Since hard-line Islamist groups took control of northern Mali earlier this year, regional and international attention has focused on plans for an African-led military force to drive out the insurgents. But this focus has distracted from the unmet and growing needs of displaced Malians, the majority of whom have fled to the country's south. Although easily accessible, they have received only limited assistance to date. With both the civilian government and the Malian army in a state of disarray, it will take time to get the political process on track and the army in shape to retake the north. In the meantime, meeting the needs of those displaced in the south must be prioritized. In addition, given the likelihood of a further deterioration of humanitarian conditions in both the north and south, coordination of the humanitarian response must be improved and far more emphasis must be placed on ensuring that well-developed and resourced humanitarian contingency plans are in place and ready for implementation.
Background
Over the past year, a complex humanitarian emergency has been unfolding in Mali with wide-ranging political and security implications for the broader region. In January, Tuareg separatists, long marginalized by the civilian government in the south, launched a rebellion to establish an independent state in northern Mali. The Malian government’s weak response to the rebellion sparked a military coup d’état in the capital, Bamako. Under international pressure, the junta’s leaders handed power over to an interim government in April, but political instability persists. In December, the military forced the resignation of the prime minister and the dissolution of his government. Meanwhile in the north, the power vacuum provided an opportunity for insurgents to seize control of vast areas and key population centers. Over the past eight months, the situation has rapidly deteriorated as the Tuareg separatists were pushed out by hard-line Islamists groups, including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (a regional, criminal terrorist network), and its splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).
The eruption of violence in Mali has had significant humanitarian impacts. Civilians in the north have been subjected to wide-spread human rights abuses, including killings, targeted executions, mutilations, rape and other forms of violence against women, and recruitment of child soldiers. In addition, approximately 400,000 people have been forced to flee and are now displaced either internally or as refugees in neighboring countries. Compounding the problem is the fact that when the conflict broke out earlier this year, Mali and its neighbors were already struggling to cope with a food crisis affecting 18 million people across the Sahel – including 4.6 million Malians. The presence of illegal armed groups has seriously hindered humanitarian access to already food-insecure populations in the north. In March, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) activated seven clusters to coordinate the humanitarian response to the unfolding emergency: food security, nutrition, health, protection, logistics, emergency telecoms, education, and water & sanitation (WASH). The shelter cluster was activated in November.
As of writing, it appears most likely that the UN Security Council will approve plans by ECOWAS (a West African regional organization) to launch an African-led military operation with the goal of restoring Mali’s territorial integrity. For that to occur, however, the splintered and disorganized Malian army will need to be reassembled, trained, equipped, and brought under civilian authority – a process that in and of itself could take six months to a year. In addition, the U.S. and other western governments have requested – and rightfully so – that any military deployment be accompanied by a parallel political process that includes elections and the restoration of a democratically-elected, civilian government.
There is a real chance that the deployment of a military force to northern Mali will be accompanied by a dramatic worsening of the humanitarian situation. Civilians are likely to be caught in the crossfire, additional forced displacement could occur, and insecurity may further hinder humanitarian access. But it is also likely that in the time it takes to ready a military force, the situation could deteriorate further; further political upheaval or the expansion of the insurgency south are two of the many scenarios that could play out. As discussed below, the UN humanitarian country team (HCT) is struggling to properly organize itself and respond to growing needs, including those of displaced populations in the south. Without immediate improvements, the HCT will be ill-prepared for political or humanitarian contingencies.