avec le financement du gouvernement français, le PAM et la FAO ont mis en œuvre un programme visant à réhabiliter les terres agricoles et ainsi accroître la résilience des communautés*.

Le programme "Espèces contre travail" du PAM fait partie d’une stratégie ambitieuse visant à mettre au point des solutions locales pour lutter contre la faim dont souffrent plusieurs millions de Nigériens. Il est aligné sur l’initiative du gouvernement nigérien "Les Nigériens Nourrissent les Nigériens" qui a pour objectif de renforcer la résilience des populations et de lutter contre la malnutrition.

Le Niger est l’un des pays les plus touchés par l’insécurité alimentaire. "La malnutrition est chronique, et connait des périodes d’exacerbation cycliques. La malnutrition est une préoccupation majeure qui est devenue un problème de santé publique", a déclaré le président Nigérien, Mahamadou Issoufou.

Notre action en 2013

Le programme du PAM "Espèces contre travail" fournit de la nourriture aux plus démunis en échange de leur travail sur des projets visant à améliorer l'ensemble de la communauté. Au Niger, le programme financé par le gouvernement français rémunère les populations en échange de leur travail sur les terres agricoles. 55.000 nigériens ont ainsi cultivé 6.000 hectares de terre, chaque ménage a reçu 48€ pour 25 jours de travail.

Le programme bénéficie également de notre partenariat avec la FAO qui apporte son expertise pour améliorer les récoltes. Avec un montant de 500.000€ la FAO a augmenté la fertilité des 6.000 hectares de terre en utilisant des semences de qualité. La FAO a distribué des kits comprenant 50 grammes de semences horticoles (oignons, choux, laitues, carottes), ainsi que du maïs et des pommes de terre à 6.000 ménages vulnérables. 70 à 85% des récoltes sont consommés par les familles et le reste est revendu sur les marchés.

Au vu du succès du projet, 145 tonnes de semences supplémentaires ont été achetées et 10.700 ménages vulnérables de la région de Tahoua et de Tillabéry ont pu bénéficier du programme.

*La résilience est la capacité non seulement de se remettre de chocs tels que la sécheresse, mais aussi de les anticiper et d’y résister, pour rebondir tout en étant plus forts qu’avant.

Bamako-Based Unit Would Investigate Wartime Atrocities

(Nairobi, June 25, 2014) – The government of Mali should establish a special investigation cell to investigate grave crimes committed by all sides during the 2012-2013 armed conflict, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to Justice Minister Mohamed Ali Bathily. The unit should consist of prosecutors, investigative judges, and others needed to carry out the unit’s work.

The recent return to northern Mali of judicial personnel forced to flee during the conflict is an important development. However, tasking those courts with investigating war crimes and other serious abuses committed during the 2012-2013 armed conflict would pose serious security and resource challenges, Human Rights Watch said. The time needed for these judicial institutions to become fully functional would contribute to inevitable delays.

“The creation of a special investigation cell in the capital, Bamako, would be the best and safest way to ensure fair and credible investigations of wartime atrocities,” said Corinne Dufka, senior West Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The special cell would allow Mali to capitalize on the current momentum for strengthening the rule of law and breaking the cycle of violence and reprisals in the country.”

Human Rights Watch and other international and national organizations extensively documented war crimes and other serious abuses by all sides during the conflict. Islamist armed groups summarily executed Malian soldiers, recruited and used child combatants, amputated limbs of criminal suspects, and destroyed shrines. The ethnic Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) committed sexual violence and widespread pillage. Some soldiers in the Malian army were responsible for torture, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial executions.

The government has made a commitment to ensure justice for grave crimes by all sides. But very few investigations are being conducted and no one has yet been prosecuted.

There is a growing demand for justice evidenced by the scores of victims and their families from all sides who have filed judicial complaints (porté plainte) with the authorities, Human Rights Watch said. Forming a special investigation cell would build on the momentum created by the increased expectation of justice, the progress in the “Red Beret dossier” (an investigation into the 2012 enforced disappearance and torture of at least 21 soldiers) and the presence of considerable donor and institutional support for reforming the judiciary and strengthening Mali’s rule of law.

Human Rights Watch detailed several reasons why a Bamako-based cell would be preferable to investigations by northern courts including:

• The unit could centralize expertise in key areas, such as the investigation of crimes not often handled by Malian courts, or link evidence from low-level suspects to senior officials implicated in multiple international crimes;
• The unit could help address the marked absence of defense lawyers in the north, which would pose a serious challenge for the right of the accused to have competent counsel;
• Basing investigative judges, prosecutors and other court officials working on high-profile cases in the north, especially in smaller jurisdictions, would make them vulnerable to attack and intimidation. The evidence gathered and judicial infrastructure would also be at risk; and
• The concentration of investigations in one location would more easily facilitate an effective system of witness protection.

“Conducting credible, impartial, and prompt investigations into the crimes committed during the 2012-2013 conflict would give hope to victims and go a long way toward breaking from the past when perpetrators got away scot free,” Dufka said. “Establishing a Bamako-based special investigation cell would greatly help in seeing justice done for crimes during the 2012-2013 conflict.”

Cet organe basé à Bamako serait chargé d’enquêter sur les atrocités commises lors du conflit armé

(Nairobi, le 25 juin 2014) – Le gouvernement du Mali devrait créer une cellule d’enquête spéciale qui serait chargée d’effectuer des investigations sur les graves crimes commis durant le conflit armé de 2012-2103, a déclaré Human Rights Watch aujourd’hui dans une lettre adressée au ministre malien de la Justice, Mohamed Ali Bathily. Cette cellule devrait être composée de procureurs, de juges d’instruction et d’autres personnels nécessaires à son bon fonctionnement.

Le retour récent dans le nord du Mali de membres du personnel judiciaire qui avaient été contraints de fuir pendant le conflit est une évolution positive. Cependant, charger les tribunaux locaux d’enquêter sur des crimes de guerre et sur d’autres graves violations des droits humains commis lors du conflit armé de 2012-2013 poserait de grosses difficultés en termes de sécurité et de ressources, a déclaré Human Rights Watch. Le temps requis pour que ces institutions judiciaires du Nord deviennent pleinement opérationnelles créerait inévitablement des retards.

« La création d’une cellule d’enquête spéciale dans la capitale du Mali, Bamako, serait le meilleur et le plus sûr moyen d’assurer que les atrocités commises pendant le conflit fassent l’objet d’enquêtes équitables et crédibles », a déclaré Corinne Dufka, chercheuse senior sur l’Afrique de l’Ouest à Human Rights Watch. « Cette cellule spéciale permettrait au Mali de continuer sur sa lancée afin de renforcer l’État de droit et de rompre le cycle des violences et des représailles à travers le pays. »

Human Rights Watch et d’autres organisations internationales et nationales ont abondamment documenté des crimes de guerre et d’autres graves violations des droits humains commis par toutes les parties lors du conflit. Des groupes armés islamistes ont exécuté sommairement des militaires maliens, recruté et utilisé au combat des enfants soldats, amputé des membres de personnes soupçonnées d’actes criminels et détruit des mausolées. Le Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), un groupe armé touareg, a commis des violences sexuelles et des pillages à grande échelle. Certains militaires de l’armée nationale malienne ont été impliqués dans des actes de torture, des disparitions forcées et des exécutions extrajudiciaires.

Le gouvernement a pris l’engagement d’assurer que justice soit rendue pour les crimes graves commis par toutes les parties. Mais très peu d’enquêtes ont été ouvertes et personne n’a encore été poursuivi.

Il y a une demande croissante de justice au Mali, comme le montre le fait que de nombreuses victimes ou leurs familles, affiliées à toutes les parties au conflit, ont porté plainte auprès des autorités, a souligné Human Rights Watch. La mise en place d’une cellule d’enquête spéciale permettrait de bénéficier de l’élan créé par cette attente croissante de justice, par les progrès effectués dans « l’affaire des Bérets rouges » (une enquête sur des cas de disparitions forcées et de tortures subies en 2012 par au moins 21 militaires), ainsi que par l’existence d’un niveau considérable de soutien, à la fois financier et institutionnel, pour une réforme du système judiciaire et pour le renforcement de l’État de droit au Mali.

Human Rights Watch a détaillé plusieurs raisons pour lesquelles une cellule basée à Bamako serait préférable à l’ouverture d’enquêtes par les tribunaux du Nord, dont les suivantes:

• Une telle structure permettrait de centraliser les compétences dans des domaines clés, comme les enquêtes sur certains crimes qui ne sont pas souvent traités par des tribunaux maliens, ou de démontrer, à partir d’éléments de preuve, l’existence d’un lien entre des auteurs de crimes de rang subalterne et des responsables de haut rang impliqués dans de multiples crimes internationaux;

• La création de la cellule pourrait aider à pallier la pénurie d’avocats de la défense dans le Nord, qui rend particulièrement difficile de garantir le droit des accusés à bénéficier d’une assistance juridique compétente;

• Baser les juges d’instruction, les procureurs et les autres membres du système judiciaire chargés d’enquêter sur des dossiers très sensibles dans le Nord, en particulier dans les juridictions les plus petites, les exposerait à des risques d’attentats et d’actes d’intimidation. Les éléments de preuve recueillis, ainsi que l’infrastructure judiciaire, seraient également exposés à des risques ; et

• Il est plus facile de mettre sur pied un système efficace de protection des témoins au service d’une seule unité spécialisée, centralisée en un lieu unique. « La conduite diligente d’enquêtes crédibles et impartiales sur les crimes graves commis lors du conflit de 2012-2013 aurait pour effet de redonner espoir aux victimes, et constituerait un progrès important dans les efforts pour rompre avec le passé, lorsque les auteurs de ces crimes jouissaient d’une totale impunité », a affirmé Corinne Dufka. « La création d’une cellule d’enquête spéciale à Bamako contribuerait grandement à ce que justice soit rendue pour les crimes commis lors du conflit de 2012-2013. »

Cameroon: malnutrition levels above emergency threshold among CAR refugees

Exhausted, hungry and often sick, tens of thousands of people have crossed the border from Central African Republic (CAR) into Cameroon. Young children are hit hardest by malnutrition. To respond to the crisis, WFP is implementing an emergency operation to feed vulnerable families and fight malnutrition, which is proving fatal for people weakened by the cross-border journey.

CAR/Cameroun : des taux de malnutrition au-delà des seuils d’urgence

La malnutrition frappe durement les plus jeunes enfants. Afin de faire face à cette grave crise humani-taire, le PAM a mis en place un programme d’urgence pour nourrir ces familles et combattre la malnutri-tion qui chaque jour tue les plus faibles.

06/25/2014 19:58 GMT

MALABO, 25 juin 2014 (AFP) - Le ministre malien des Affaires étrangères, Abdoulaye Diop, a affirmé mercredi à l'AFP que les négociations pour une sortie de crise avec les groupes armés du nord démarrerait "dès la mi-juillet".

Le chef de la diplomatie malienne a réaffirmé la volonté de son gouvernement d'aller vers la paix, lors d'une entretien à Malabo en marge des travaux préparatoire au sommet de l'Union africaine qui se tient jeudi et vendredi dans la capitale équato-guinéenne.

"Il serait important que nous discutions puisque nous sommes tous des Maliens et nous allons devoir vivre ensemble et dessiner un projet commun", a assuré M. Diop, estimant que Bamako est "prêt" au dialogue.

"Les conditions sont aujourd'hui réunies pour que le gouvernement s'asseye autour d'une table avec ses compatriotes maliens (six groupes armés du Nord) pour envisager une solution politique durable", a-t-il déclaré.

Le Mali a connu une profonde crise de près de deux ans, déclenchée en janvier 2012 par une rébellion touareg et a été marquée par l'occupation de ses régions du Nord par des groupes armés dominés par des jihadistes.

Les jihadistes ont été chassés des grandes villes par une opération militaire internationale déclenchée en janvier 2013 à l'initiative de la France et toujours en cours, mais ils y demeurent actifs, y commettant régulièrement des attaques meurtrière.

De violents combats ont opposé en mai à Kidal (extrême nord-est) les forces maliennes et des groupes armés composés de Touareg et d'Arabes. Un accord de cessez-le-feu a été signé par les différentes partie le 23 mai. La communauté internationale presse au dialogue, estimant que les négociations de paix tardent à se concrétiser.

Ce dialogue doit se dérouler "dès la mi-juillet"à Alger, qui fait office de médiateur dans ce conflit.

"Les lignes rouges qui ont été tracées par le gouvernement du Mali, à savoir le respect de son intégrité territoriale, le respect de sa souveraineté et de l'unicité de l'Etat (...) le fait que ça a été clairement affirmé que nous n'allons pas discuter d'indépendance ou d'autonomie", rendent possible ces discussions, a estimé le ministre.

Les questions abordées seront notamment la sécurisation et le développement économique du Nord Mali, sur la base de l'accord de Ouagadougou de juin 2013 entre le gouvernement malien et les rebelles touareg.

Le ministre a également affirmé la volonté du gouvernement malien d'arriver à un accord "dès que possible", sans pouvoir fixer de calendrier.

cl/mc/sba

© 1994-2014 Agence France-Presse

SC/11453

Security Council
7210th Meeting (PM)

The Security Council today extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2015, within the authorized troop ceiling of 11,200 military and 1,440 police personnel.

Unanimously adopting resolution 2164 (2014), the 15-nation body decided that the Mission should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country.

The Council requested the Mission to expand its presence, including through long-range patrols and within its capacities, in the north of Mali beyond key population centres, notably in areas where civilians were at risk. It should also provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisers and Women’s Protection Advisers, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.

The Mission should also exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict. It should monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali.

The Council urged the signatories to the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014 to respect it fully and immediately implement its provisions, including the liberation of prisoners and the establishment of an international commission of inquiry, and requested the Secretary-General to facilitate the swift establishment of that commission.

The Council expressed its strong support for the key role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali in the peace talks, and requested the envoy to continue his good offices and active engagement towards the launching of an inclusive process open to all communities in the north.

The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council within three months of the adoption of this resolution, focusing on the implementation of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, the expansion of the Force’s presence in the north, and benchmarks to assess progress on the implementation of the priority tasks of the MINUSMA mandate.

Sekou Kasse (Mali), speaking after adoption, said the situation in the north was “extremely worrisome”. Terrorists and armed groups continued to operate in the mountainous regions, posing a serious threat to civilians, compromising efforts by MINUSMA and undermining the humanitarian operation. The Mission’s deployment had been unable to contain that situation.

The proposals made on 18 June by his Foreign Minister included a call for the rapid deployment of MINUSMA outside the major urban areas to the north, around villages and nomad factions, while curtailing the movement of armed groups by isolating and disarming them. The situation was undermining the security operations of the Chadian and Malian armed forces. The Foreign Minister had also requested support by MINUSMA in reconstructing the northern regions.

Moreover, he said, the operation should compel the armed groups to lay down their weapons and return to positions held before 17 May. The Foreign Minister had also sought United Nations support to accelerate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the inter-Malian dialogue. His Government was ready to consider all possible mechanisms to overcome the recent developments. He asked Algeria to continue its intervention to establish a common platform as a basis for inclusive negotiations.

The meeting began at 3:12 p.m. and ended at 3:21 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2164 (2014) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular 2100 (2013) and 2085 (2012), its Presidential Statements of 23 January 2014 (S/PRST/2014/2) and 12 December 2013 (S/PRST/2013/20), and its press statements of 11 June 2014, 20 May 2014 and 23 April 2014,

“Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali,

“Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

“Underscoring the need to address the underlying causes of recurrent crises which have affected Mali, including governance, security, development and humanitarian challenges, drawing lessons from past peace agreements, and that any sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali should be Malian-owned, including all aspects of the political process, in particular national dialogue and reconciliation,

“Welcoming the successful holding of peaceful and transparent presidential elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013 as well as legislative elections on 24 November and 15 December 2013 in Mali, which constitute a major step in the restoration of democratic governance and the full return of constitutional order in Mali, and commending the people and authorities of Mali for the manner in which they were conducted,

“Welcoming the signing on 18 June 2013 of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, which, inter alia, reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and secular nature of the Malian State, provides for an immediate ceasefire and the launching of the cantonment process, establishes a framework for inclusive peace talks with all communities of the North of Mali, but expressing its concern at the failure of the parties to the Agreement to meet the agreed timeline for the launching of these talks,

“Commending the efforts of all regional and international actors, including those who facilitated discussions with the signatory and adherent armed groups of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, to solve the crisis in Mali, and, in this regard, welcoming the efforts of Algeria to contribute to the launching of a credible and inclusive negotiation process, as well as Burkina Faso as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mediator, and urging all these actors to maintain coordination to consolidate political and security progress in Mali, in close coordination with the Special Representative for Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),

“Welcoming the appointment by the Malian President on 23 April 2014 of a High-Representative for the Inter-Malian Inclusive Dialogue and his initial efforts to consult with national and international actors on the peace process,

“Condemning strongly the violent clashes in Kidal on 17 and 18 May 2014 in the context of the Malian Prime Minister’s visit, which resulted in the death of Malian Defence and Security Forces personnel, as well as eight civilians, including six Government officials, the unacceptable seizure by the armed groups, notably the Mouvement national de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), of administrative buildings, including the Governorate of Kidal, the subsequent seizure of towns in the North of Mali, and the reported illegal establishment of parallel administrative structures therein, and of arms and materiels belonging to the Malian Defence and Security Forces, which constitute a breach of the ceasefire arrangements provided for by the Agreement, as well as attacks on personnel of MINUSMA by the armed groups, expressing serious concern about the events that occurred in Kidal and elsewhere in the North of Mali on 21 May 2014 which resulted in additional casualties and in an altered security landscape in the North of Mali, and reiterating its call on all parties to act with restraint and refrain from any further violence that could threaten civilians,

“Welcoming the signing of the cease-fire agreement of 23 May 2014, brokered under the auspices of the African Union (AU) Chair Mauritanian President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, and welcoming the convening of the ECOWAS Summit in Accra on 30 May 2014, taking note of its support for the cease-fire agreement and its call for a political solution, through the launching of inclusive peace talks, as well as its call for the immediate withdrawal of the armed groups from the public buildings and occupied areas, and return to the pre-17 May positions, and further welcoming the signing on 13 June 2014 of the agreement on the modalities for the ceasefire implementation,

“Remaining concerned over the fragile security situation in the North of Mali and the continuing activities in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Eddine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al Mourabitoune, which constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond, and reiterating its strong condemnation of the abuses of human rights and violence against civilians, notably women and children, committed in the North of Mali and in the region by terrorist groups,

“Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat, and reaffirming that terrorism could not and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

“Recalling the listing of MUJAO, the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali, and Al Mourabitoune on the Al-Qaida sanctions list established by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), and reiterating its readiness, under the above-mentioned regime, to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups, including AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and Al Mourabitoune, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

“Welcoming the continued action by the French forces, at the request of the Malian authorities, to deter the terrorist threat in the North of Mali,

“Noting with growing concern the transnational dimension of the terrorist threat in the Sahel region and underlying the need for a coherent regional response to combat this threat,

“Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism, strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, reiterating its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Sahel region, in accordance with applicable international law, recalling its resolution 2133 (2014) and including its call upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from the payment of ransoms or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages and, in this regard, noting the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) “Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists”,

“Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region and over the insecurity which hinders humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorist and criminal networks, and their activities, the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens the peace, security, and stability of States in this region,

“Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali and stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need,

“Condemning strongly all abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, and calling upon all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law,

“Reiterating, in this regard, that all perpetrators of such acts must be held accountable and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute and taking note that, acting upon the referral of the transitional authorities of Mali dated 13 July 2012, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened, on 16 January 2013, an investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012, and recalling the importance of assistance and cooperation, by all parties concerned, with the Court,

“Emphasizing that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, underscoring the importance of Malian civilian control and oversight of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, reiterating that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces are vital to ensure Mali’s long-term security and stability and to protect the people of Mali, and stressing the importance of the Malian Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security throughout the Malian territory,

“Recognizing that the threat to the civilian population in the North of Mali extends beyond the key population centres to include rural areas,

“Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and for MINUSMA and expressing its concern at the slow pace of deployment of MINUSMA,

“Commending the role and contribution of the AU, ECOWAS and of neighbouring countries to the stabilisation of Mali, including to contribute to the efforts of MINUSMA towards a political settlement,

“Commending the role of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in Mali to provide training and advice for the Malian Defence and Security Forces towards contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect for human rights, and welcoming the decision of the European Union (EU) to establish the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) to provide strategic advice and training for the Police, Gendarmerie and Garde nationale in Mali,

“Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve the crisis in Mali through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs, encompassing security, governance reform, development and humanitarian issues, commending the contributions already made toward the 2014 Consolidated Appeal for Mali, and urging all Member States and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

“Determining that the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Framework for long-term peace and stability in Mali

“1. Urges the Malian authorities and the signatory and adherent armed groups to fulfil their commitments under the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, and in this regard, further urges the parties in Mali to engage in good faith and without delay in a credible and inclusive negotiation process, respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, and underscores that this Agreement constitutes a solid basis for long-term peace and stability in Mali;

“2. Urges the signatories to the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014 to respect it fully, to immediately implement its provisions, including the liberation of prisoners and the establishment of an international commission of inquiry, and to take steps that support national reconciliation, and requests the Secretary-General to facilitate the swift establishment of the commission, in consultation with the parties;

“3. Urges in particular the Malian authorities to launch without delay an inclusive and credible negotiation process with the signatory and adherent armed groups of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, and those armed groups in the North of Mali that have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and committed unconditionally to the Agreement;

“4. Reiterates its demand that all armed groups in Mali put aside their arms, cease hostilities immediately, as well as reject the recourse to violence and urges all such groups that have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, to engage in an inclusive dialogue open to all communities of the North of Mali;

“5. Urges all armed groups in Mali to resume the cantonment process, supported and monitored by MINUSMA, as a crucial and practical step leading to an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement;

“6. Expresses its strong support for the key role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali in the peace talks, and requests the Special Representative to continue his good offices and active engagement, including in coordinating with and supporting the Malian authorities, towards the launching of an inclusive process open to all communities of the North of Mali, consistent with paragraph 13 (b) (i) and (ii);

“7. Urges further the parties in this negotiation process to coordinate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, with the goal of securing a durable political resolution to the crisis and long-term peace and stability throughout the country, respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State;

“8. Urges the Malian authorities to further combat impunity and, in this regard, to ensure that all perpetrators of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law are held accountable, and to continue to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, in accordance with Mali’s obligations under the Rome Statute;

“9. Welcomes the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission on 20 March 2014, and calls on the Malian authorities to take the necessary steps to ensure the neutrality, impartiality, transparency and independence of the Commission and to enable it to commence its work to benefit all Malians as soon as possible;

“10. Stresses the importance of continued coordination among the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the neighbouring countries of Mali and other key actors in the promotion of lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Mali and calls upon these actors to coordinate their efforts in this regard with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and MINUSMA;

MINUSMA mandate

“11. Decides to extend the mandate of MINUSMA within the authorized troop ceiling of 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country, and 1,440 police personnel until 30 June 2015;

“12. Authorizes MINUSMA to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

“13. Decides that the mandate of MINUSMA shall focus on the following priority tasks;

(a) Security, Stabilization and protection of civilians

(i) In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres, notably in the North of Mali, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas;

(ii) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Malian authorities, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

(iii)To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(iv) To expand its presence, including through long-range patrols and within its capacities, in the North of Mali beyond key population centres, notably in areas where civilians are at risk;

(v) To support the implementation of the ceasefire and confidence-building measures on the ground, consistent with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement;

(vi) To enhance its operational coordination with the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF), within its resources and areas of deployment and within the framework of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, subject to an assessment of risk and in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces (S/2013/110);

(b) Support to national political dialogue and reconciliation

(i) To coordinate with and support the Malian authorities to launch an inclusive and credible negotiation process open to all communities of the North of Mali, consistent with paragraphs 6 and 7 above;

(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the participation of civil society, including women’s organizations;

(iii)To support the cantonment of armed groups, as an essential step leading to an effective DDR process, in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement;

(iv) To assist the Malian authorities, and to coordinate international efforts, towards developing and implementing DDR programmes of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, consistent with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children;

(v) To support, within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent local elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements, in the context of an inclusive decentralization process led and owned by the Malian authorities;

(vi) To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the Malian authorities, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for serious abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, in particular war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court;

(vii)To provide support to the activities of the international commission of inquiry as envisaged by the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014;

(c) Support to the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, the rebuilding of the Malian security sector, the promotion and protection of human rights and the support for humanitarian assistance

(i) To support the Malian authorities to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country, especially in the North of Mali, in line with the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014;

(ii)To support national, and to coordinate international, efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close collaboration with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations, including the EU, engaged in these fields, including through enhancing information sharing and joint strategic planning among all actors;

(iii)To assist the Malian authorities, through training and other support, for the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management;

(iv) To assist the Malian authorities in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;

(v) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council and publicly, as appropriate, on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;

(vi) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;

(vii)In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;

(viii) In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects aimed at stabilizing the North of Mali, including quick impact projects;

“14. Further decides that the mandate of MINUSMA shall include the following additional tasks:

(a) Protection of United Nations personnel

To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(b) Support for cultural preservation

To assist the Malian authorities, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO;

“15. Requests MINUSMA to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phase, including the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in the national political dialogue, reconciliation and electoral processes;

“16. Requests MINUSMA to take fully into account the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 13 and 14 above, where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces (S/2013/110);

“17. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of MINUSMA with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;

“18. Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014);

“19. Requests the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, encourages MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites;

“20. Encourages MINUSMA to further enhance its interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities;

Deployment of MINUSMA

“21. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to enable MINUSMA to reach its full operational capacity as soon as possible in the context of a new Force laydown and, in this regard, calls upon Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment, including enablers, in order for MINUSMA to fulfil its mandate and commends troop and police contributing countries for their engagement in this respect;

“22. Urges all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of MINUSMA, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali to enable MINUSMA to carry out fully its mandate and stresses, in this regard, the importance of facilitating MINUSMA’s new Force laydown to extend its operations in the North of Mali, as mandated in paragraph 13 (a) (iv) above, in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats;

“23. Calls upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA;

“24. Requests the Secretary-General to accelerate the disbursement of the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012) in support of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), including to enable MINUSMA’s new Force laydown, in consultation with the donors;

Inter-mission cooperation in West Africa

“25. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in order to ensure inter-mission cooperation, notably between MINUSMA, UNMIL and UNOCI, appropriate transfers of troops and their assets from other United Nations missions to MINUSMA, subject to the following conditions: (i) the Council’s information and approval, including on the scope and duration of the transfer, (ii) the agreement of the troop-contributing countries and (iii) the security situation where these United Nations missions are deployed and without prejudice to the performance of their mandates, and, in this regard, encourages further steps to enhance inter-mission cooperation in the West African region, as necessary and feasible, and to report thereon for consideration as appropriate;

French forces mandate

“26. Authorizes French forces, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 33 below;

European Union contribution

“27. Calls upon the EU, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali missions, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral partners of Mali engaged to assist the Malian authorities in the Security Sector Reform (SSR);

Obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law

“28. Urges all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, facilities and relief consignments, and take all required steps to allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need, while respecting the United Nations humanitarian guiding principles and applicable international law;

“29. Reiterates that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

International cooperation on the Sahel

“30. Urges all Member States, notably Sahel and Maghreb States, to coordinate their efforts to prevent the serious threat posed to international and regional security by terrorist groups crossing borders and seeking safe havens in the Sahel region, to enhance cooperation and coordination in order to develop inclusive and effective strategies to combat in a comprehensive and integrated manner the activities of terrorist groups, notably AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and Al Mourabitoune, and to prevent the expansion of those groups as well as to limit the proliferation of all arms and transnational organized crime;

“31. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to ensure early progress towards the effective implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, encompassing political, security, development and humanitarian aspects and welcomes in this regard the establishment of a Ministerial Coordination Platform that would meet biannually and under the chairmanship of Mali for 2013‑2015, and takes note of the conclusions from its first and second meetings held in Bamako on 5 November 2013 and 16 May 2014;

Small arms and light weapons

“32. Calls upon the Malian authorities, with the assistance of MINUSMA, consistent with paragraph 13 above, and international partners, to address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons and further stresses the importance of the full implementation of its resolutions 2017 (2011) and 2117 (2013);

Reports by the Secretary-General

“33. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months of the adoption of this resolution, focusing on the implementation of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, the expansion of the Force’s presence in the North of Mali, and benchmarks to assess progress on the implementation of the priority tasks of MINUSMA’s mandate, as defined by paragraph 13 above, and then, every three months, to report on the implementation of this resolution, in particular on the progress achieved on the benchmarks;

“34. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

For information media • not an official record

Activities reflect African priorities, including youth employment and nutrition

25 June 2014, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea– The FAO-managed Africa Solidarity Trust Fund today gave a green light to four new, continent-spanning projects at a ceremony during the African Union Summit, being held here this week.

The President of Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, a key supporter of the fund, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, and FAO Director-General José Graziano da Silva were in attendance.

The projects, worth $16 million, will span 24 different countries in West, Central, East, and Southern Africa, focusing on youth employment and malnutrition, transboundary animal diseases and food safety and urban food security.

"In Africa we see the growing commitment of countries not only to improving their own food security, but that of their neighbours as well," said FAO Director-General José Graziano da Silva. "The Africa Solidarity Trust Fund is a concrete manifestation of Africa's willingness to work together to guarantee the food security of the entire continent," he added.

"I commend the African Union and heads of state who are using the opportunity of the 2014 Year of Agriculture and Food Security in Africa to adopt the resolution of ending hunger by 2025," said Ban Ki-moon.

“By Africans for Africans” initiative expands

The four new subregional projects formalized today will cover the following areas of work:

Enhancing urban food security in Central Africa by increasing the availability of locally produced food for people living in towns and cities. Recipient countries: Cameroon, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.

Promoting greater diversity in agricultural production and activities to improve nutrition and to offer better job prospects to young people in Eastern Africa. Recipient countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.

Strengthening controls on food safety, plant and animal pests and diseases to boost agricultural productivity and trade in Southern Africa. Recipient countries: Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Creating more and better jobs for young people in West Africa through sustainable aquaculture and Cassava activities. Recipient countries: Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Senegal.

About the fund

The Africa Solidarity Trust Fund was launched in 2013 as a unique Africa-led initiative to improve agriculture and food security across the continent. It includes contributions from Equatorial Guinea ($30 million), Angola ($10 million) and a symbolic contribution by civil society organizations in the Republic of the Congo.

Since its inception, the Fund has already provided financing for projects in six countries – Mali, the Niger, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Malawi– including building resilience for conflict affected rural communities, reducing rural poverty through youth employment opportunities and building best practices to increase crop and livestock production.

Next allocation planned will cover a continental intervention to support African rural youth future through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and a facility for South-South Cooperation from Africa to Africa, to allow a better sharing of knowledge and development solutions within the continent.

Administered by FAO in partnership with key collaborators, the fund aims to pool resources from Africa’s strongest economies and use them across the continent to implement initiatives in the framework of the African Union's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to boost agricultural productivity and food security in the region.

It is governed by a steering committee currently consisting of Equatorial Guinea, Angola, the Chair of the Africa Group, the Chair of the FAO Regional Conference for Africa, the African Union and the FAO secretariat.

The Central Emergency response Fund (CERF) had another record year in 2013, as donors contributed US$477 million to support emergency response efforts in 45 countries.

Whether in high-profile natural disasters or forgotten emergencies, the humanitarian community once again relied on rapid and strategic CERF funding to kick-start the response and to keep life-saving programmes running.

CERF enabled UN agencies and NGOs to respond quickly to humanitarian crises including the highest-level emergencies in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Syria. CERF was also used to boost the humanitarian response in crises that were underfunded, allocating an unprecedented $175 million to address humanitarian needs in countries including Algeria, Bangladesh and Colombia.

The strategic management of CERF continued to improve, as the CERF secretariat implemented all the recommendations contained in the management Response Plan from its five-year evaluation and further refined its Performance and accountability Framework.

I am profoundly grateful to the donors—including 68 member states, corporations, regional governments and many private individuals—who demonstrated their faith in CERF’s effectiveness and gave generously. as humanitarian needs continue to grow, with conflicts and natural disasters becoming more numerous and intense, funding needs will be substantial in 2014.

I appeal to UN member states, the private sector and individuals to support CERF generously again, so that it can continue to ensure that life-saving assistance reaches people in need, quickly and equitably.

Valerie Amos

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

June 2014

Chaque année, la période de soudure*, qui dure au Sénégal de juin à septembre, est très difficile pour les familles les plus démunies. Le gouvernement sénégalais et le PAM joignent leur effort pour assurer une nourriture suffisante à 675.000 personnes.

Les récoltes de céréales ont été un peu décevantes cette année. La production a chuté de 16% par rapport à l’an dernier et de 20% par rapport à la moyenne des cinq dernières années. Et cette année, la période de soudure* a débuté très tôt.

Le gouvernement a mis en place, à travers le Conseil national à la sécurité alimentaire (CNSA), et en partenariat avec le Programme alimentaire mondial un programme d’assistance aux personnes les plus vulnérables.

Cette année, le lancement de cette opération a été organisé à Oussouye, une commune de la Casamance au sud-est du pays. Ici, 1700 familles vont bénéficier d’un soutien pour passer dans de meilleures conditions cette période difficile.

Les bons d’achat alimentaires : une protection sociale Aida Sambou 46 ans, mariée et mère de 8 enfants, n’arrive déjà plus à nourrir correctement ses enfants sans s’endetter au-delà du raisonnable. Son mari, handicapé, ne peut guère l’aider. "Je n’ai qu’un potager familial pour assurer un revenu, lorsque je n’ai pas de produits à vendre au marché, c’est le boutiquier du quartier qui me fournit à crédit ce dont j’ai besoin pour nourrir ma famille. A ce jour je dois 10 000 F CFA et je n’ose même plus retourner à la boutique", explique-t-elle.

Aida recevra 45.000 FCFA. "Je vais pouvoir rassurer le boutiquier. A partir d’aujourd’hui je vais pouvoir nourrir mes enfants, leur préparer du riz comme ils aiment, mais aussi faire des économies pour rembourser mes dettes", ajoute-t-elle.

A partir de juin, chaque ménage recevra un bon alimentaire d’une valeur allant de 5.000F CFA à 45.000 FCFA en fonction de la taille du ménage (jusqu’à 9 personnes) et ceci pendant les quatre mois de soudure.

Ce programme couvrira 43 des 45 départements du pays, soit 675 000 personnes. "Le PAM va accompagner le gouvernement du Sénégal pour répondre aux besoins urgents des populations grâce au soutien des bailleurs de fonds comme ECHO, USAID, le Canada et le Sultanat d’Oman", a indiqué Ingeborg Breuer, directrice du PAM-Sénégal.

Cette assistance se fera sous plusieurs formes, des distributions de vivres, des transferts monétaires, notamment par téléphones mobiles et des bons d’achats alimentaires. Parmi les bénéficiaires de cette campagne, 133 000 enfants et femmes enceintes et allaitantes, vivant dans des zones où les taux de malnutrition, qui recevront des produits nutritionnels adaptés.

*Période de soudure : période où les récoltes précédentes sont épuisées et les nouvelles pas encore fauchées.

HIGHLIGHTS

• 200 participants attend world’s first WHS regional consultation in Abidjan

• Affected communities from 11 countries speak their mind on humanitarian action

• 15.5 million affected and 647,000 displaced in Northeast Nigeria

• Up to 30 per cent of CAR refugee children in Cameroon acutely malnourished

• Revised CAR regional crisis appeal calls for $858 million

• Following clashes, more than 18,000 people flee Mali’s Kidal region

KEY FIGURES FOR THE SAHEL

Food insecure people: 20.2 Million

Nb. of children <5 estimated SAM: 1.5 Million

Nb. of children <5 and estimated MAM: 3.5 Million

FUNDING OF THE SAHEL STRATEGY

2014: USD$2.2 billion requested

USD$ 519 million received (in SRP)

USD$ 197 million received (outside SRP)

Mouvements des populations

De façon générale, le nombre de personnes déplacées internes et de réfugiés Maliens dans les pays voisins diminue avec le retour continu des populations au nord

Mensajes clave

Irregularidades de lluvia registradas en el inicio de la primera temporada de lluvias, han generado daños (resiembras, estrés y marchitez) en las siembras realizadas en abril y mayo, particularmente en algunas zonas de producción en la región sur de Honduras; paralelamente se registra retraso de las siembras de primera, en gran parte de las zonas de producción de Honduras y Nicaragua; de acuerdo al comportamiento de las lluvias en algunas de esas zonas, ya no se podrá realizar la siembra de maíz. En la región, los precios del frijol rojo continúan con tendencia al alza, se espera que mantendrán al alza hasta la salida de las cosechas de primera, estos podrían incrementar aún más por pérdidas de primera y postrera a partir de septiembre.

Las predicciones del modelo de ENSO (International Research Institute), de mediados de junio indican una probabilidad de 65 por ciento, que el fenómeno del Niño se establezca en el periodo julio a septiembre, esto provocará periodos prolongados con falta de lluvia, lo cual acentuará los daños en las siembras de Primera y Postrera de granos básicos, café, y ganadería.

En El Salvador, la falta de empleo en el corte del café y la falta de alimentos, provocan que, los jornaleros y pequeños productores de las cordilleras cafetaleras de El Salvador se clasifiquen de julio a septiembre en seguridad alimentaria en Estrés (Fase 2, CIF) y a partir de la disponibilidad de las cosechas de siembras de primera y postrera, se clasifiquen en Mínima Seguridad Alimentaria (Fase 1, CIF).

En Honduras, la reducción de ingresos y la falta de reservas alimentarias, determinan que los jornaleros y pequeños cafetaleros de la Zona Occidental y Sur se clasifiquen en Seguridad Alimentaria en Estrés (Fase 2, CIF) de julio a septiembre.

En Nicaragua de julio a septiembre la inseguridad alimentaria será Mínima (Fase 1, CIF), por la disponibilidad de reservas de granos y acceso a fuentes alternas de ingresos, sin embargó, de registrarse pérdidas en las siembras de primera y postrera por efectos del fenómeno de El Niño, los hogares más pobres de pequeños agricultores y migrantes temporales, se clasificaran en Seguridad Alimentaria en Estrés (Fase 2, CIF).

The main staple foods produced and consumed throughout most of Central America and the Caribbean are maize, rice, and beans; the latter constituting a key source of protein for poor households. In Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua white maize, mostly consumed in the form of tortillas, and red or black beans are preferred, while in Costa Rica and Panama rice dominates in production and consumption. In Haiti, the primary staples are rice, black beans, and maize.

In Central America, there are typically two main growing seasons: the Primera (April-September) during which maize is primarily produced, and the Postrera (August-December) during which bean production dominates. The Apante season (November-March) is a third growing season during which beans are produced in south-central Nicaragua, northern Guatemala, and northern Honduras. In Haiti, there are several growing seasons. Maize is produced during the Primavera season (April-September). Black beans are produced over two seasons in Haiti’s humid and mountainous areas. The first season spans from March to May and the second from July to October. Beans are also produced in the country’s irrigated and humid mountainous areas during a third, fall season from December to January.

White maize and beans are commonly traded between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Central America. The market in San Salvador in El Salvador is considered the most important regional market for these staple foods and is well integrated with the rest of the region; due to the high levels of commercial exchange it hosts both with regional and international markets. Other important trade hubs include Guatemala City (Guatemala), San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa (Honduras), Chontales and Managua (Nicaragua), San Jose (Costa Rica) and Panama City (Panama). The Dominican Republic is Haiti’s main source for imported maize, beans, and tubers. Haiti relies heavily on the United States for rice imports, for about 80 percent of consumption needs.

Sorghum, millet, white maize, and local and imported rice are the most important food commodities. Millet is most heavily consumed in the eastern and northern regions of the country. Local rice is another basic food commodity, especially for poorer households. Imported rice and white maize are most commonly consumed in and around the capital. The Marché d'Atrone in N’Djamena, the capital city, is the largest market for cereals. Moundou is an important consumer center for sorghum and the second largest market after the capital. The Abéché market is located in a northern production area. The Sarh market is both a local retail market and a cross-border market.