Policy recommendations

The United Nations: In each country where resiliency initiatives are being rolled out, the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) should take the lead in coordinating the various resiliency initiatives. Based on the input of the UN country team, donors, regional bodies, and international financial institutions, s/he should develop one national-level resilience plan and coordination mechanism, in cooperation with the national government, to which donor initiatives can link.

Wed, 07/31/2013

Recurrent climate-related shocks in West Africa’s Sahel region are having severe impacts on vulnerable populations. Increasingly, those unable to feed themselves or their families have no option but to leave their villages, resorting to new forms of migration that bring with them serious protection risks. New resilience-building initiatives launched by regional bodies, the United Nations, and donors have the potential to begin to tackle the root causes of these populations’ vulnerabilities. However, a lack of coherence and coordination is seriously threatening the effectiveness of these initiatives. With implementation still in the initial stages, there is a window of opportunity to address these shortcomings before significant time and resource commitments are made.

Background

The Sahel is a semi-arid swath of grasslands and shrubs that borders the Sahara Desert. It is home to many of the world’s poorest countries, and malnutrition rates in many areas regularly exceed the emergency threshold of 15 percent. In Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad, nearly half of children under five suffer from chronic malnutrition. The ecological fragility of the Sahelian environment contributes to the food insecurity of its people, 80 percent of whom rely on natural resources for their livelihoods. Explosive population growth means that the Sahel’s population of more than 100 million people will double in 25 years. Sahelian countries also experience frequent political instability, with the separatist insurgency and military coup d’etat in Mali being the most recent example. In addition, the historic trade routes traversing the region have proven highly vulnerable to terrorist and criminal networks that present regional and global security risks.

Although the Sahel region is prone to droughts, over the past decade, marked changes in rainfall patterns have emerged. Rains have become more erratic in terms of quantity, timing, and geographic scope, making droughts and poor harvests more frequent. These changes are, in turn, having enormous impacts on the region’s livestock herders (pastoralists) and farmers who rely on crops to feed their animals (agro-pastoralists), given their dependence on rainfall for their livelihoods. This is especially the case for agro-pastoralists, for whom proper forecasting of the timing, location, and quantity of precipitation is crucial for planting.

In 2012, poor rains combined with high food prices across the Sahel region resulted in a food crisis – the third in seven years – which left 18 million people without sufficient food and put one million children at risk of starvation. At the same time, flooding has also become more acute. In 2012, severe floods in Niger and Chad displaced more than a million people while flooding in northern Nigeria displaced more than 6 million. Numerous climate experts have attributed these changes in rainfall patterns to global warming, and there is strong consensus that in the coming decades, continued climate change will result in more unpredictable weather accompanied by temperature rise in the range of 7 to 10ᵒ Fahrenheit by mid-century.

In June 2013, RI visited two of the Sahel’s poorest countries, Burkina Faso and Niger, and met with vulnerable pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities. All were highly aware of abnormal and harmful changes in temperatures and rainfall patterns that were directly undermining their ability to feed their families. In village after village, the refrain was the same: “The rains are no longer predictable.” “They come too early and then end too soon.” “There is too much rain, or too little.” In one village in Burkina’s Center North Region, villagers described how in 2010, there was not enough rain. Then, in 2011, sudden downpours came early, causing massive floods that destroyed houses and schools – something people there had never seen before. But thereafter, the rains largely ceased and crop yields were poor.

These repeated shocks have sent the poorest households into a downward spiral wherein there is insufficient time to recover before the next crisis hits. During bad years, they are forced to resort to negative coping mechanisms, including eating less, selling their limited productive assets (e.g., livestock), and taking on debt, leaving them even more vulnerable and less able to withstand future shocks. One man in the aforementioned village who was forced to sell livestock during the 2012 food crisis in order to buy food for his family explained that it would take him at least a year to save enough to purchase a single cow. A recent food security trend analysis conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Niger found that two years after the 2009 crop failure, poor households in Niger had not recovered, despite above average crop yields in 2010. Worse yet, in roughly a third of districts, resiliency levels (measured in terms of the extent to which households resorted to negative coping strategies like eating less, borrowing, and selling assets) were even lower in 2010 than in 2009. In short, it takes most poor households more than a year to recover from a drought or other crisis, and a single crisis can continue to have negative impacts beyond one growing season.

Increased climate variability, combined with structural factors such as smaller plot sizes, consistently high food prices, and population growth, mean that a significant number of poor households find themselves with no other choice but to leave their villages in search of other forms of income. Leaving home has become a negative coping mechanism – a form of “distress migration." According to the director of one NGO with long-standing ties to the region, recurrent drought and food crises have resulted in as many as a third of families leaving their villages altogether.

In food-insecure villages in northern and central Burkina Faso, this “distress migration” often forces people to seek work at gold mines. Nearly every family RI interviewed in Burkina’s Central North and Sahel Regions had at least one family member who had gone to work at a mine. Although not covered in this report, conditions at many gold mining sites are extremely dangerous and pose significant health and safety risks. Child labor is also widespread: according to one UN official in Burkina, as many as 600,000 children are working at mines. RI met with numerous families who had children as young as 12 working at local mining sites.

In neighboring Niger, a similar phenomenon has emerged wherein poor families find themselves with no option other than to leave their villages. In these instances, family members cannot afford to migrate internationally to countries that might offer them opportunities like new skills or higher wages. Rather, as a last resort, they go to urban centers to engage in petty trade, or in the worse cases, to beg. This distress migration is especially widespread during crisis years. One NGO representative in Niger with whom RI spoke estimated that during the 2005 food crisis, 80 to 90 percent of people in some hard-hit areas were forced to leave their villages to survive.

But exactly how many are leaving and for how long is not entirely clear. In addition, there are insufficient analyses of how closely migration trends correlate with climate-related shocks, and whether this migration is to urban areas, gold mines, or other agricultural areas. Another crucial data gap is the positive or negative impacts on those migrating and those left behind, and significantly, the new protection risks such movement creates. More broadly, at present, there are no global estimates for the number of people displaced by slower-onset disasters like droughts or food crises that may evolve over several years because there are no widely accepted methodologies for doing so. The annual estimates of numbers of people displaced by natural disasters compiled by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) do not include individuals displaced by slower-onset disasters like droughts or more gradual changes linked to global warming.

Resiliency Initiatives – Promises and Challenges

More recurrent droughts, food crises, and complex humanitarian emergencies in the Sahel in recent years have led to a widespread recognition among national governments, regional institutions, donors, and humanitarian and development agencies that more must be done to enhance the resilience of chronically vulnerable households to be able to withstand shocks and recover more quickly.

This has led to the adoption of a wide array of resilience-building initiatives and strategies for the Sahel. Chief among them is the Global Alliance for Resilience – Sahel (AGIR), launched in 2012 and adopted by Sahelian and West African governments, regional organizations, UN agencies, and other stakeholders. AGIR represents a “shared understanding of resilience” among its members for supporting and accelerating implementation of West Africa’s regional agenda on food and nutritional security, with an overarching goal of achieving “zero hunger” in 20 years by building upon existing regional and national agendas. In the shorter term, AGIR seeks to build resilience among vulnerable households to be able to resist future food shocks. Political leadership rests with ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) and UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union), with CILSS (Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel) in the Sahel providing technical assistance for implementation. Earlier this year, AGIR released a regional roadmap to serve as a basis for formulating national resilience priorities. These national priorities, in turn, are expected to provide operational frameworks for funding, implementation, monitoring, and assessments. The European Union has been a key supporter of AGIR and has pledged to invest 1.6 billion euros in the strategy over the next six years.

UN agencies working in the region are also embracing a resilience approach. Last year, they adopted the UN Common Strategy on Resilience Building in West Africa, which is now part of the UN Integrated Strategy on the Sahel adopted by the Security Council in June 2013. In addition to improving governance and regional capacity to address security threats, the UN Integrated Strategy seeks to integrate development and humanitarian interventions to build resilience.

Major donors have also adopted their own resiliency strategies and projects. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) has published an approach paper on “Defining Disaster Resilience” and is committed to building resilience into all of its country programs by 2015. It is also supporting the Political Champions for Resiliency, a global initiative that is producing a set of pilot, country-level plans, including for Niger. In March 2012, the European Union adopted a strategy for security and development in the Sahel aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty in the region. And earlier this year, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) solicited proposals from partners to implement a new five-year, $70 million project called Resilience and Economic Growth in the Sahel – Enhanced Resilience (REGIS-ER). REGIS-ER is one of three new USAID procurements that will target vulnerable livelihood zones in Niger and Burkina Faso.

In the Sahel, the concept of resilience makes a great deal of sense to the extent that it addresses the failure of development interventions to treat chronic vulnerabilities, which are in turn contributing to more recurrent humanitarian emergencies and undermining development gains. One high-level UN representative articulated the problem as follows: “The response to the 2012 food crisis was seen as an improvement to the extent that early warnings prompted early action by humanitarian agencies that mitigated the crisis. Yet donors still spent over $1 billion in humanitarian response costs,” (with the U.S. government alone having spent over $400 million). “Looking ahead, the long recovery time for vulnerable households means that it’s very likely that there will be another humanitarian emergency one or two years from now.” If implemented effectively, resilience-building programs can mitigate humanitarian emergencies by forcing development actors to target assistance at the most vulnerable, while forcing humanitarian actors to think beyond the immediate emergency intervention and facilitate sustainable recovery.

Nonetheless, AGIR and the UN Integrated Strategy face significant implementation challenges that must be addressed if these programs are to achieve their intended results. Foremost is the sheer number of different resilience initiatives and projects, which has led to a great deal of confusion on the ground. Compounding this problem is the fact that the various resiliency programs are driven by different entities (e.g., regional bodies, UN agencies/envoys/special representatives, donors, financial institutions) that have somewhat different definitions of “resilience”, as well as different scopes (regional versus national) and targets (populations alone versus populations, governments, and systems). Rather than being linked to each other in a comprehensive fashion, they are linked to other initiatives, actors, and programs. For example, AGIR is linked with an array of existing regional and national food security and drought initiatives, while the UN Integrated Strategy includes an array of security- and governance-related objectives and initiatives. As one high-level UN official admitted, “It is a source of confusion for all of us. Basically, it’s being worked out as we speak.”

The lack of national ownership or “buy in” for these high-level initiatives is also slowing implementation. Part of the problem is that there is no formula or consensus on how AGIR is to be implemented on a national level or who should lead. While some have suggested that UN regional and country-level Resident Coordinators/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) should take the lead, the UN is taking the position that it has no formal role in AGIR. Some countries have relatively advanced national programs for tackling food insecurity and malnutrition (e.g., the Nigeriens Nourishing Nigeriens Initiative, better known as 3N) that could form a basis on which AGIR could build. However, according to officials with whom RI spoke, many countries lack the capacity or political will to implement AGIR’s top-down objectives, and in some countries it is still unclear which government officials or ministries are responsible.

A third and related challenge is coordination. All of the initiatives call for coordination, but not through the same mechanism or set of actors. In short, there is no unified framework or vision for coordination among (and in some cases within) the various resiliency initiatives. For example, the UN Integrated Strategy proposes a “coordination platform” wherein the main multilateral donors would meet every six months (starting in September 2013) to ensure that needs are met and overlap is avoided. AGIR calls for the establishment of coordination mechanisms at the global level (although not yet defined) and at the country level, for coordinating mechanisms to be established based on “already existing mechanisms of technical and financial partners of the Alliance,” which will vary from country to country. As one NGO representative in Niger remarked when asked about resiliency initiatives, “Theoretically, it’s a good idea. But in practice, it’s very messy.”

Most donors and UN agencies RI interviewed agreed that at the country level, national governments should take the lead in coordinating the various resiliency programs, and this is supported by the various strategy documents. However, while national ownership is essential, it is unrealistic to assume that national governments in the Sahel, which face enormous humanitarian, budgetary, and security challenges, will have capacity to coordinate this wide array of initiatives. Given the significant financial flows planned for resiliency programs (potentially amounting to billions of dollars), the broad array of actors involved, and the limited financial and human capacity of regional bodies and national governments, the importance of effective coordination cannot be overstated.

Rather than pursuing various resiliency initiatives independently and expecting national governments to coordinate them, a far better and more streamlined approach would be for the UN RC/HC in each country to take the lead on coordinating the various resiliency initiatives. The RC/HCs would be responsible for getting the input of other UN agencies, donors, regional bodies, and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, and then working with the national government to create one national-level resilience plan. In addition, the RC/HCs would identify or develop one mechanism or platform for coordinating the UN Integrated Strategy with AGIR and other donor- or IFI-led initiatives.

This approach is similar to the one adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) under the Common Framework for Preparedness, part of the IASC’s Transformative Agenda (TA). One of the goals of the TA is to build global capacity for disaster preparedness, an important component of resiliency. Towards that end, the Common Framework establishes a process for supporting national capacity for disaster preparedness “in a coherent manner using a systematic country level approach that collectively assesses capacity and need, uses this assessment to jointly develop programs and plans, and coherently implements these programmes and plans to strengthen preparedness.” In addition to recognizing the need for joint planning and coordination, the Common Framework emphasizes the key role that RC/HCs can play in “supporting government leadership and providing coordination, in particular for UN entities, but also in seeking coherence with a wide range of relevant actors.” It makes a great deal of sense for the same approach to be used in coordinating resiliency strategies at the national level in West Africa, as well as for linking them to the Common Framework and TA.

Donor-led resilience initiatives also require support. It is true that the resilience-building approach adopted in REGIS-ER is not all that different from ongoing, USAID-funded programs such as Title II Development Food Assistance Programs (DFAPs) (multi-year, non-emergency, cash-based projects that target the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition by, e.g., diversifying household incomes and strengthening agricultural productivity). Moreover, it is too early to judge whether REGIS-ER’s goal of increasing resiliency “by scaling up, deepening, and expanding upon resilient adaptations and innovations already under way” will prove transformative. Nonetheless, USAID deserves credit for successfully instituting new, cross-sectoral, joint planning processes (i.e., Joint Planning Cells) that break down humanitarian and development silos. In addition, REGIS-ER’s pool of funding from various humanitarian and development accounts represents a much improved, more comprehensive approach to programming that makes sense in countries experiencing recurrent humanitarian emergencies. USAID’s efforts to replicate this approach in other countries/regions experiencing recurrent humanitarian emergencies are most welcome. In addition, to the extent that much of the funding for USAID resiliency-building programs is currently channeled through Title II non-emergency programs authorized in the Farm Bill (i.e., DFAPs), the U.S. Congress should support robust funding for Title II non-emergency programs in line with the Senate Agricultural Appropriations bill for FY 2014, and pass a Farm Bill which includes authorization for non-emergency programs that build resilience.

One shortcoming in USAID’s strategy, however, is its limited geographic scope. The REGIS-ER project is limited to parts of Burkina Faso and Niger in which USAID has already been working on food security initiatives, and the project is managed out of USAID’s West Africa Regional Bureau in Dakar. Not included are other western Sahel countries like Chad, Mauritania, Senegal, and Nigeria – the latter being a crucial player in terms of markets, migration, and security, especially in neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso. For instance, both flooding and conflict in Nigeria over the past year have had adverse impacts on food prices and cross-border livestock trading in Niger, thus increasing food insecurity there. To achieve resiliency in the region over the long term, USAID must broaden its West Africa resiliency strategy to include other countries, especially Nigeria.

Linking Resilience to Distress Migration

Resiliency projects must offer vulnerable households more secure livelihoods that avoid a reliance on distress migration. These projects must include activities to better track and monitor migration as a negative coping strategy, as well as institute measures to mitigate its adverse impacts on vulnerable households. Finally, project success should be evaluated, in part, on the extent to which project activities reduce distress migration.

USAID’s REGIS-ER project recognizes the increasingly predominant role labor migration plays as a survival strategy for vulnerable households. It points to the risks that current labor migration practices pose to the most vulnerable households, including exploitation, extortion, sexually-transmitted illnesses (STIs), and gender-based violence (GBV), as well as their potential to undermine familial relationships and cohesion. REGIS-ER seeks to address these risks by facilitating access to national identification documents, developing the skills of workers to match skills in higher demand, and improving access to information about labor opportunities. Also included are support mechanisms to address the negative impacts of labor migration on women and families, including GBV, for both migrants and those left behind.

However, in the regions of Burkina and Niger targeted by REGIS-ER, very limited alternative livelihoods currently exist. While the identified activities may mitigate climate-related migration and displacement to some extent, they are highly unlikely to stem the flow completely. As such, in addition to mitigating migration-related risks, REGIS-ER and other resiliency programs must incorporate the need to better protect individuals who resort to distress migration in response to climate shocks. For those forced to flee to cities to engage in petty trade, more must be done to track them and to improve services and protection.

In Burkina, this means providing support to national and local governments to address the horrendous conditions at mining sites and implement improved health, safety, and child labor laws. At present, the U.S. Department of Labor is funding a $5 million, four-year technical assistance project to support efforts to reduce child labor in cotton farming and informal artisanal gold mining. In addition to providing education and social protection services for children, the project seeks to deliver alternative livelihood and income-generating options for families who send their children into the workforce for their own economic survival. USAID resiliency projects should link to and expand upon these projects.

Other donors, UN agencies, and national governments should likewise recognize the link between recurrent climate shocks and involuntary migration/displacement as a negative coping mechanism, and incorporate protection from displacement-related risks into their resilience-building strategies.

Finally, resiliency projects must incorporate the need to build government capacity to manage increasing levels of climate-related displacement. One important mechanism for doing so is the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa (Kampala Convention), which came into force in late 2012 and has been ratified by both Niger and Burkina Faso. The Kampala Convention extends protection to those who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or natural disasters. It also gives humanitarian and development actors an important rights-based framework within which to develop programs to mitigate natural disaster displacement and protect displaced persons through improved access to housing, basic services, and increasing livelihood opportunities, thereby reducing poverty. The UN, with donor support, should provide technical assistance to national governments as they implement the Kampala Convention and ensure the protection of those displaced by climate-related shocks.

Conclusion

The new focus on the complex threats facing the Sahel is certainly welcome, as are resilience-building initiatives that reflect a more fine-tuned understanding of the underlying causes of vulnerability. But just as building resilience requires a focus on the causes of vulnerability, so too must it include a more nuanced understanding of recurrent climate-related changes as drivers of new forms of displacement and migration which may not fit well into existing definitions or classifications. In light of the serious protection risks created by distress migration, far more research and resources must be devoted to better tracking and monitoring. In addition, the UN, donors, and others must act quickly to address the significant coordination and other challenges facing effective implementation of the region’s numerous resiliency-building initiatives. Finally, reversing the growing resiliency deficit in the Sahel will not be possible unless the countervailing pressures of population growth and rapid climate change are addressed. Resilience building should not distract the U.S. and other major emitters of greenhouse gases from the urgent need to slow and reverse climate change before it is too late, while also mitigating its devastating impacts on populations, like those in the Sahel, who are least responsible.

Alice Thomas traveled to Burkina Faso and Niger in June 2013 to assess the situation of vulnerable households affected by repeated droughts and food crises, and gather information on the implementation of new UN- and donor-led resilience initiatives.

KEY MESSAGES

• A February 2013 FEWS NET West Africa Alert raised concerns that prices could increase atypically during the April-to-September period given conflict and flood-related market disruptions in Nigeria. Subsequent market behavior has followed expected trends, as indicted in a May 2013 Special Report. FEWS NET participated in a joint market assessment in June 2013 to better understand staple food market behavior and stock levels, as well as their implications for acute food security outcomes.

• Despite high food prices in Nigeria and border areas of neighboring countries, private traders in the marketing system appear to have responded effectively to this year’s atypical conditions. Burkina Faso played a more prominent role in supplying structurally-deficit areas of western Niger than previously anticipated. Despite these increased trade flows, there have been no impacts on local price levels in Burkina Faso due to the availability of stocks from above-average 2012 production.

• FEWS NET expects prices to be below their respective 2012 levels through December 2013 in areas of West Africa with good 2013/14 production prospects and above-average carryover stocks. The opposite is true in areas that continue to be directly affected by conflict in Nigeria and areas with below-average carryover stocks.

• Conflict in northeastern Nigeria continues to disrupt local and cross-border staple food and livestock markets. Atypically high cereal prices are negatively affecting household purchasing power during the lean season (June – September). Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food security outcomes are currently present in Borno and Yobe states of Nigeria. Neighboring areas of Niger (Diffa) are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

• Higher-than-average income levels earned by poor households in northwestern Nigeria and western and central Niger during the 2012/13 consumption year have offset the effects of abnormally high staple food prices. Above-average cash crop production and price levels in late 2012 have played a particularly important role in absorbing price increases and maintaining Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity in these areas.

Une période de soudure avec des prix nettement au dessus de la moyenne saisonnière

MESSAGES CLÉS

• Conformément aux previsions meteorologiques, les pluies fortes à modérées enregistrées en fin juin/début juillet ont donné le top départ de la campagne agricole 2013/14 avec des semis réalisés dans 86 pour cent des villages agricoles contre 90 pour cent en moyenne à la même période. Toutefois, dans certaines localités des régions de Zinder, Tahoua et Diffa, les pluies tardives pourraient occasioner de légers retards dans l’installation de la saison.

• L’analyse des prix des céréales locales (mil, sorgho) montrent une tendance saisonnière en hausse typique mais à un niveau moderement au desssus de la moyenne saisonnière à cause des flux atypiques. Cette tendance des prix correspond à des hausses mensuelles extremes de 5 à 10 pour cent par rapport a la normale.
  La continuation des hausses atypiques va probablement continuer dans les zones sur la frontiere de Nigeria pour atteintre leur pic en aout. .

• En mai/juin 2013, 1 123 618 personnes, y compris les réfugiés, ont été identifiées en insécurité alimentaire à l’issue des analyses techniques du Dispositif National chargées des castastrophes et crises alimentaires. Cette situation traduit à une forte diminution de 56 pour cent par rapport au nombre moyen des 5 dernières années.

• Suite au déroulement normal de la campagne agropastorale, les revenus saisonniers vont se normaliser et s’ajouter aux revenus en cash et food des programmes d’assistances en juillet-septembre pour atténuer l’impact des prix elevés des ménages pauvres qui seront en insécurité alimentaire minimale (IPC Phase 1) dans la plupart du pays. Toutefois, à Diffa et Nguigmi, les ménages pauvres vont continuer a se trouver IPC Phase 2 : Stress en juillet-septembre apres une soudure difficile et les prix des denrees de base tres elevees par rapport a normale. La consommation des produits des nouvelles récoltes en octobre-décembre et les différentes formes de payement en nature et en cash vont améliorer significativement l’accès alimentaire et une insécurité alimentaire au niveau IPC Phase 1 Minimale sera observée dans tout le pays à partir d’octobre.

L’insuffisance des pluies au sud impacte les opérations culturales dans les zones de production

MESSAGES CLÉS

• Malgré un retard léger de la campagne agricole suite aux insuffisances pluviométriques dans les zones de production, les prévisions de production pour les céréales et le coton pour 2013/2014 restent moyennes. Une récolte moyenne est probable due aux appuis en intrants de l’Etat et des partenaires et à la poursuite très probable selon les prévisions météo des pluies jusqu’en octobre.

• La situation sécuritaire s’améliore dans les régions de Tombouctou et de Gao, tandis qu’a Kidal, les perturbations localisées continuent à être observées. En général la sécurité retrouvée favorise le retour des populations déplacées et refugiés avec la reprise des activités économiques et la mise en œuvre des appuis humanitaires. En fin juin, 14, 015 personnes sont retournées à Gao (service du développement social).

• L’approvisionnement des marchés est suffisant et les prix des céréales sont de façon générale en dessous des niveaux de 2012 malgré la baisse des offres résultant du début tardif de la pluviométrie dans les zones de production qui a incité à la réticence des producteurs à déstocker. Pour la première fois depuis janvier, des hausses de prix d’environ 5 pour cent ont ainsi été observées. Les prix du mil restent supérieurs d 5 à 20 pour cent à la moyenne, et non abordables pour la plupart des pauvres pasteurs au nord.

• En juillet, le niveau d’IPC Phase 3 : Crise dans les zones pastorales du nord et la Stress aigue (IPC Phase 2) parmi les agropasteurs s’est améliorée en juillet en raison de la continuation des importants appuis humanitaires depuis mars qui se sont intensifiés depuis juin. Cependant, les baisses des revenues saisonnières et la reprise timide de l’économie continuent à contraindre le pouvoir d’achat des ménages pasteurs pauvres en fin de soudure et les agropasteurs qui entament la soudure. Ces populations se maintiendront en IPC Phase 2 : Stress jusqu’en septembre ou la disponibilité des produits de cueillette, du lait, et les premières récoltes permettent d’évoluer à IPC Phase 1 Minimale insécurité alimentaire d’octobre à décembre.

Une période de soudure normale pour les ménages très pauvres et pauvres

MESSAGES CLES

• A l’entrée de la période habituelle de soudure, la consommation alimentaire des ménages très pauvres et pauvres est normale. Mieux, les termes de l’échange bétail/céréales leur sont favorables et les actions de renforcement de la résilience dont ils bénéficient leur permettent de vivre une insécurité alimentaire Minimale, IPC Phase 1 de juillet à décembre.

• Contrairement à la tendance saisonnière marquée habituellement par une hausse des prix des céréales, on assiste plutôt à une stabilisation, voire des baisses par rapport aux mois passés. L’offre importante de céréales sur les marchés face à une demande des ménages plus faible que la normale serait la principale raison, toute chose qui facilite l’accès des ménages pauvres aux céréales.

• Globalement, les revenus des ménages, en particulier ceux issus de la vente de bétail, de produits animaux et de produits agricoles, seront meilleurs que la normale à la faveur des bonnes productions attendues à partir d’octobre et des demandes de bétails pour les fêtes de Tabaski (en octobre) et de fin d’année (en décembre). Ainsi, tout en favorisant l’accès à l’alimentation, ils permettront aux ménages de protéger ou de générer des avoirs.

ALAIN KABORÉ

Every week here on Impatient Optimists, you’ll find stories, written by one of the Frontline Health Workers Coalition’s 30+ member organizations, about the inspiring work of health workers on the frontlines of care in developing countries and how United States leadership can help ensure that everyone has access to basic care by skilled, supported and motivated frontline health workers.

“Today,” Mariama Boubacar Diallo says, “Thank God, I no longer suffer. I’m healthy; I am healed.” Mariama, a resident of the village of Kriollo Ourarsaba, located in the northern Sahel region of Burkina Faso, reflects on her recent surgery to repair the obstetric fistula she developed while giving birth to her third child four years ago.

Obstetric fistula, an injury to the birth canal resulting from an obstructed or prolonged birth, causes long-term, physical pain. Mariama, like many women suffering fistula, also experienced emotional distress from losing the respect of her family and community.

Burkina Faso, a land-locked West African country, struggles against chronic poverty like many of its neighbors in the Sahel, the southern band of the Sahara Desert that stretches across the width of the African continent. Most recently, Burkina Faso has been working to overcome the severe food shortage that has plagued the region since 2011.

Although Mariama wasn’t rejected by her husband when she suffered from obstetric fistula, her in-laws blamed and abused her.

Recognizing the urgency of the food security crisis, the USAID has reserved more than $56.5 million to fund projects working in areas of agriculture, livelihoods, health and water, sanitation and hygiene in the region. To counteract the food security crisis and mobilize productive members of society, policymakers should address the unnecessary loss of life that occurs when mothers suffer or die from preventable pregnancy and childbirth complications. Frontline health workers are a key part of the solution, both for preventing fistula from occurring and for ensuring that survivors receive the treatment they need.

Through our programs in Burkina Faso and around the developing world, Family Care International (FCI) has worked to raise awareness of the causes of and treatment for obstetric fistula. FCI-Burkina Faso, with support from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), has worked with communities and partner organizations in the Sahel region to prevent fistula by improving access to and utilization of emergency obstetric care, which is provided by midwives and doctors in health centers and hospitals that are too often inaccessible to women in rural villages.

In order to get these women to the urgent care they need, FCI and our partners have helped more than 700 villages establish emergency procedures for transporting pregnant women to the nearest health clinic when faced with life-threatening complications. We have also trained hundreds of community health and outreach workers to visit people in their communities, hold meetings to raise awareness of pregnancy complications and their treatment, and bring fistula survivors out from isolation so they can reclaim their lives. Mariama is one of those brave women who, thanks to the tenacity and commitment of frontline health workers, has triumphed over her injury and succeeded in becoming a leader in her community.

Although Mariama wasn’t rejected by her husband when she suffered from obstetric fistula, her in-laws blamed and abused her. A community outreach worker affiliated with an FCI partner found Mariama and helped her arrange surgery in a hospital in the regional capital, Dori. In the months after her surgery, she received training in modern methods of raising cattle and sheep, the primary economic activity in many parts of the Sahel.

At the end of 2010, Mariama received a grant of 100,000 CFA francs (about $200) to purchase a ram and a ewe, along with some feed, in order to establish her own breeding business. Mariama now owns four head of cattle, making her one of the village’s most prosperous and successful citizens, and she generously shares her new agricultural knowledge with her neighbors. She is fully included in baptisms, weddings, and other social events of the village — something that was inconceivable only a year ago — and has fully reunited with her in-laws. “Today,” she says, “thanks to this program, my in-law family has truly accepted me.”

Policymakers must come to better understand the impact of frontline health workers, with the resources and the know-how to empower women and get them to the care they need , on the lives of women like Mariama.

For more information for Mariama and other women in Burkina Faso, please visit The FCI Blog.

Listen

The current atmosphere in Mali is very calm, according to Aurelien Agbenonci, the UNDP Resident Representative in the country.

Mr. Agbenonci says following the 28 July elections, people have been going about their usual business, there is no tension and they are expecting the results from the ministry in charge of the election.

He believes the election will help reunite Mali which in the past 18 months has experienced an armed rebellion in the north, a military coup and French intervention.

“After the Ouagadougou agreement, the election for me constitutes an important milestone to really reunite the country because you cannot complete the job with a transitional government.”

UNDP Resident Representative in Mali, Aurelien Agbenonci.

Gerry Adams, United Nations.

Duration: 51″

Un contexte saisonnier favorable à l’amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire rurale

MESSAGES CLÉS

• La disponibilité alimentaire est satisfaisante dans tout le pays mais l’accès régulière et suffisante est difficile pour les ménages pauvres d’agriculteurs du nord et du sud-est du pays. Alors que les premiers sont affectés par deux années de mauvaises productions agropastorales, les seconds subissent les conséquences de la présence de 75 000 réfugiés qui a élevé les prix des denrées alimentaires et limité leurs revenus saisonniers. Ces deux groupes restent en situation d’IPC Phase 2 : Stress alors que la situation est stable dans les zones les plus peuplées du pays (Figure 1).
• Les pluies de juin semblent confirmer les prévisions saisonnières d’une pluviométrie égale à supérieure à celle d’une année moyenne faites par l’ACMAD, le Centre Régional Agrhymet et l’Office mauritanien de la météorologie (ONM).
  Ce serait une situation conforme à celle des années moyennes observées aux cours de ces dix dernières années.
• Dans le scenario le plus probable entre juillet et décembre, les retombées des bonnes conditions pastorales et les activités agricoles offriront, aux ménages pauvres de toutes les zones de moyens d’existence, des revenus et des productions agropastorales au moins semblables à celles d’une année moyenne. Il devrait en résulter entre août et décembre, une insécurité alimentaire minime (IPC Phase 1) (Figures 2 et 3).
• Le retour progressif de la sécurité civile dans le sud-est du pays, se traduit par l’intensification de l’exode et des échanges transfrontaliers ainsi que la baisse des flux des réfugiés. On observe des mouvements de retour qui concernent surtout les maliens arrivés après l’intervention française.

KEY MESSAGES

• In West Africa, the effects of last year's flood-related production shortfalls and civil insecurity in Nigeria continue to disrupt staple food and livestock markets. Staple food prices remained stable in the central basin in June as producers sold remaining stocks from above-average 2012 harvests to finance the current agricultural season. Cereal prices were stable or started to increase in most structurally-deficit areas as the lean season approached. Staple food availability continues to improve in northern Mali (Pages 3-5).

• In East Africa, staple food prices generally followed their seasonal trends in June. Prices increased in South Sudan, Sudan, and Ethiopia with the progression of the lean season, and decreased in Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda with ongoing harvests. Erratic cross-border trade flows, localized conflict and high levels of inflation further reinforced upward price trends in some areas. (Pages 5-7).

• In Southern Africa, maize and maize meal prices decreased on most markets as harvests continued. Price levels remained above their respective 2012 and five-year average levels due to tight regional supplies resulting from localized production shortfalls during the previous two seasons, and strong export and institutional demand. Prices continued to increase in parts of Zambia due to strong export demand, and in parts of Zimbabwe due to limited supplies (Pages 7-9).

• In Haiti, local black bean, maize, and maize flour prices were stable in rural areas with increased availability following spring harvests. Imported rice and wheat prices increased in Port-au-Prince between May and June, but were stable elsewhere in the country. In Central America, black and red beans prices were stable between May and June due to residual effects from above-average production in 2012. Maize price levels and trends varied by country (Pages 10-11).

• In Afghanistan and Tajikistan, wheat and wheat flour prices were stable or decreased in June with ongoing harvests (Page 11-12).

• International rice prices remained stable in June. Maize and wheat prices were stable at high levels; global supplies remain tight, but prospects for the upcoming 2013 harvests are favorable in key exporting countries (Figure 2). Crude oil prices were stable (Pages 2-3).

Period covered by this Final Report:19 December 2011 to 15 April 2013;

Appeal target (current): CHF 2,239,273

Appeal coverage: 93%;

Appeal history:

· Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF): CHF 231,613 was allocated from the IFRC’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) on 20 December 2011 to support the Red Cross of Chad (RCC) with food distribution to malnourished children and their families in the region of Kanem.

· This Emergency Appeal was launched on 25 February 2012 for CHF 2,239,273 to assist 123,000 beneficiaries in Lac and Kanem regions, for 12 months.

· An operations update n° 1 was issued on 25 May 2012 to provide an update on the progress of the response operation.

· A 6-months summary update was published on 16 November 2012 informing on the blanket feeding distributions, general food distributions as well as seeds distribution.

· An operations update n° 2 was published on 18 February 2013, reporting on progress between October 2012 to February 2013 and announced a 45 days’ timeframe extension to allow for monitoring of the distribution of materials consisting of motor-pumps for the irrigation facilities in marshland areas along with the drilling of wells and the distribution of agricultural tools and food processing millet grinders already pre–positioned in the field.

Summary: Despite the early DREF allocation followed by the launch of the Emergency Appeal there were some operational delays which picked-up with the arrival in Chad of international staff. The operation kicked off with the training of 108 volunteers in three regions instead of the two regions of Lac and Kanem as was originally planned in the appeal. Following a field level agreement with WFP, the additional region of Hadjar Lamis was added as a priority in terms of food assistance. Following the training, the volunteers began with beneficiary screening in Hadjar Lamis for signs of malnutrition among women and children, immediately followed by distributions that took place on time before the start of the rainy season that can cut-off the region from being accessible by road. In the region of Lac, the activities focused on screening and the distribution of blanket feeding, followed by a general food distribution in vulnerable villages of Kanem.

The overall emergency appeal objectives were reached through the provision of food assistance, distribution of agricultural materials and the construction of water points fitted with water pumps. The partnership with WFP allowed the operations to reach a larger number of beneficiaries than was originally planned at the start of the operation and covered the cost food, transportation and distributions as well as the training costs of volunteers.

Period covered by this final report: 22 December 2011 to 30 April 2013.

Appeal target: CHF 1,009,507

Appeal coverage: 76%

Appeal history:

• A Preliminary Emergency Appeal was launched on 22 December 2011 for a total of CHF 2,131,749 to assist the Mauritanian Red Crescent (MRC) deliver assistance to 10,000 households (60,000 persons) with a start-up of CHF 200,000 allocated from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) to support this operation.

• The food insecurity Emergency Appeal was launched on 25 April 2012 with a reduced budget of CHF 1,794,192 to deliver assistance to 7,000 households (42,000 persons).

• Operation update no. 1 was issued on 28 May 2012.

• The Emergency Appeal revision was issued on 26 November 2013. Due to lack of funding and in order to accommodate new needs with the arrival of Malian refugees, the appeal became a complex emergency. The budget was cut from CHF 1,794,192 to CHF 1,009,507 to assist 72,000 beneficiaries (12,000 households) consisting of: 42,000 food insecure beneficiaries, (7,000 households) in the Brakhna region and 21,000 Malian refugees (3,500 households) in M’Béra camp and 9,000 host-community beneficiaries (1.500 households) in the village of Bassikounou, commune of Fassala in the region of Hod Chargui, in the most south-eastern part of the country on the border with Mali.

• Operation update no. 2 was issued on 20 February 2013 requesting a two month time-frame extension to complete the last activities in the community gardens and the distribution of goats to the families of children suffering from malnutrition.

Summary: The Mauritania appeal was the first out of the seven Sahel food insecurity appeals to be launched. The DREF allocation of CHF 200,000 allowed the Mauritanian Red Crescent (MRC) to respond in the early stages of the food crisis. The response was based on the twin-track approach aiming at saving lives and protecting livelihoods whilst building resilience to minimize the impact of future droughts. The emergency assistance consisted of: food and fodder distributions; health and nutrition promotion; screening and referral of children and women suffering from malnutrition; on water, sanitation and hygiene promotion.

The longer-term interventions concentrated on strengthening livelihoods with agricultural support during the main as well as off-season planting, restoring the soil with tree planting and water catchments, dune retention, rehabilitating wells and solar irrigation systems, income generation, cash for work and disaster risks reduction (DRR) activities in villages of Maghtaa Lehjar department, in the Brakna region. Notable progress was achieved in improving the lives of the beneficiaries and acute rates of malnutrition in the targeted communities have disappeared.

Since the start of the conflict in the north of Mali in early 2012, the Mauritanian Red Crescent has also been responding to the needs of the Malian refugees and of the hosting communities in the Hod El Chargui region situated in the south-eastern part of the country. A total of 120 volunteers: 60 volunteers were trained to focus on the refugee community and 60 on the host-community. They have conducted sensitisation campaigns through a participatory hygiene and sanitation transformation (PHAST) in the M’Béra refugee camp and among the hosting population. Waterborne and water related diseases have reduced due to these campaigns.

In addition, throughout the emergency operation, the MRC has been working bi-laterally on longer-term nutritional activities with the French Red Cross Society in the Gorgol region.

08/01/2013 15:38 GMT

by Serge Daniel

BAMAKO, August 1, 2013 (AFP) - The results of a first round of voting in Mali's crunch presidential election will be announced on Friday, a day later than expected, the presidency said.

No explanation was given for the delay, announced by the presidency's Twitter account on Thursday, but an official from the ministry of territorial administration said vote-counting had not been completed following Sunday's poll.

"The law allows us until Friday for the publication of interim results and we have not quite finished counting. It is tedious work," the official said.

The crucial election comes after a disastrous March 2012 coup ousting president Amadou Toumani Toure, which left one of the region's most stable democracies crippled by political crisis and led to an Islamist insurgency.

As hardline Al-Qaeda allies took control of the country's vast north, and threatened to extend their often violent rule, former colonial power France launched a military offensive to drive out the Islamist fighters.

The election is seen as key to the country's recovery.

Initial results showed on Tuesday that former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita had taken a comfortable lead, and interior minister Moussa Sinko Coulibaly said there would be no need for a second round vote on August 11 if the trend continued.

But the party of Keita's rival Soumaila Cisse said Wednesday the election had been marred by "ballot stuffing", a form of electoral fraud in which people submit multiple ballots during a vote in which only one ballot per person is allowed.

He called for the interior minister Coulibaly to be sacked.

Although there were 27 presidential hopefuls, analysts have characterised the election as a two-horse race. Keita was seen as the frontrunner ahead of Cisse, a former finance minister and erstwhile chairman of the Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Despite heavy security during voting after the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa -- one of the main armed groups in northern Mali -- said it would "strike" polling stations, no serious incidents were reported on election day.

Acting president Dioncounda Traore and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon have acknowledged that the vote may be "imperfect" in a country with 500,000 citizens displaced by conflict, but have urged Malians to respect the outcome.

Critics argue that Mali, under pressure from the international community, was rushing to the polls and risked a botched election which could do more harm than good.

But initial estimates put the turnout above 50 percent, a huge improvement on the 36 percent who voted in 2007, and Mali was praised by the international community for running a transparent, credible and peaceful election.

A UN peacekeeping mission integrating more than 6,000 west African soldiers into its ranks is charged with ensuring security in the post-election period, and will grow to 11,200 troops, plus 1,400 police, by the end of the year.

The deployment allows France to start withdrawing most of the 4,500 troops it sent to Mali in January to stop the Islamists from advancing towards Bamako and Paris plans to have just 1,000 troops on the ground before the end of the year.

sd-stb/cs/ft/fb

© 1994-2013 Agence France-Presse

• Retard dans le démarrage de la campagne agricole suite à l’arrivée tardive des pluies
• Hausse du nombre de réfugiés au Nigéria, de déplacés en Guinée, retour des déplacés au Mali
• Situation alimentaire préoccupante en Guinée Bissau suite à l’échec de la campagne de noix de cajou
• Prix du mil anormalement élevé au Niger

08/01/2013 14:57 GMT

BAMAKO, 1 août 2013 (AFP) - Les résultats du premier tour de la présidentielle au Mali, qui étaient attendus jeudi, ne seront proclamés que vendredi, a annoncé la présidence malienne sur son compte Twitter.

Aucune explication n'a été donnée à ce report, mais un responsable du ministère malien de l'Administration territoriale (Intérieur) joint par l'AFP a affirmé que le "dépouillement" n'était pas "totalement" terminé.

Ce responsable a ajouté que le dépouillement des bulletins était "un travail fastidieux", mais que la loi électorale donnait cinq jours après le scrutin pour proclamer les résultats provisoires et officiels.

Le premier tour de la présidentielle s'est déroulé dimanche 28 juillet, et vendredi est donc la date limite à cette proclamation.

Des "tendances" portant sur un tiers des bulletins données mardi par le ministre de l'Administration territoriale, le colonel Moussa Sinko Coulibaly, faisaient état d'une "large avance" d'un des deux grands favoris, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, 68 ans, face à son principal rival Soumaïla Cissé, 63 ans.

"Si ces écarts sont confirmés, il n'y aura pas de deuxième tour", avait affirmé le colonel Coulibaly, ce qui avait provoqué l'indignation du camp de Soumaïla Cissé.

Le parti de M. Cissé, l'Union pour la République et la démocratie (URD), a dénoncé mercredi "un bourrage d'urnes" et affirmé qu'un second tour était "sûr à 100%" entre les deux candidats favoris.

L'URD a réclamé la démission du colonel Coulibaly, accusé d'avoir outrepassé son rôle en affirmant que qu'Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta pourrait l'emporter dès le premier tour.

bur-stb/cs/de

© 1994-2013 Agence France-Presse

FAITS SAILLANTS

• La malnutrition aiguë globale (MAG) a régressé de 1,5 % de son taux de 14,8% en 2012 mais elle est toujours au-delà du seuil d’alerte de 10%.

• Les inondations à Maradi révèlent un état d’impréparation.

• L’absence de pluies et d’écoulements dans les koris ralentit la campagne d’oignon à Agadez.

Global Highlights

• The global cereal price index increased by 9% on a year-on-year basis in the April-June 2013 quarter, mostly driven by nominal price rises of maize and wheat (+7% and +17%, respectively).

• However, on a quarterly basis (Q2 vs. Q1 2013), real global maize, wheat and rice prices2 fell by 5%, 1%, and 2%, respectively. The marked price drop for maize is driven by the improved global stock-to-use ratio of maize (+12% y/y).

• Yet maize prices are still 3% higher, while wheat and rice prices are 30% and 46% lower than during their respective peak period in 2008.

• Price trends for most domestic markets are similar to the global trend. The impact of domestic price changes on the food basket cost in the last quarter was low or moderate (<5%) in 66 out of 70 monitored countries. Only four countries experienced high (5-10%) or severe (above 10%) price impacts, namely Bangladesh, the Kyrgyz Republic, Zambia (all high) and Bolivia (severe). The highest effects are driven by prices of maize in Zambia (+7%) and Bolivia (+6%), as well as rice in Bangladesh and Bolivia (both +6%).

• Egypt’s volatile socio-political situation has been accompanied by macro-economic instability, rising unemployment and poverty, and worsening food security for many vulnerable households.

• Several macro-economic factors are maintaining pressure on food and non-food prices in Pakistan.
Food inflation in particular contributes to recent food insecurity.

LISTEN

Fighting between Government forces and rebels in the northern part of Mali, which started early last year, has caused insecurity, instability and a growing refugee crisis.

The Human Rights Council says human rights violations were committed by rebels, terrorist groups and other organized transnational crime networkS, particularly in the north of the country.

These abuses, which included violence against women and children, summary and extrajudicial executions, and pillaging, were condemned by the Council.

Today, we tell you the story of Fatoumata, who is one of the victims of the atrocities.

Beng Poblete-Enriquez has more.

Duration: 2'40"

Background and Context

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 2012/13 Third Round Agricultural Production Estimates Survey (APES) is indi-cating that the country will register some increases in produc-tion in most of the crops except for wheat, potatoes and cotton. Cotton production has decreased drastically (31%) be-cause of the late delivery of inputs (seed and pesticides) and water logging conditions that affected some parts of country.

Maize production has been projected at 3,639,866 MT. This represents a slight increase of 0.44% from last season’s final round estimate of 3,623,924 MT. Rice production is estimated at 125,156 MT from 110, 405 MT which represent 13% increase over last season’s final estimates. Groundnut production is esti-mated at 380,787 MT from 368, 082 MT from last season’s final estimates representing a 3% increase. Pulses production (beans, pigeon peas, cow peas, field peas, grams, soya beans and chick peas) has been estimated at 660,655 MT from 581, 373 MT for last season; representing a 14% increase. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security further estimates that the total national food requirement for 2013/2014 con-sumption season will be 2,461,054 MT. Owing to the FISP and other interventions by government and its partners, the coun-try is expected to still produce a maize surplus of 194,340 MT (total cereal surplus is pegged at 271,842 MT ) despite some areas experiencing floods and dry spells when the maize crop was at its critical stage.

Il est 10h lorsque notre équipe arrive à Dar Salam, quartier dans lequel se tient la distribution alimentaire du programme EA 38.

L’équipe chargée de la distribution de Caritas Mali nous accueille chaleureusement. Le soleil est déjà haut, les personnes bénéficiaires attendent à l’ombre le commencement du processus. Parmi elles, Oumou Diarra, arrivée de Kidal après la prise de la ville avec son mari et ses six enfants âgés de 6 à 16 ans. A Kidal, elle tenait avec son époux un restaurant. Aujourd’hui, elle ne parvient pas à trouver d’activité génératrice de revenus à Bamako. Elle s’est vue remettre 3 sacs de 50 kg de riz, 33 kg de haricots, un bidon d’huile, ce qui lui permet de tenir pendant deux mois. A côté d’elle, Ouseinou Maïga a fui la région de Gao à cause de la guerre avec sa femme qui souffre d’invalidité et ses deux enfants. Ouseinou, cultivateur à Gao est ici journalier : il tente de trouver des petits boulots au jour le jour pour subvenir à ses besoins. Il a reçu aujourd’hui un sac de 70 kg de riz, des haricots et de l’huile. Bien qu’il ne puisse pas voter dimanche, n’ayant pas reçu sa carte NINA, il a bon espoir que la situation de sa région d’origine se normalise après l’élection d’un nouveau président.

Une réponse d’urgence efficace

Le programme, supervisé à Bamako par Jacques, salarié de Caritas Mali, a débuté en mai dernier et concerne sur Bamako 382 bénéficiaires. Les distributions ont lieu une fois par mois. Cette activité de distribution vient répondre à une des recommandations de la dernière rencontre du Comité de Pilotage de l’EA 38 tenue à Bamako du 24 au 26 juin dernier. Le programme EA 38 qui a débuté depuis janvier 2013 par le renforcement de capacités des Caritas du Sahel (Burkina, Niger, Sénégal et Mali), vise à apporter une réponse d’urgence efficace et coordonnée aux populations affectées directement ou indirectement par le conflit au Mali. Il se décline en trois volets : l’aide humanitaire à destination des personnes déplacées internes (PDI), des réfugiés et des communautés riveraines des camps, le renforcement des compétences techniques et des capacités opérationnelles des Caritas de la bande sahélienne, et l’amélioration de la coordination dans la gestion de la crise. L’approche originale et concertée de 4 Caritas sahéliennes (Mali, Burkina, Niger et Sénégal) permet d’apporter une réponse pertinente à de nombreuses familles en détresse. Prions pour que le mot « espoir », présent sur toutes les lèvres à l’évocation de l’élection à venir, trouve une résonnance concrète et pratique pour toutes les personnes bénéficiaires du programme mais également pour tout le peuple malien.

Alice LE MOAL Secours Catholique

By Alice LE MOAL, Secours Catholique

It is 10 AM when our team arrives in Dar Salam district where Caritas food distribution is taking place. The Caritas Mali team responsible for the distribution welcomed us warmly. The sun is already high, the beneficiaries wait in the shade for the beginning of the process.

Among them, Oumou Diarra, her husband and six children are from Kidal , they all left town when the rebels took over. In Kidal, she was running a restaurant with her husband. Today, unable to find an income-generating activity in Bamako they are standing on line . They were given three bags of 50 kg of rice, 33 kg of beans, a can of oil, allowing the family to be fed for two months.

Beside her, Ouseinou Maiga fled the Gao region because of the war with his wife who is suffering from disability and her two children. Ouseinou, a farmer, tries to find odd jobs on a daily basis to meet their needs. He received a bag of 70 kg of rice, beans and oil. Although he cannot vote on Sunday, as he did not received voting his card (NINA), he is hopeful that the situation in Gao will normalise after the election of a new president.

An effective emergency response

The program, supervised by Jacques in Bamako, an employee of Caritas Mali , began last May and covers 382 beneficiaries. Distributions are held once a month. The distribution is a response to the recommendations of the last meeting of the Steering Committee of the Emergency Appeal (EA) made from 24 to 26 June.

The EA program 38 which has since January 2013 began with the reinforcement of capacity building of Caritas Sahel (Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Mali), with the aim to provide an effective emergency response and coordinated directly or indirectly people affected by the conflict in Mali. It comes in three parts: humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and local communities around the camps, building technical skills and operational capacities of Caritas Sahel, and improving coordination in crisis management.

The original and collaborative approach of the four Caritas Sahel group (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal) will provide an appropriate response to many families in distress. Let us pray that the word “hope”, now on everyone’s lips at the thought of the upcoming election, will have a concrete and practical resonance for all beneficiaries of the program, but also for all the people of Mali.