Ce rapport a été produit par OCHA en collaboration avec les partenaires humanitaires et concerne les vagues de déplacements internes depuis le 21 juillet 2015. Il est publié par OCHA Tchad et couvre la période du 1er au 31 octobre 2016. Le prochain rapport sera publié vers le 6 décembre 2016.

Faits saillants

La situation sécuritaire est calme, mais marquée par quelques incidents sécuritaires dans les zones frontalières.

 Le nombre de personnes en situation de reddition est en augmentation, plus de 1 000 personnes seraient arrivées.

 Les dynamiques de déplacements secondaires continuent. A ce jour, il y a 117 873 déplacés dans la région du Lac, et 6 994 réfugiés. Les déplacements affectent également la région du Kanem.

 Les résultats de l’enquête SMART 2016 rapportent 12,2% de malnutrition aigüe globale et 2,1% de malnutrition aigüe sévère dans la région du Lac. La malnutrition chronique est de 36%, le taux régional le plus élevé du pays.

 On observe une amélioration de l’accès à l’eau et à l’assainissement : le taux d’accès à l’eau est passé de 23 à 41% dans les sites et villages d’accueil entre août et septembre, et le taux d’accès à l’assainissement de 10 à 20%.

 La grève des enseignants du fait du non-paiement des salaires et de la suppression des primes paralyse la rentrée scolaire, qui a seulement été effective dans trois écoles privées et au camp de réfugiés de Dar-es-Salam.

 Seuls 43% des financements requis pour la réponse humanitaire dans la région du Lac en 2016 ont été reçus à fin octobre.

95 063 déplacés enregistrés depuis mai 2015 Dont :

• 82 260 déplacés internes - 12 481 retournés Tchadiens - 322 ressortissants des pays tiers

22 810 déplacés estimés pas encore enregistrés.

6 994 réfugiés dont 5 424 dans le camp de Dar-es-Salam depuis janvier 2015.

Aperçu de la situation

La situation reste marquée par des incidents sécuritaires dans les zones frontalières de la région du Lac, notamment un vol de bétail dans la sous-préfecture de Kaiga-Kinjiria le 15 octobre et une attaque le 23 octobre à Kolerom, à 12km au nord-ouest de Tchoukoutalia, qui aurait entrainé le décès de deux civils et une intervention militaire.

Plus de 1 000 personnes se trouvent actuellement en situation de reddition dans la région du Lac (statut à déterminer par les autorités compétentes), y compris au moins 235 enfants. Ces personnes sont détenues par les autorités administratives et militaires à Baga-Sola. Une mission conjointe du « Mécanisme de surveillance et de communication de l’information » sur la résolution 1612 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (MRM - Monitoring Reporting Mechanism) composée du Fonds des Nations Unies pour l’Enfance (UNICEF), du Haut-Commissariat pour les Réfugiés (UNHCR), d’OCHA, des ministères de l’Action Sociale, de la Justice, des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense Nationale, a eu lieu du 24 au 26 octobre à Bol et Baga-Sola pour assurer le plaidoyer auprès des autorités civiles et militaire pour le respect du Protocole d’accord entre le Tchad et les Nations Unies relatif au transfert des enfants associés aux forces et groupes armés signé en 2014. Un Centre de Transit et d’Orientation (CTO) est en place à Bol depuis juin 2016 pour l’appui aux enfants séparés et non-accompagnés.

Des incendies ont affecté deux villages dans la sous-préfecture de Ngouboua. Les 17 et 18 octobre, des incendies dont l’origine reste inconnue ont eu lieu à Kaiga-Ngouboua et Ngoubouacentre. L’ONG Help-Tchad aurait identifié 170 ménages affectés à Ngouboua-Centre parmi lesquels quatre ménages réfugiés selon la Commission Nationale d’Accueil et de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et Rapatriés (CNARR). Selon le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) et la Croix-Rouge Tchadienne (CRT), il y aurait 219 ménages affectés à Kaiga-Ngouboua, dont 33 ménages réfugiés et 11 ménages de déplacés. Par ailleurs, environ 17 000 sacs de céréales (dont 10 000 à KaigaNgouboua et 7 000 à Ngouboua) et d’autres biens auraient été détruits. Les besoins urgents concernent les abris et articles ménagers essentiels, ainsi que l’assistance alimentaire, médicale et psychosociale. Plusieurs partenaires se sont déjà positionnés pour fournir une réponse d’urgence. A Kaiga-Ngouboua, les difficultés d’accès à la zone, notamment liées au contexte sécuritaire fragile et à la montée des eaux, constituent un obstacle important à la réponse sur cette localité.

Les mouvements de population s’étendent au-delà de la région du Lac. Suite à une alerte des autorités locales, une mission conjointe composée du Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM), de l’UNICEF, d’OCHA, des ONG Action Contre la Faim (ACF), SECADEV, ARNUT, et des services étatiques s’est rendue du 25 au 26 octobre à Foyo, village situé à 60 km au nord- est de Rig Rig, dans la région du Kanem. La mission confirme l’arrivée depuis septembre de 70 ménages d’éleveurs nomades soit environ 222 personnes (chiffre à confirmer car les populations locales se seraient intégrées aux déplacés) comprenant en majorité des femmes et des enfants (69% de femmes et d’enfants), en provenance de localités situées entre le Lac Tchad et le Niger. Leur déplacement ferait suite à des attaques par des groupes armés. Les populations sont prises en charge et soutenues par les populations hôtes, mais font face à des conditions de vie précaires et ont des besoins urgents en assistance alimentaire, abris et en prise en charge de la malnutrition (renforcement des capacités au centre de santé de Foyo).

La coordination civilo-militaire se met en place à Baga-Sola. En effet, le contexte dans la région du Lac rend nécessaire le maintien d’une distinction claire entre humanitaires et militaires, afin de protéger l’accès et les principes humanitaires, et garantir la sécurité des travailleurs humanitaires. La coordination civilo-militaire vise à créer un espace officiel et régulier de dialogue entre les forces présentes dans la région (Armée Nationale Tchadienne, Force Multinationale Mixte, forces de sécurité nationales) et les partenaires humanitaires, dans le but de maintenir la liaison avec les militaires, promouvoir les principes humanitaires et discuter des questions d’accès et de la protection des civils.

L’assistance humanitaire augmente grâce à l’arrivée de nouveaux partenaires pour répondre aux besoins des populations dans la région du Lac. Les ONG Islamic Relief Worldwide et World Vision envisagent des interventions multisectorielles (sécurité alimentaire, eau hygiène et assainissement, protection, articles ménagers essentiels), tandis que l’ONG INTERSOS se positionne pour une intervention en santé/nutrition dans une trentaine de sites sur l’axe Liwa-Daboua, et l’ONG LWF (Lutheran World Federation) vise à mettre en œuvre des projets en moyens d’existence / environnement / énergie. L’Association des Femmes Juristes du Tchad (ASFJT) vient de s’installer à Baga Sola et Bol afin d’apporter une réponse aux Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG).

L’association, financée par UNFPA, s’occupera de sensibilisations, formations, et de la prise en charge psychosociale et juridique des survivants/tes.

Cameroon’s military campaign against the Boko Haram insurgency started late but has met with partial success. To consolidate gains and bring lasting peace to the Far North, the government must now shift to long-term socioeconomic development, countering religious radicalism and reinforcing public services.

Executive Summary

For the last two-and-a-half years, Cameroon has confronted the insurgents of the Nigeria-born group Boko Haram. The conflict has already caused 1,500 deaths, and led to 155,000 displaced persons and 73,000 refugees. Although the first attacks occurred in March 2014, the jihadist group’s presence in Cameroon’s Far North region dates back to at least 2011. It has benefited from a network of local collaborators and has exploited vulnerabilities that the region shares with north-eastern Nigeria. While the first eighteen months of conflict were characterised by conventional warfare, the group has now switched to an asymmetric mode of attack. The Cameroonian government’s focus on a military response has been partly successful, but the structural problems that allowed this threat to arise have not been addressed. The fight against Boko Haram requires adapting and improving security structures, and long-term crisis resolution policies that will prevent a revival of this threat in a different form, and stop insecurity in the region reigniting.

The Far North is the poorest of Cameroon’s regions and has the lowest school enrolment rate. A combination of weak national integration and historic neglect by the state have for many years contributed to violence and the presence of smugglers in the region, with a proliferation of highway robbers, traffickers and petty criminals. It was vulnerable to this jihadist insurrection due to geographical and cultural overlap with north-eastern Nigeria, the presence of an intolerant version of Islam and the repercussions of the Chadian civil wars.

Boko Haram has exploited these vulnerabilities to make the Far North a logistics base, a safe haven and a source of recruitment. The group has particularly gathered support among disaffected youth in districts adjacent to Nigeria through the use of ideological indoctrination, socio-economic incentives and coercion. Cameroonian security forces, starting in 2013, dismantled hidden weapon stockpiles and arrested Boko Haram leaders, pushing the group to threaten and eventually attack Cameroon directly. In the last two-and-a-half years, the Far North region has experienced at least 460 attacks and about 50 suicide bombings.

Cameroon’s government was slow to react against the Boko Haram menace, due to historic tensions with Nigeria, an aversion to intervening in what it perceived as its neighbour’s internal problem, and a fear of becoming a target. Despite these early lapses, the government was later able to put in place an effective military response. This response disrupted the group and guided the reaction of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the sub-regional task force with which Cameroon was reluctant to associate at first. Nonetheless, the weak point of the Cameroonian response remains the lack of commitment to development initiatives and the absence of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programs. Indeed, some measures adopted after the Maroua attacks in July 2015, such as the ban on full-face veils, the closing of the border, restrictions on motorcycle-taxis, and abuses by the military could radicalise a portion of the population, including women, and have already accentuated socio-economic vulnerabilities for many young people, leading some to join Boko Haram.

Despite the geographical distance, the war against Boko Haram has not only impacted the Far North. The conflict has reinforced President Paul Biya’s leadership and boosted the legitimacy of the nation’s defence forces with parts of the population. The war has nonetheless had a negative effect on the country’s economy and has created ethnic and social cleavages, as seen in the stigmatisation of the Kanuri people in the Far North, often indiscriminately associated with the jihadist group. More generally, the conflict highlights a deficit of representation; the gerontocratic political elite is increasingly challenged by a very young population, although without fundamentally threatening the legitimacy of the state.

The fight against Boko Haram is a test for security cooperation and sub-regional solidarity. The intervention by Chadian armed forces both in Cameroon, and, alongside forces from Niger, in Nigeria has reduced the group’s conventional military capacities. Despite some mistrust, the countries in the region have been able to establish the MNJTF and Nigeria finally accepted that Cameroon may intervene on its territory. This new multilateral force has slowed down the frequency of suicide attacks in Cameroon and is currently engaged against a dissident faction of the group in the Lake Chad Basin. However, the MNJTF lacks funding and logistical resources.

In order to consolidate military gains against Boko Haram and bring back lasting peace in the Far North, Cameroon’s government must shift from a security-based approach to focus on socio-economic development and countering religious radicalism. Due to heavy losses during confrontations with the Cameroonian army, Boko Haram has concentrated most of its efforts for the last three months in the Cameroonian areas of the Lake Chad Basin (Darak and Hile Alifa), where it controls part of the fishing economy and illicit trafficking and continues to stage suicide attacks. This shift in Boko Haram’s centre of gravity calls for a reinforcement of the security package around Lake Chad, as well as measures to counter the group’s financing in that area. A long-term solution should see the return of the state, which would build on the role of civil society and the youth, as well as local elites and external partners to rebuild public services in a long-neglected region.

Recommendations

To encourage development in the Far North, combat religious radicalism and reinforce state presence and public services

To the government of Cameroon:

Elaborate a development and economic relaunch program in the Far North by, as a priority: Improving assistance to internally displaced persons and victims of Boko Haram, as well as education opportunities and health infrastructure; Reopening the Cameroon-Nigeria border for heavy goods vehicles and traders, with security provided by military escorts, restoring and developing the road network and launching high labour-intensity construction projects; and Ensuring transparency and good governance of projects initiated in the Far North, in partnership with local populations, including youth and representatives of different ethnic communities.

To finance this program, allocate to the region a share of the budget of the triennial emergency plan and of the public investment budget proportionate to its demographic weight (one sixth of the national population), and coordinate with countries of the Lake Chad Basin to ask for support from donors.

Create a program of awareness raising against religious radicalism, and a program of de-radicalisation in prisons.

Encourage the security services and judiciary to distinguish among members of Boko Haram taking account of the seriousness of their crimes and their level of involvement in Boko Haram, understanding that categories can overlap; ensure that suspects and detainees are treated fairly and in accordance with international law; and support the creation of a “restorative justice” program, including a social reintegration component, for forced recruits, and informants and low-level logisticians, not suspected of serious human rights abuses.

Arrange an official visit of the president, leaders of the opposition and civil society, to the departments of the Far North targeted by Boko Haram, and organise the next 20 May national parade in Maroua. This visit will be an opportunity to launch a social cohesion and intercommunal reinforcement program to counter the stigmatisation of communities perceived as being Boko Haram sympathisers. To civil society, elected and traditional chiefs of the Far North:

Adopt a collective and inclusive approach to raising awareness on religious radicalism, including by taking into account cultural, gender and social particularities, and emphasising the need for dialogue tolerance and openness within families and communities and in public spaces such as quranic schools, mosques, markets and prisons. To countries of the sub-region:

Elaborate a medium-term development strategy for the Lake Chad Basin, coordinated with the Cameroonian development plan for the Far North and ask for support from donors for financing such plans. To Cameroon’s donors:

Encourage the government’s development projects in the Far North and coordinated initiatives in the sub-region for the development of the Lake Chad Basin by guaranteeing 50 per cent financing, assuming suitable guarantees of the proper use of funds. To improve the security response to the Boko Haram threat

To the government of Cameroon:

Cut off Boko Haram funding sources while closely monitoring the livestock market in the Far North and economic activity in the Lake Chad region.

Block Boko Haram recruitment: By improving cooperation between the Cameroonian armed forces and the local population. This can be achieved through civil-military operations and eradicating human rights violations perpetrated by security forces, notably by consistently sanctioning wrongdoers; By lifting, on a case by case basis, restrictions which currently affect economic activity such as that on motorcycles; and By putting in place a more efficient communication strategy through drawing on and supporting community-based radio stations, through the creation of awareness-raising shows on national channels, aired in local languages in the Far North, and through countering the promotion of violent radicalism on social networks.

Adapt security structures to respond to recent changes within Boko Haram, and improve the strategy against suicide attacks, via collaboration with local population and reinforced forward-looking intelligence.

Ensure better coordination between the three military operations in the Far North, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force, and reinforce cooperation with Nigeria and the other countries in the Lake Chad Basin.

Limit the usage of vigilante groups, and progressively demobilise them if Boko Haram continues to weaken.

Plan for the progressive return of better-equipped police and gendarmerie units along Cameroonian borders if Boko Haram continues to weaken. To Cameroon’s donors:

Co-finance the preparing of the Multinational Joint Task Force for operations, adding an important component of training about human rights in wartime, while possibly making funding conditional on respect for human rights by armies of the region.

Synthèse

Depuis deux ans et demi, le Cameroun est confronté à l’insurrection du groupe Boko Haram, né au Nigéria. Les violences ont déjà fait 1 500 morts, 155 000 déplacés internes et 73 000 réfugiés. Si les premières attaques datent de mars 2014, la pré-sence du groupe jihadiste dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun remonte au moins à 2011. Il s’est appuyé sur un réseau de complicités locales et a exploité les facteurs de vulnérabilité que partage la région avec le Nord-Est du Nigéria. Alors que les dixhuit premiers mois du conflit ont été marqués par des affrontements conventionnels,
Boko Haram a ensuite adopté un mode opératoire asymétrique. Le gouvernement s’est focalisé sur la réponse militaire avec un certain succès, mais les causes structurelles qui ont facilité son implantation demeurent. La lutte contre Boko Haram requiert de réadapter le dispositif sécuritaire et de mettre en place des politiques de sortie de crise durables pour éviter que la menace ne resurgisse sous d’autres formes et n’alimente l’insécurité dans la zone.
L’Extrême-Nord est à la fois la région la plus pauvre du Cameroun et celle où le taux de scolarisation est le plus bas. La combinaison d’une faible intégration nationale et de la négligence historique de l’Etat ont depuis longtemps exposé aux violences et à la circulation des contrebandiers cet espace où se sont socialisés les coupeurs de route, les trafiquants et les petits délinquants. La fluidité géographique et culturelle entre cette région et le Nord-Est du Nigéria, la présence d’un islam rigoriste et les contrecoups des guerres civiles tchadiennes la prédisposaient à une contagion de cette insurrection jihadiste.
Boko Haram a su exploiter ces vulnérabilités pour faire de l’Extrême-Nord une base logistique, une zone de repli et un vivier de recrutements. Le groupe a principalement mobilisé dans les départements frontaliers, parmi les jeunes défavorisés, en alliant endoctrinement idéologique, incitations socioéconomiques et coercition.
Le démantèlement de ses caches d’armes et l’arrestation de ses cadres par les forces de sécurité camerounaises à partir de 2013 l’ont poussé à menacer, puis finalement à attaquer de front le Cameroun. En deux ans et demi, l’Extrême-Nord a enregistré au moins 460 attaques et une cinquantaine d’attentats-suicides.
Le gouvernement camerounais a réagi tardivement, à la fois en raison des tensions historiques avec le Nigéria, par souci de ne pas se mêler d’un problème perçu comme interne au voisin, et par crainte de devenir une cible du groupe. En dépit des lacunes initiales, il a ensuite mis en place une réponse militaire efficace. Celle-ci a contribué à désarticuler le groupe et a créé une émulation au sein de la Force multinationale mixte (FMM), force sous-régionale à laquelle le Cameroun était réticent à s’associer au départ. Mais le principal point faible de la réponse camerounaise demeure le manque d’ambition des initiatives de développement et l’absence de mesures de sensibilisation au radicalisme religieux, et de programmes de déradicalisation.
Au contraire, certaines mesures prises après les attentats de Maroua en juillet 2015, comme l’interdiction du voile intégral, la fermeture de la frontière et la limitation des motos-taxis, mais aussi les bavures de l’armée, ont le potentiel de radicaliser une frange de la population, y compris des femmes, et ont accentué les vulnérabilités socioéconomiques de nombreux jeunes, poussant certains à rejoindre Boko Haram.

Malgré l’éloignement géographique, la guerre contre Boko Haram n’a pas été qu’un phénomène isolé de l’Extrême-Nord. Elle a renforcé politiquement le président camerounais Paul Biya tout en légitimant les forces de défense auprès d’une frange de la population. La guerre a cependant eu des effets négatifs sur l’économie du pays et a généré des clivages communautaires, comme en témoigne la stigmatisation des Kanuri à l’Extrême-Nord, souvent assimilés de façon indiscriminée au groupe jihadiste. De manière plus générale, le conflit met en évidence un déficit de repré-sentation, sans pour autant remettre en cause l’Etat : l’élite politique gérontocratique de l’Extrême-Nord est de plus en plus contestée par une population très jeune.
La lutte contre Boko Haram est un test pour la coopération sécuritaire et la solidarité sous-régionale. L’intervention des forces armées tchadiennes au Cameroun et, avec les forces nigériennes, au Nigéria, a permis de réduire les capacités conventionnelles du groupe. En dépit de leurs appréhensions réciproques, les pays de la région sont parvenus à mettre en place la FMM et le Nigéria a fini par accepter que le Cameroun intervienne sur son territoire. Cette nouvelle architecture a permis de ralentir la spirale des attentats-suicides au Cameroun et est actuellement engagée contre une faction dissidente de Boko Haram dans la zone du lac Tchad. Toutefois, la FMM manque de financements et de moyens logistiques.
Afin de consolider ses victoires militaires sur Boko Haram et de ramener une paix durable dans l’Extrême-Nord, le gouvernement camerounais doit passer d’une approche centrée sur le sécuritaire à une approche privilégiant le développement socioéconomique et la lutte contre le radicalisme religieux. A cause d’énormes pertes subies durant les affrontements avec l’armée camerounaise, Boko Haram concentre depuis trois mois la majorité de ses opérations dans les zones camerounaises du lac Tchad (Darak et Hilé Alifa) où il contrôle une partie de l’économie halieutique et des trafics illicites, tout en poursuivant les attentats-suicides. Ce déplacement du centre de gravité du groupe requiert un renforcement du dispositif sécuritaire autour du lac Tchad, ainsi que des mesures pour y contrer ses circuits de financement. Une solution durable nécessite le retour de l’Etat, qui devrait s’appuyer sur la société civile et les jeunes, les élites locales et ses partenaires extérieurs pour reconstruire les services publics dans une zone longtemps délaissée.

SITUATION OVERVIEW

The number in need of humanitarian assistance is now estimated at 14 million, including 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) across the six states of North-East Nigeria, with up to 55 per cent believed to be children. As some areas previously held by Boko Haram become more accessible, civilians previously in inaccessible areas are now within limited reach of the government and humanitarian community partners. Many of these citizens are in critical need of humanitarian assistance including health, protection, shelter, WASH and most especially food and nutrition. Efforts will continue to provide the necessary life-saving assistance to displaced people in formal and informal camps and within the host communities, as well as the host communities themselves.

The main driver of the humanitarian crisis in the north-east continues to be the threat of Boko Haram where up to 1.8 million people remain displaced across six states. The onset of the dry season enables greater mobility and the number of attacks on civilians has increased, which could see further displacement to the main centres . The Nigerian military continues to protect gains in Local Government Areas (LGAs) around Borno state and increased security in the area enables displaced people to return to the capital LGAs. There are concerns that the use of suicide bombers may continue targeting crowded areas to maximise fatalities and create fear.

BAMAKO / GENEVE (16 novembre 2016) – l’Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali, Suliman Baldo s’est dit vivement préoccupé par la détérioration de la situation des droits de l’homme provoquée par l’insécurité dans le nord et le centre du pays.

Au terme de sa septième visite au Mali, du 7 au 16 novembre, M. Baldo a appelé les signataires de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issue du processus d’Alger à « redoubler d’efforts pour que démarrent les mesures de cantonnement et de désarmement des combattants et pour accélérer la mise en œuvre de cet Accord.»

« Cette insécurité grandissante, attribuable en grande partie aux retards enregistrés dans la mise en application de l’Accord, aux défections au sein des groupes armés signataires et à l’émergence des nouveaux acteurs armés, met en péril les populations civiles dans les régions touchées en restreignant leurs moyens de survie, leur accès aux services de base et à l’aide humanitaire », a-t-il indiqué. « Les groupes violents extrémistes, ont aussi multiplié les attaques meurtrières contre les civils, les FAMA et les forces internationales.»

«A Goundam, tous mes interlocuteurs, y compris les autorités locales, se sont plaints de cas de vols à main armée et d’extorsion aux postes de contrôle mis en place par des groupes armés sur les axes routiers de la région de Tombouctou. Certains usagers de ces axes routiers ont été tués ou gravement blessés lors de ces contrôles. Les populations vivent dans la peur.

L’Expert indépendant a rencontré plusieurs associations de victimes et les principaux acteurs du secteur de la justice pénale et transitionnelle. « Il est évident que peu de progrès ont été enregistrés dans le traitement judicaire des dossiers de crimes graves commis pendant la crise de 2012/2013. En particulier, les 113 victimes d’abus sexuels qui avaient portés plainte devant les instances judiciaires attendent toujours que justice soit faite.»

«J’ai aussi rencontré des femmes victimes de violence sexuelle et basée sur le genre qui ne sont pas en mesure d’assurer leur prise en charge psychologique, médicale, économique et juridique faute de moyens », a ajouté l’expert indépendant. « Les risques de violences sexuelles restent élevés en l’absence de programmes de protection.»

M. Baldo a néanmoins salué les actions entreprises par les autorités depuis sa dernière visite en février en vue d’améliorer la situation des droits de l’homme, notamment : la réinstallation progressive de l’autorité de l’Etat dans plusieurs zones touchées par le conflit, et la réforme de la Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme, conformément aux normes internationales. L’annonce du procès de Capitaine Haya Sanogo et d’autres individus présumés impliqués dans la mort des Bérets Rouges en 2012, qui se tiendra fin novembre, constitue un autre pas important dans la lutte contre l’impunité et la restauration de l’état de droit.

M. Baldo a noté avec satisfaction la diligence dans la mise en place de la Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation. Pourtant, il a souhaité que la CVJR fasse plus d’efforts en matière de communication envers la population, et mène des concertations plus approfondies avec les associations de victimes dans le pays.

L’expert a conclu sa visite en réitérant l’appel à la communauté internationale et aux agences des Nations Unies à redoubler leurs efforts pour aider le Mali à surmonter les obstacles persistants à la lutte contre l’impunité et à la protection des civils dans le pays.

Au cours de sa visite de dix jours, M. Baldo a rencontré le ministre de la justice et des droits de l’homme, Madame la ministre de la promotion de la femme, de la famille et de l’enfant, le ministre de la défense et des anciens combattants et d’autres membres du Gouvernement malien. Il s’est également entretenu avec des représentants de la société civile, y compris des associations de victimes, avec les représentants des mouvements armés signataires de l’Accord de paix, et avec les officiels du corps diplomatique et des agences du système des Nations Unies.

L’Expert indépendant présentera un rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali au Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies en mars 2017.

M. Suliman Baldo (Soudan) a pris ses fonctions d’Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali le 1er août 2013. M. Baldo a occupé des fonctions de Directeur pour l’Afrique auprès de l’International Centre for Transitional Justice basé à New York et de l’International Crisis Group. En 2011, il a été l’un des trois membres de la Commission internationale d’enquête mise sur pied par le Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations unies afin d’enquêter sur les violences post électorales en Côte d’Ivoire.

Les Experts indépendants font partie de ce qui est désigné sous le nom des procédures spéciales du Conseil des droits de l’homme. Les procédures spéciales, l’organe le plus important d’experts indépendants du Système des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, est le terme général appliqué aux mécanismes d’enquête et de suivi indépendants du Conseil qui s’adressent aux situations spécifiques des pays ou aux questions thématiques partout dans le monde. Les experts des procédures spéciales travaillent à titre bénévole; ils ne font pas partie du personnel de l’ONU et ils ne reçoivent pas de salaire pour leur travail. Ils sont indépendants des gouvernements et des organisations et ils exercent leurs fonctions à titre indépendant.

Droits de l’homme de l’ONU – Page d’accueil du Mali : http://www.ohchr.org/FR/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/MLIndex.aspx

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Highlights

• Critical funding constraints forced WFP to reduce the size of the food ration distributed to C.A.R refugees by 30 percent in October. The cuts are expected to continue into the months of November and December unless new funds become available.

• In the Far North region, WFP is scaling up critical food and nutrition support with the aim of reaching up to 320,000 people by the end of 2016.

• Despite prevailing insecurity and deteriorating road conditions, WFP Cameroon delivered 205 metric tons of food to Banki and Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria in October.

Operational Updates

Far North region (Lake Chad Crisis):

• WFP and partners are scaling up food and nutrition support in the Logone and Chari department and in priority areas across the Far North region. In October, an additional 20,000 newly identified IDPs and 30,000 children under two received assistance for food and nutrition programmes respectively. The aim is to reach up to 320,000 people by end 2016.

• In October, 8,000 IDP, previously enrolled in food assistance programmes, were provided with mobile phones and SIM cards to receive their first cash transfers. The programmes currently target 24,000 IDPs in Mokolo, Mora and Kousseri and efforts will continue to scale up the programme to new areas in 2017.

• Despite prevailing insecurity and deteriorating road conditions, WFP Cameroon ensured food delivery to Banki and Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria. On 25 October, a cross-border operation delivered 205 metric tons from Maroua, transported by 11 trucks.

• Plans are underway to introduce an emergency school meals programme for 80,000 children in the Boko Haram affected areas of the Far North region to encourage school enrolment and improve children's diet and nutrition.

Eastern Cameroon (C.A.R refugee crisis):

• In October, WFP and partners delivered food support (in-kind and cash) to 156,000 C.A.R refugees. Due to lack of resources, the general food basket provided to the refugees was reduced by 30 percent of the initial value. Nutrition activities continued as planned during the month. Between September and October, the coverage of the malnutrition prevention programme was increased from 13,000 to 35,000 children between 6-23 months.

• With partners and community participation, WFP and UNHCR are developing vulnerability-based targeting criteria to be introduced gradually in 2017. The two agencies have defined a joint strategy and action plan to guide the process.

• WFP Country Strategic Plan: Following the completion of the Country Strategic Review of the food security and nutrition situation in Cameroon in September, WFP has embarked on the formulation of the Country Strategic Plan, which will define WFP’s portfolio of assistance in Cameroon for the next five years.

Round XII of the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) accessed 21 of 27 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno state, the hardest hit by conflict. The report revealed a heightened need for immediate humanitarian response. Despite continued insecurity and poor road conditions the assessment managed to also reach Ngala in Borno, which was cut off for many months.

DTM Round XII covered six states in the north-east; Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe, covering a total of 106 LGAs and 924 wards. It was more focused than previous assessments which covered 13 areas and tracked IDPs across the country. Round XII presents many of the unmet basic humanitarian needs of displaced people and updated numbers on returnees including their shelter conditions. Supporting the Government of Nigeria and other humanitarian response partners, the DTM allows for the needs of IDPs to be assessed systematically in the field while providing a profile of internally displaced populations

Informations générales

Population totale : 58,933

Nombre de ménages : 15,795
Taille moyenne des ménages : 4

Etats d’origine : Borno (97%), Adamawa(2%), autres (1%)

Principales religions : Musulmans(56.29%), Protestants (34.88%), Catholiques(8.38%), Autres (0.45%)

Principales ethnies : Glavda, Cinene, Kanuri, Arabe, Mafa, Hausa, Fulbe

Niveaux d’études : Adultes: 54.04% sans éducation;12.05% éducation Informelle et 0.14% ont fait des études universitaires

Compétences : Adultes : 9.65% de la population est composée des éleveurs et agriculteurs; 6.46% de travailleurs manuels et vendeurs; 39.02% de personnes sans qualifications

KEY FIGURES

1,843
Voluntary returns to Mali facilitated since January 2016

3,292
New arrivals from Mali in 2016

4,422
Malian refugees with specific needs (as of 1 November 2016)

11, 889
Malian households in Mbera camp (as of 1 November 2016)

30L
of potable water available per person per day

FUNDING 2016

USD 19.4 M
Requested for the operation

Funded
21%

PRIORITIES

• Maintain protection and assistance for all Malian refugees in Mbera camp.

• Strengthen support to refugees’ self-reliance.

• Maintain peaceful coexistence between the refugees and host communities

HIGHLIGHTS

• During the month of October 2016, almost 3,000 people crossed the Mali-Mauritania border to seek refuge in Mbera camp; influx continues in November. So far, UNHCR registered more than a thousand people. This represents a tenfold increase compared to the total number of new arrivals registered over the last 8 months. New arrivals are assisted with emergency food, shelter and basic items.

• There is an urgent need to replace shelter and latrines – 50% of latrines in Mbera camp will reach their maximum storage capacity by the end of 2016. This is particularly crucial considering the unstable situation in northern Mali, with unlikely massive return and recent waves of arrivals to the camp.

• In October 2016, five Congolese refugees who had been living in the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott for several years were resettled to France. Another group of 17 urban refugees of different countries of origin, such as Senegal and Central African Republic, were resettled to the United States.

UPDATE ON ACHIEVEMENTS

Operational Context

In collaboration with the Mauritanian Government which has kept its borders open to new influxes, UNHCR with UN organizations and national and international NGOs, continues to lead the humanitarian response for 42,867 Malian refugees and any new arrivals in Mbera camp. In addition, the organization ensures the protection and assistance of 1,483 urban refugees and 325 asylum seekers, mainly from the Central African Republic, Syria and Côte d’Ivoire.

UNHCR works closely with Mauritanian authorities to enhance the protection environment for refugees and asylum seekers in Mauritania, notably through the development and implementation of a national asylum law. Pending the adoption of a national refugee legislation, UNHCR advocates for further integration of refugees by improving access to basic services, such as health, economic opportunities but also to documentation and birth registration.

The majority of Malian refugees living in Mbera camp arrived in 2012: violent clashes in north Mali triggered important waves of displacements into Mauritania, where a refugee camp was established 50 Km from the Malian border in the Hodh el Charghi region. Following the military intervention in northern Mali in January 2013, new influxes of Malian refugees were accommodated in Mbera camp.

On 16 June 2016, Mauritania, Mali and UNHCR signed a Tripartite Agreement to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Malian refugees. The tripartite agreement reiterates the voluntary nature of repatriation and reconfirms the commitments of the Mauritanian and Malian states to protect refugees. However, despite the signing of a peace agreement in Mali in June 2015 and the voluntary return of more than 1,800 refugees from Mbera camp so far in 2016, the security conditions in northern Mali remain volatile. Large-scale returns of refugees are therefore not yet envisaged and UNHCR and its partners maintain their presence in Bassikounou to sustain the humanitarian response in Mbera Camp where more than a thousand new arrivals from Mali have been registered in 2016.

En appui à la Croix-Rouge burkinabé et la Croix-Rouge malienne, la Croix-Rouge de Belgique participe à la lutte contre la malnutrition depuis près de dix années avec le soutien de l’Union européenne (ECHO). L’objectif : renforcer le système de santé local pour une meilleure prise en charge des cas de malnutrition.

Une prise en charge différente de la malnutrition

Grâce à son expertise et à son réseau de volontaires, la Croix-Rouge fournit un véritable appui aux autorités et aux professionnels de santé locaux et vise l’intégration complète de la lutte contre la malnutrition au sein du système de santé local. On considère que les centres de santé ont intégré la malnutrition lorsqu’ils ne la dissocient plus des autres maux dont souffre l’enfant. Le personnel de santé est donc formé et équipé pour prendre en charge la malnutrition lorsqu’un enfant est admis pour n’importe quelle autre pathologie.

Au Burkina Faso, l’autonomie en marche

Au Burkina Faso, des progrès significatifs ont été obtenus ces dernières années dans les districts de Dori et Sebba, qui ont intégré les activités liées à la prise en charge de la malnutrition en offrant une prise en charge médicale et nutritionnelle de qualité aux enfants et aux femmes enceintes et allaitantes. La Croix-Rouge n’intervient plus que pour un appui ponctuel. Elle poursuit par contre ses efforts dans les districts de Djibo et de Gorom, où elle assure un suivi régulier des différents centres de santé et du personnel médical: formation, équipement, etc.

Le Mali, autonome face à la malnutrition

Au Mali, le travail réalisé avec le système de santé du cercle de Nioro entre dans sa dernière phase et prendra fin en mars 2017. Accompagnés par la Croix-Rouge, la plupart des centres de santé ont déjà intégré la lutte contre la malnutrition dans leur offre de soins, les agents de santé ont été formés, équipés et coachés. Ils seront bientôt complètement autonomes pour faire face à la malnutrition.

Des solutions portées par les communautés locales

En parallèle à l’appui au système de santé, la Croix-Rouge se mobilise pour renforcer la population et lui permettre de participer directement au recul de la malnutrition. Informées et sensibilisées à travers des démonstrations culinaires, des séances d’information et parfois un accompagnement particulier, les communautés défient la malnutrition en adoptant des mesures préventives. Les volontaires de la Croix-Rouge, eux-mêmes issus des communautés, accompagnent ce changement et garantissent la durabilité de l’intervention.

Avec l’appui de la Croix-Rouge, les professionnels et les communautés agissent simultanément pour évincer la malnutrition dans une région du monde encore trop souvent touchée par le fléau.

By Aurélien Tobie, Senior Researcher and Activity Coordinator, Mali civil society and peacebuilding

The 2012 crisis in Mali triggered a strong response from regional, international, national and non-state actors in a country that, until then, had been considered an example of democratic stability in the unstable Sahel region. Crucially, civil society also mobilized to support peace negotiations and conflict resolution efforts at the community level.

Groups of citizens demonstrated against the military coup in the capital, Bamako, and they alerted the public to the poor conditions of Malian soldiers fighting in the North. Solidarity movements conveyed medical supplies and equipment to the conflict-affected regions. While under enormous constraints, civil society organizations in north Mali worked to counterbalance the absence of the state and ensure the delivery of vital services to the population.

In 2015, inter-Malian negotiations resulted in a peace agreement between the Government and two coalitions of armed groups (the Coordination of Azawad Movements, CMA, and the Platform of armed groups, the Platform). The agreement was supplemented with military operations that enabled the formal restoration of state institutions in areas previously under the control of these groups. Despite the severity of the crisis, and as a consequence of the mobilization, quick progress has been made in restoring constitutional order and achieving some level of stability.

The 2012 crisis triggered a public debate to explore the severity and the far-reaching roots of insecurity and fragility of the Malian state—not just in the north, but over the entire territory. Issues of governance, availability and delivery of public services, effectiveness of the security architecture, local participation in decision-making and power-sharing at the national and local levels are now openly discussed in public forums. The perceived role of development aid in enabling or hindering prospects of peace is also a topic of conversation in Mali’s public spaces.

The conflict demonstrated the capacity and readiness of civil society to contribute to the resilience of the Malian society. If progress is to be made towards a sustainable peace in Mali, civil society has to remain actively involved.

The root causes of the conflict

Despite the brokering of a negotiated peace agreement in 2015, violence is still part of the daily life of many people in Mali. While the fighting was predominantly contained within three main regions in the north of Mali, new violent groups have emerged in the central part of the country. Worryingly, while the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and other international and regional security actors still struggle to stabilize the most affected areas of the country, little has been achieved in tackling the root causes of the conflict.

The 2012 events were the result of structural issues within the Malian state, which have still not been comprehensively addressed: the legitimacy of state institutions is contested and the decentralization process has not made any significant progress, long-term community tensions have not been resolved, the political representation of different groups of the population is strongly debated, the role of women in the public sphere remains greatly constrained, and youth struggle to find a place and a voice in a changing society.

If these issues are to be addressed, they will need a long-term approach and a clear political commitment. They directly affect the prospects for sustainable peace and could even bring into question Malians’ historic sense of togetherness. Studies and surveys—such as the Afrobarometer, a research project that measures public attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa, or the self-portrait of Mali conducted by the Malian Institute of Action Research for Peace—have demonstrated a strong willingness of the Malian population to engage in a nationwide dialogue on Mali’s future. These studies also show that the population’s concerns and needs reach far beyond the immediate stabilization agenda and cessation of hostilities between armed groups.

 **New SIPRI–CONASCIPAL project to further support civil society**

In an effort to contribute to sustainable peace in Mali, SIPRI and its Malian partner the Coalition Nationale de la Société Civile pour la Paix et la Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères (CONASCIPAL, National Coalition of Civil Society for Peace and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms) have launched a new project to analyse the immediate security needs of the Malian population in a holistic manner and identify avenues for longer-term contributions of civil society to peace and state-building.

The project works with civil society groups in 35 communes (selected from nine out of the ten regions of Mali and the District of Bamako) to work from the ground up to build a sustainable peace. In each of these communes, the project has established a ‘Monitoring Group for Peace and Security’ composed of local actors representing three segments of civil society: youth, women and local community leaders. In collaboration with these Monitoring Groups, SIPRI and CONASCIPAL will identify and contextualize the most relevant security issues for the population, in terms of both risks and resilience. Findings from these local groups will be consolidated through debates at the national level and will then be published and shared with national, regional and international audiences. The publication—which gives voices to a broad range of Malians across the country—will serve as a vehicle for civil society to inform and influence policies and programmes related to the safety and security of people in Mali.

This project has the potential to have a far-reaching impact through four main goals.

First, the project will test the justification underlying current interventions in the country against the perception of need on the ground. In a context marked by overlapping security interventions by diverse actors, it is crucial to assess whether the stated objectives of security policies and their implementation reflect the needs and expectations of the population, both in terms of security and development. This could improve the legitimacy of the interventions and provide people with responses to the needs that they have identified themselves.

Second, the project will contribute to asserting civil society’s capacity and skills for contributing to security policies, which will promote the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement. As the peace agreement emphasises the role of local institutions in the provision of services to the population and decentralized decision-making, supporting the involvement of local communities in the design and implementation of security strategies is paramount to the effective delivery of this agreement.

Third, the project’s findings could shed new light on issues that are already under discussion and add useful insights into the key security priorities and policies that have been adopted at the national level. While priorities for peace and statebuilding are generally agreed on and reflected in the many international strategies for the Sahel—such as the fight against violent extremism, illicit trafficking or the strengthening of state capacity at the local level—this project will focus on important local community perspectives.

Finally, exploring and documenting the role of civil society actors in the peace process can highlight the resilience of Malian society, and the capacity of local communities to mobilize in order to address problems that directly affect them. This is particularly useful in the context of weak-state capacity to provide services.

Throughout this project, the objective is to engage Malian civil society to reflect on their perceptions of security and on their role in laying the foundation for sustainable peace in Mali.

This brief summarizes FEWS NET’s most forward-looking analysis of projected emergency food assistance needs in FEWS NET coverage countries. The projected size of each country’s acutely food insecure population is compared to last year and the recent five-year average. Countries where external emergency food assistance needs are anticipated are identified. Projected lean season months highlighted in red indicate either an early start or an extension to the typical lean season. Additional information is provided for countries with large food insecure populations, an expectation of high severity, or where other key issues warrant additional discussion.

Pour les « Prix Producteurs »

Les prix collectés ce mois d’octobre 2016, nous indiquent que :

• Riz Gambiaka: le prix le moins cher est 275 enregistré à Kléla dans la région de Sikasso,
  Siengo et Niono sont à 300 FCFA/kg et 400 le plus cher toujours à Sofara dans la région de Mopti.

• Riz Adny11 : il est à Niono et Siengo à 300 FCFA/kg contre 350 à Baguineda dans la région de Koulikoro.

• Riz local BG : il se vend à 350 à Baguinéda (Koulikoro) et 375 FCFA/kg à Sofara (Mopti).

• Riz Local étuvé : il est vendu à 400 FCFA/kg maximum à Niono, 300 à Siengo, Sofara (Mopti) enregistre 325 et enfin 275 à Klela (Sikasso).

• Paddy : le prix des différentes variétés varie entre 140 et 150 à Niono et Siengo toute variété confondue.

• Les Semences : les prix des différentes variétés restent stables à 300 FCFA/kg à Niono et Siengo sauf pour les varié

Every war is a war against children. So said Eglantyne Jebb, the woman who founded Save the Children to help children starving following the First World War. I’ve just seen the truth of her words, in Borno, north east Nigeria.

Borno has suffered from 7 years of brutal insurgency, finally hitting the global headlines 2 years ago following the abduction of hundreds of girls from a school in Chibok, Borno.

The impact of this conflict on Nigeria’s children is horrific – they are being killed and maimed, forced to fight a war that is not of their making, and witnessing unimaginable acts of violence.

Hundreds of children’s graves

And children are not just losing their lives in active conflict – they are dying from hunger and disease. Dying from lack of food, water and basic healthcare.

Hundreds of children’s graves have been discovered in parts of Borno which have recently become accessible following advances made by the Nigerian armed forces.

The UN has reported that 400,000 children are severely acutely malnourished – which is life-threatening without treatment.

Statistics are hard to digest, so to put this in context, that’s equivalent to the population of Bristol. I met some of these severely acutely malnourished children in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, at a stabilisation centre that we run.

Fleeing violence

I met Saliha, who was 20 months old but looked much younger. She was visibly malnourished – very thin, distressed, with welts on her skin.

The doctor told me she and her mother were found, with Saliha in a desperate state, and brought to the stabilisation centre.

Saliha’s mother Rakiya told me insurgents had attacked her village in Konduga, in the south of Borno state. They killed her husband and burned down her house. Rakiya managed to escape with her two children, and fled to Maiduguri. One of Rakiya’s children then died from measles, aged just two. Her sole surviving family member, Saliha, was fighting for her life.

Desperate shortage of supplies

I also talked to Falmata, who was in the stabilisation centre with her daughter Bintu, who was two. Bintu had pneumonia and malaria, as well as acute malnutrition. She was incredibly thin and listless.

The doctor told me that as well as the antibiotics he was administering to Bintu, she needed an oxygen cylinder. But he only had one, which was being used to help an emaciated baby in an overflow ward.

This baby was in a worse condition, the doctor judged, so she got the oxygen. What a judgment he had to make – one he has to make every day, with limited supplies and equipment and overwhelming need.

Urgent need for international support

Most of the children in the stabilisation centre would be dead if it were not there. And yet the centre only has funding to continue for the next few months. We urgently need longer term funding to secure the centre’s future and the futures of the children it is reaching.

And we need the funds to set up more such centres in Maiduguri – which has doubled in size due to the massive influx in displaced people fleeing the conflict – and in other parts of Borno.

And yet the response of the international community has been in no way equal to the scale this massive humanitarian crisis.

The UN’s 2016 appeal was only 38% funded. The UK, the US and the EU have stepped up, and our scale up to other parts of Borno has been enabled by early support from the Dutch. But the general response from the donor community has been woefully inadequate. Italy has given just $2.2m, Norway $1.1m and Australia $221,000.

75,000 children’s lives at stake

Without immediate action to reverse donor apathy and commit the funds for a significant scale up of the humanitarian response, the UN predicts 75,000 children will die.

The UN is shortly to launch its funding appeal for 2017 which is likely to be twice as large as the unfunded 2016 appeal, in response to the huge scale of the crisis in north east Nigeria – where 13.4 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance.

History will judge us for how we respond.

"People (in Chibok) told us that we are stupid for sending our children to school again after what happened"

By Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani

ABUJA, Nov 17 (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - When a colleague asked Margee Ensign to help her sister who had been snatched by Boko Haram from her school dormitory in Chibok and escaped, the president of the American University of Nigeria could not refuse.

Ensign decided to offer scholarships to girls who managed to flee the Islamist militant group after it abducted more than 270 of their classmates in April 2014, its most high-profile assault in a seven-year insurgency to create an Islamic caliphate.

Of the 57 girls who escaped after the night-time raid in northeastern Nigeria, 24 accepted the university's offer.

But not everyone celebrated their return to education in Yola, the capital of a state neighbouring Borno where they were seized.

"People (in Chibok) told us that we are stupid for sending our children to school again after what happened," said the father of one girl who took up a scholarship at the university in a video recording of her first day there.

Scarred by his daughter's ordeal, he was one of many parents who stayed with their children in the dormitories during the first few weeks.

Boko Haram has abducted hundreds of men, women and children, killed thousands and displaced more than 2 million people during its insurgency.

But it was the kidnapping of the Chibok girls which prompted outrage worldwide and spurred a campaign, #bringbackourgirls, backed by celebrities and U.S. first lady Michelle Obama.

The Islamist militants released 21 of the girls last month after the Red Cross and the Swiss government brokered a deal with the group, but some 200 remain missing.

FEARS AND DOUBTS

Ensign, an American academic who has previously worked as an advisor to the governments of Uganda and Rwanda, said the Chibok girls arrived on campus in August 2014, most of them nervous and doubtful about resuming their education.

"We took them to the market place and they were very frightened," said Ensign, recalling accompanying the girls on a shopping trip with the school bus. "They didn't want to be out (of the bus) on their own ... so we took in a few at a time."

While the girls gradually settled into life at the university - sticking together for comfort and support, and using laptops and phones to stay in touch with their families - starting classes was a challenge for many of the new arrivals.

"When I first came here, I was shocked," said 18-year-old Glory.

"I said: 'Is this Nigeria?' I didn't think I would make it because of my Chibok background," she told the Thomson Reuters Foundation by Skype.

The teenager, who along with 56 classmates jumped off a truck used by Boko Haram fighters to spirit them away, is now pursuing her dream of studying medicine.

"I want to be a medical doctor to help my community in Chibok ... we don't have well qualified doctors," Glory said.

Yet many of the Chibok girls could not read or write fluently when they arrived at the university, said its staff.

"It was like they had special needs," Ensign said.

"PAST IS IN THE PAST"

To accommodate their varying academic abilities, the university devised a special programme for the girls - rather than just sending them to its affiliated secondary school - and split them into beginner, intermediate and advanced classes.

Called the 'New Foundation School' (NFS), the girls are tested frequently in the hope of getting them ready to move up to the university. But they are also awarded regularly for public speaking, sports and other extracurricular activities.

"We didn't want to call them Chibok girls anymore," said Reginald Braggs, assistant dean of student affairs at the university. "We made up this new name ... letting the girls know that whatever they have done in the past is the past."

The girls have their own dormitory and a floor to themselves, but have bonded with the rest of the students.

"Nobody treats us funny," said 19-year-old Martha, who in September moved from the NFS to the university to study a degree in natural environmental sciences. "I have many friends."

But events like the deaths of family members to Boko Haram attacks and the anniversary of their abduction disrupt the girls' school lives and reopen old wounds, according to Ensign.

"The first anniversary was difficult ... they were just in each other's arms, inconsolable," she said, adding that the university had provided a psychologist for the girls. "But by the end of the day, we were all holding hands and praying."

The girls - six of whom have moved from the NFS to the university to study subjects like law, medicine, and computer science - said they all wanted to go home to Chibok and help to rebuild their community once they had finished their education.

Yet their friends and families back home say that the way the girls talk and behave has changed, according to Glory.

"People are jealous of us, and ask us: 'Why are you behaving like this? Are you not from Chibok background, and yet you are behaving like people who came back from America'," she said.

"We tell them that is why we are in school."

(Reporting by Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, Writing by Kieran Guilbert, Editing by Katie Nguyen; Please credit the Thomson Reuters Foundation, the charitable arm of Thomson Reuters, that covers humanitarian news, women's rights, trafficking, corruption and climate change. Visit news.trust.org)

Highlights

• 598
  IDP children enrolled for the new academic year in the primary school in Kabelawa IDP camp in the Diffa region
  
• 12,294
  Malian refugee households received mosquito nets in Tazalit and Intikane the refugees hosting areas in October 2016
  
• 14,774
  Households of a targeted 20,000 households outside of the camps have received gas bottles as planned in Diffa between January and October 2016
  
• 782
  Malian refugee children between 0 and 5 years old in Tazalit and Intikane Malian refugee hosting areas received vaccinations in the expanded program on immunization in October
  

Population of Concern

A total of 282,613 people of concern

Funding

USD 51,188,166 requested

N’DJAMENA– The European Union has announced its support for the local production of fortified complementary food in Chad. The joint 3-year project (2016-2019) will be implemented by several United Nations agencies (FAO, WHO, WFP, UNICEF) in partnership with the Chad Government. Through an integrated, innovative approach, the project aims to improve access, availability and use of highly nutritious complementary food for children under five. Malnutrition is a major obstacle to country’s development.

“Thanks to the EU’s contribution of €5 million (3,28 billion CFA Francs) the participating UN agencies are on the path to reaching Sustainable Development Goal 2 – to achieve zero hunger by 2030,” said WFP Chad Country Director Mary-Ellen McGroarty. The EU Ambassador, head of European Delegation in Chad Denisa-Elena Ionete, is joining WFP to welcome the launch of this project: “We are delighted because this enables us to reinforce our efforts to fight malnutrition and support this initiative, which will create the first link in a chain of locally-produced fortified complementary food for children. Through this project,” she said, “the EU will be supporting the Chadian government’s strategy for the country’s development.”

The project will be piloted in Mayo-Kebbi East, Mayo-Kebbi West and Kanem regions. These Chadian regions are affected by chronic hunger, with levels of malnutrition either close to or surpassing WHO’s emergency threshold of 30 percent, though favourable conditions for good agricultural production exist.

All parties involved in the “Local production of complementary fortified food” project (PRO-FORT) will contribute to creating an environment which is conducive to promoting local production of quality food; to reinforcing production capacities and marketing of fortified food; to encouraging the uptake of better maternal and child nutrition practices; and to reducing malnutrition.

Chronic malnutrition has serious and sometimes irreversible consequences on their cognitive and physical growth, which continues into adulthood and considerably reduces their productivity, with a negative impact on productivity during adulthood. According to the Cost of Hunger Study in Chad (October 2016), 56 percent of the adult population suffered from stunting during their childhood.

“Improving infant and young child nutrition is a real challenge in Chad. To raise communities’ awareness, especially that of mothers, about the importance of adequate nutrition for infants and young children will be crucial to ensure optimal growth. That’s why promoting healthy nutritional practices is an essential component of and will contribute to the success of the project,” said Philippe Barragne-Bigot, UNICEF Representative in Chad. “UNICEF and its partners will support behavioural change communication campaigns and will promote the uptake of locally produced nutritious food.”

“This project also supports Chad’s National Nutrition and Food Policy and the National Investment Programme in the Rural Sector. To fight against malnutrition is one of FAO’s key goals. Through the local production of complementary fortified food, which adheres to quality international standards, we are delighted to improve access, availability and use of highly nutritious food for the most vulnerable, especially for young children,” said FAO Representative in Chad, Mohamadou Mansour N’Diaye. This new project is a complement to the 11th European Development Fund, through which the EU will invest more than 100 billion CFA francs (€156 million) from 2016 until 2021 to improve efforts to combat chronic malnutrition.

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For more information:
Nathalie Magnien, WFP Chad :
+235 66 99 30 40 I nathalie.magnien@wfp.org I www.wfp.org/countries/chad
Maria Fernandez, UNICEF Chad
+235 66 36 00 42 I mfernandez@unicef.org I www.unicef.org/chad
Estelle Madjilem, FAO Chad
+235 60980656I Estelle.madjilem@fao.org
Toussaint Ablaye Roasngar, EU in Chad
+235 66260196 I Toussaint.ABLAYE-ROASNGAR@eeas.europa.eu> www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tchad

HIGHLIGHTS

598 IDP children enrolled for the new academic year in the primary school in Kabelawa IDP camp in the Diffa region

** 12,294** Malian refugee households received mosquito nets in Tazalit and Intikane the refugees hosting areas in October 2016

** 14,774** Households of a targeted 20,000 households outside of the camps have received gas bottles as planned in Diffa between January and October 2016

** 782** Malian refugee children between 0 and 5 years old in Tazalit and Intikane Malian refugee hosting areas received vaccinations in the expanded program on immunization in October

ACHIEVEMENTS

Protection

 Nigeria situation: The government have recruited three staff members for the project management of the NADRA Biometric Registration Project for the Diffa region, while the Technical Working Group, including government and UNHCR staff have moved to a new joint office. UNHCR and the government will receive a visit from NADRA experts from Pakistan in early November, for the first feasibility study of the project.

Education

 Mali & Nigeria situations: In October, 4 refugees in Niger were granted DAFI funded scholarships, to begin their university studies in Niger. This includes two Malian refugees, one Nigerian refugee, and a Refugee from Central African Republic.

WASH

 Nigeria situation: The construction of emergency showers and latrines continues in Sayam Forage in response to the increasing population and needs. In total, there are currently 200 latrines and 148 showers functioning in the camp.

This equates to a ratio of 35 persons / latrine and 47 persons / shower. Sensitization sessions on hygiene are ongoing in the camp, including through the child friendly spaces and community based committees.

 Mali situation: On the 4th October a mission including the Regional Directorate of Hydraulics, UNHCR and several partners took place in the refugee hosting area (ZAR) of Intikane, to launch the work on the solar powered water pump station in the nearby village of Eknewane, that will supply the ZAR with sufficient potable water for the population, as well as local host population.

Health

 Nigeria situation: 2 temporary hangars have been installed in the health centre in Sayam Forage refugee camp, to increase the capacity of the centre to respond to the increasing population needs. However, this is an interim measure, while construction plans for an Integrated Health Centre (CSI) Type II are underway, which will be launched in 2017.

 Mali situation: A dramatic reduction in malaria amongst children under 5 years old has been reported in the Malian refugee camp of Abala. This is following the launch of a new malaria prevention programme in August, which involves the use of deet (chemical anti-malarial) for 5 days every month.

Coordination

 Nigeria situation: On the 11th and 12th of October, UNHCR and OCHA co-facilitated the national validation workshop for the HNO/ HRP and RRRP for the Nigeria Situation. All clusters, relevant government bodies and organizations participated in the discussions. Additionally, from the 6th -8 th of October, UNHCR Niger held a 3 day planning workshop for 2017 in Niamey, with the Heads of all Field and Sub Offices.

Shelter

 Nigeria Situation: In the commune of Maine Soara, in the Diffa region, UNHCR began the distribution of ‘Refugee Housing Units’ (RHUs) for the first time, to beneficiary families who received land plots as part of the Urbanization project. UNHCR staff and beneficiaries were trained in the construction of the RHUs, while the first families moved into their new homes at the end of October.

This map illustrates satellite-detected displaced persons shelters in the Muna settlement near Dalakaleri, Nigeria, 6 km east of Maidugur's city on the main road that connect Maidugur to Dikwa. UNITARUNOSAT analysis of satellite imagery acquired 5 September 2016 revealed a total of 2,597 shelters and 22 infrastructure and support buildings within the Muna compound.

In addition there are 203 detected shelters outside the settlement, grouped across the road. Finally, as of 5 September 2016 there are 120 newly constructed shelters arranged in five rows in the norther part of the Muna compound. This is a preliminary analysis and has not yet been validated in the field.

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