In 2012 discontent over the government’s handling of separatist rebels in the north of Mali triggered a coup in the capital, and opened the door to an Islamist takeover in the north. Hundreds of thousands of Malian people fled the harsh treatment and gross human rights abuses perpetrated by Islamist forces as they took control of towns and cities throughout the north of the country.
After months of limited progress towards the stabilization of the north events in recent months have dampened optimism about the future of Mali. The recent outbreak of violence in Kidal was triggered when the President of Mali visited Kidal in a bid to demonstrate government control of the north. The net result has been a re-assertion of separatist control in Kidal region, as well as Menaka and Anderamboukane towns in Gao region.
As funding plummets, the humanitarian needs in Mali continue to be immense. There are currently over 151,000 people displaced inside Mali and over 137,000 continue to live as refugees in neighbouring countries, unable to return home.
Roughly 1.5 million people are at imminent risk of running out of food and lack of adequate water is a persistent concern. Government services such as health care and education are weak or non-existent in the north, and roughly 50% of Malian people do not possess the identity cards necessary to access services, to move safely around the country, or to reclaim property abandoned during the conflict.
Ongoing clashes, breaches of ceasefire agreements and divisions within and amongst non-state armed groups have brought the peace process to a halt. Renewed violence, displacement, and a steady escalation of the use of asymmetric attacks – including landmines, IEDs and suicide attacks - against international targets has fundamentally changed circumstances in the north of Mali. The humanitarian crisis has been amplified, and humanitarian actors have been forced to adapt to these new, more dangerous context.
UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA):
The UN Stabilization Mission in Mali – known by the French acronym MINUSMA – operates at the invitation of government, and the mission’s mandate is to provide political, security and other stabilization support to the country.
As such, MINUSMA forces have become a target for numerous armed groups opposed to the government. MINUSMA is also mandated to facilitate access of humanitarian organizations to communities in need and to provide protection for Malian people under threat.
The mandate is demanding, the geographical scale is huge and the scope of the challenges facing MINUSMA military, police and civilian staff is daunting. Resources are not adequate for the task. As of June, the mission is still roughly 3,000 troops short of its authorized strength of 11,200 soldiers. Support capacities such as mobility and transport of goods is weak, a fact that is compounded by the large areas to be covered in Mali, and the harsh climate that wears down equipment.
The role and responsibility of the mission is unclear to most Malian people, and this lack of communication between the mission and local communities has lead to suspicion and outright scapegoating. When non-government armed forces perpetrate attacks against Malian forces or civilian targets, MINUSMA is often blamed. When government forces were defeated in Kidal and Menaka, Malian people protested against MINUSMA throughout the country, blaming them for failing to support government forces and calling for a MINUSMA withdrawal.
This misunderstanding of the MINUSMA mandate and capacity, and the mistrust of the peacekeepers is largely due to a real lack of communication and contact between MINUSMA forces – the most visible part of the mission – and local communities.
At present, MINUSMA military do some patrolling, but rarely venture outside of larger population centers, and there is no regular channel for ordinary people to engage with the mission. Allegations of serious indiscipline – including sexual exploitation and abuse, looting, and intimidation – by MINUSMA forces has also served to lower public opinion of the peacekeepers and raises questions as to the utility of the presence.
Even if allegations are untrue, a lack of communication and a lack of appearance of taking these issues seriously will continue to erode MIUSMA’s reputation. Protests and open hostility against MINUSMA forces are likely to escalate if MINUSMA does not develop a communication strategy that allows for Malian people throughout the deployment areas to have regular, reciprocal communication with the peacekeepers.
Positive Developments for the Protection of Civilians:
In a positive development, the mission appointed a senior Protection of Civilians focal point in early April, tasked with the development of a mission-wide protection of civilians (PoC) strategy to ensure that protection is prioritized by all aspects of the mission. The Human Rights section – tasked with monitoring human rights abuses – is also being strengthened throughout the country. Both of these departments engage actively with protection coordination mechanisms. and directly with national and international NGOs, and the strengthening of these capacities is to be applauded.
However, strategy demand political support and capable staffing to ensure that is it actively implemented, and – in addition to communication needs, MINUSMA military forces require s direct line to communities in order to better understand shifting protection threats and civilian vulnerabilities at the field level.
In order to address these gaps, the UN Security Council, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) and senior MINUSMA leadership should;
• Hire dedicated Protection of Civilians Officers to be based in each MINUSMA field office to provide support to the HoO and ensure that a PoC perspective permeates the mission at the operational and tactical levels.
• Appoint a senior Harm Mitigation Adviser to report and institute the development of a civilian casualty tracking capacity and amends mechanism. These would support MINUSMA military to minimize the civilian harm brought about by MINUSMA military operations, and to make amends in a culturally appropriate manner.
• Prioritize the deployment of the Community Liaison Assistants (CLA) – a capacity already under discussion. The CLA concept was first piloted within the MONUC/MONUSCO mission in the Democratic republic of Congo and produced excellent results. CLAs are local staff based within UN peacekeeping military units in the field, working closely with both the community and the unit commander to ensure a free flow of information and a better understanding of community perspectives and protection needs.
The Norwegian Refugee Council is providing food and shelter assistance, education, legal assistance and referral information for Malian people in Central and Northern Mali and Burkina Faso.
For more information, or for press interviews please contact Erin A. Weir – erin.weir@nrc.no– +223 75 99 75 22
