Sorghum, millet, white maize, and local and imported rice are the most important food commodities. Millet is most heavily consumed in the eastern and northern regions of the country. Local rice is another basic food commodity, especially for poorer households. Imported rice and white maize are most commonly consumed in and around the capital. The Marché d'Atrone in N’Djamena, the capital city, is the largest market for cereals. Moundou is an important consumer center for sorghum and the second largest market after the capital. The Abéché market is located in a northern production area. The Sarh market is both a local retail market and a cross-border market

Local rice and sorghum are the most consumed food products by poor households in Mauritania followed by imported wheat which is a substitute that these households turn to the most. Local rice is grown in the river valley (in the southern regions of Trarza, Brakna, Gorgol and Guidimakha). Sorghum is produced in all areas of production (rainfed) and in flood-recession areas. However, a significant portion is imported from Mali and Senegal. Mauritania depends greatly on food imports (70% in a good agricultural year and 85% in a bad year) than on internal production. Nouakchott is the principal collection market for imported products and also the distribution market where traders acquire supplies for the secondary markets referenced below.
Cooking oil is consumed mainly in urban areas. The sale of animals is a lifestyle in all areas and an important source of income and food.

Millet, rice, and sorghum constitute the basic staple foods for the majority of the Malian population. Millet has traditionally been the most widely consumed, but since 2005 rice has become a popular substitute in urban households. Sorghum is generally more important for rural than urban households. Markets included are indicative of local conditions within their respective regions. Ségou is one of the most important markets for both the country and region because it is located in a very large grain production area. Bamako, the capital and largest urban center in the country, functions as an assembly market. It receives cereals from Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso for consumption and also acts as an assembly market for trade with the northern regions of the country (Kayes and Koulikoro) and Mauritania. Markets in the deficit areas of the country (Timbuktu and Gao) receive their supplies of millet and rice from Mopti, Ségou and Sikasso.

Staple Food Markets in East Africa: White maize is the main staple grain consumed in Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia. In Uganda, white maize is grown mainly as a commercial crop for export in the region. Imported rice is a major staple for Djibouti and Somalia, which mainly consume belem—the imported red rice. Tanzania is also a major producer and source of rice in the region while Kenya and Uganda are minor producers. Both red and white sorghum are produced and consumed in the region. This is an important staple in Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia as well as in other marginal agricultural areas of the region. It is also a substitute cereal among the rural poor. Red sorghum is mainly grown in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, and is the preferred type for households in Djibouti. Beans are an important source of protein and a complementary food crop grown in the high potential agricultural areas of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda,
Burundi and Ethiopia. It is consumed across household types. Maize and beans are the most heavily traded commodities in the region. The cooking banana–matoke is the primary staple in Uganda. Uganda is also a main source of cooking and other types of bananas traded in the region especially in Southern Sudan. However, bananas are not traded nearly as heavily as maize or beans.

West Africa can be divided into three agro-ecological zones or three different trade basins (West Basin, Central Basin and East Basin). Both important for understanding market behavior and dynamics.
The three major agro-ecological zones are the Sahelian, the Sudanese and the Coastal zones where production and consumption can be easily classified. (1) In the Sahelian zone, millet is the principal cereal cultivated and consumed particularly in rural areas and increasingly, when accessible, in urban areas. Exceptions include Cape Verde where maize and rice are most important, Mauritania where sorghum and maize are staples, and Senegal with rice. The principal substitutes in the Sahel are sorghum, rice, and cassava flour (Gari), the latter two in times of shortage. (2) In the Sudanese zone (southern Chad, central Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, southern Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Serra Leone, Liberia) maize and sorghum constitute the principal cereals consumed by the majority of the population. They are followed by rice and tubers, particularly cassava and yam. (3) In the Coastal zone, with two rainy seasons, yam and maize constitute the most important food products. They are supplemented by cowpea, which is a significant source of protein.
The three trade basins are known as the West, Central, and East basins. In addition to the north to south movement of particular commodities, certain cereals flow horizontally. (1) The West basin refers to Mauritania, Senegal, western Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and The Gambia where rice is most heavily traded. (2) The Central basin consists of Côte d'Ivoire, central and eastern Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo where maize is commonly traded. (3) The East basin refers to Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Benin where millet is traded most frequently. These three trade basins are shown on the map above.

Rice, millet, sorghum, and maize are the primary staple foods in Senegal.
Groundnuts are both an important source of protein and a commonly grown cash crop. Imported rice is consumed daily by the vast majority of households in Senegal particularly in Dakar and Touba urban centers. Local rice is produced and consumed in the Senegal River Valley. St. Louis is a major market for the Senegal River Valley. Millet is consumed in central regions where Kaolack is the most important regional market. Maize is produced and consumed in areas around Kaolack, Tambacounda, and the Senegal River Valley. Some maize is also imported mainly from the international market. High demand for all commodities exists in and around Touba and Dakar. They are also important centers for stocking and storage during the lean season. The harvests of grains and groundnuts begin at the end of the marketing year in October; and stocks of locally produced grains are drawn down throughout the marketing year. Senegal depends more on imports from the international market for rice than from cross border trade which mainly includes cattle from Mali and Mauritania that supply Dakar and surrounding markets.

L’Urgence au nord-est du Nigeria restera la plus grande préoccupation jusqu’en janvier 2017

MESSAGES CLES

• Des évaluations rapides récentes, bien que non statistiquement significatives, suggèrent qu’une insécurité alimentaire très élevée de type d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) et même Famine (Phase 5 de l’IPC) pourrait se produire dans les poches les plus touchés par le conflit et moins accessibles et se maintenir jusqu’en janvier 2017. En outre, une «urgence nutritionnelle» a été déclarée dans l'Etat de Borno par le ministère nigérian de la Santé et de l'information. Un accès humanitaire amélioré et une augmentation significative de l'assistance sont nécessaires de toute urgence pour sauver des vies dans ces zones.

• Ailleurs et d’une manière générale, des précipitations moyennes à supérieures à la moyenne avec une bonne répartition se poursuivent excepté à l’extrême Ouest du Sahel, notamment en Mauritanie Ouest et au Sénégal. Les conditions sont en général favorables au développement des cultures et des pâturages. La soudure pastorale tire à sa fin dans la plupart des zones pastorales et l’intensification des activités agricoles, crée des opportunités de revenus pour les ménages pauvres.

• L’approvisionnement du marché continue à être normal dans la région suites aux déstockages opérés par les agriculteurs et les commerçants avec la progression satisfaisante de la saison et les échanges transfrontaliers normaux. Cependant, l'insécurité et les conflits continuent à perturber le fonctionnement des marchés au nord du Mali et autour du Lac Tchad. Aussi, la dépréciation de la Naira engendre une forte hausse des prix des céréales au Nigeria et perturbe les flux avec le Sahel.

• D’une manière générale, les conditions de sécurité alimentaires sont moyennes à bonnes. Elles favorisent un accès saisonnier au moins moyen aux aliments et aux revenus dans la plupart des zones agricoles et agropastorales. Les ménages sont en mesure de tirer les revenus à travers les stratégies habituelles favorisant ainsi le maintien d’une insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) en générale actuellement. Elle persistera jusqu’aux prochaines récoltes et se généralisera dans toute la région jusqu’en janvier 2017.

• Cependant, la Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) sévissant localement dans les zones de faible performance agro-pastorale du Sahel tchadien en 2016 et le Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) sévissant en Mauritanie, au Sénégal, au Mali, au Niger et au Tchad pourra persister jusqu’en la fin de la soudure en septembre et faire place progressivement à une insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) à partir d’octobre suite aux récoltes.

• Dans les pays sous menace Ebola, les conditions continuent à être favorables pour le maintien d’une insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) jusqu’en janvier 2016. Toutefois, en Sierra Leone, le Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) persistera de façon général jusqu’en septembre pour ne subsister que localement à partir d’octobre dans les zones de persistance de faible pouvoir d’achat limitant la satisfaction des besoins non alimentaires de base.

KEY MESSAGES

• In West Africa, market availability was good in June with supplies from above-average 2015/16 regional harvests, and international rice and wheat imports. Markets remained disrupted throughout the Lake Chad Basin and in parts of Central and Northern Mali. The recent depreciation of the Naira has led to price increases across Nigeria and reduced purchasing power for livestock in the Sahel (Page 3).

• In East Africa, maize prices followed seasonal downward trends in surplus-producing Tanzania, supporting a steady flow of exports to regional markets. Despite the availability of well below average supply from production in Ethiopia in late 2015 and early 2016, staple food prices have remained stable with the availability of food through humanitarian assistance programs underway. The South Sudanese Pound was allowed to float in December, leading to a persistent depreciation of the local currency and reducing purchasing power. Markets remain disrupted by insecurity in South Sudan and Yemen (Page 4).

• In Southern Africa, maize availability is well below average following a consecutive year of well-below average regional production. Production in Zambia is estimated as average, while South Africa did not produce enough to meet domestic requirements. Maize prices began to increase several months early in many areas and prices are well above-average levels across the region. Imports from outside of the region (likely from well-supplied international markets) will be required to fill the very large maize import gap (Page 5).

• In Central America, regional bean supplies were average, while imports sustained stable levels of maize supplies. Maize and bean prices were atypically stable or increased. Locally produced bean and maize availability remained below average in Haiti, while imported commodity prices and availability remained stable (Page 6).

• In Central Asia, wheat availability remained adequate region-wide and trade continued between surplus and deficit countries. Prices are below their respective 2015 levels in surplus-producing areas (Page 7).

• International staple food markets remain well supplied.
  Wheat and rice prices were stable, while maize and soybean prices increased in June (Figures 2 and 3). Crude oil prices increased but remained well below average (Page 2).

Relocation of IDPs to UN House started on 28 July with relocation of 115 IDPs from UNMISS Tongping in the last two days. Out of several cholera cases reported in both sites, one positive and two positive confirmed by culture for Tongpiny and UN House respectively. Health and WASH partners have stepped up efforts on cholera response.

OCHA reports that approximately 12,500 people remain displaced due to the fighting that broke out in Juba on 7 July and continued until a ceasefire was declared on 11 July. Of these 11,338 people are sheltering in the UN Tong Ping and UN House bases. An estimated 1,250 IDPs are staying in Don Bosco collective center in Gumbo.

• 7 million people affected by the conflict and in need of humanitarian assistance

• 2 million people have been displaced (the majority of which are in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe)

• 4.4 million people are severely food insecure (IPC phases 3 and 4)

• 2.5 million SAM children

by Delphine Mechoulan

A year after the signing of a peace agreement with northern rebels, the government of Mali and United Nations Security Council are seeking an increase of 2,500 troops for the country. Ahead of the renewal of its mandate on Thursday this week, the UN stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is struggling just to provide for the security of its own personnel. While new peacekeepers might increase its capacity to respond to threats, there is a need to reassess the mission’s overall mandate, particularly its understanding of what state authority entails in Mali and how this can be reestablished.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has proposed including a quick reaction force—a long-standing request of the Malian government—within the expanded MINUSMA. This illustrates a reinforced security agenda for the mission, which responds to the stalled implementation of the peace agreement and an increase in threats. During the past year jihadists have continued to move south to the Mopti and Segou regions and are targeting UN peacekeepers. Attacks are being claimed by groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front. Clashes between armed groups that signed the peace agreement—considered ceasefire violations—have also resumed, reviving fears of widespread intercommunal violence.

The peace deal, signed in two phases in May and June 2015 between the government and two coalitions of armed Tuareg-Arab rebels, was designed to provide a framework for long-term stability, but implementation is at a relative standstill. The lack of concrete progress and the worsening security environment has led to disillusionment among many parties. This includes local populations concerned about the absence of so-called “peace dividends” such as improved basic services, education, health, and justice.

The situation highlights the general failure of MINUSMA—in its role as one of the international custodians of the peace deal—to prioritize long-term political solutions and adopt a more localized, people-centric approach to stabilization. This would be in keeping with the “primacy of politics” approach recommended in last year’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report. MINUSMA has instead been pulled in a more militarized direction. To move past this, its support for the “extension of state authority” requirement of its mandate should be reconsidered to emphasize political negotiation and the fostering of stronger state-society relations. This is key to building legitimacy and trust in those authorities that will assume responsibility for Mali’s future.

Extension of State Authority

The extension of state authority is one of the complex expectations the UN Security Council has recently placed on peacekeeping operations. Although no fixed definition of state authority has been established, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office’s Capstone doctrine of 2015 identified various measures for missions, including developing political participation, operationally supporting the immediate activities of state institutions, small-scale capacity building, and supporting constitutional and institutional restructuring. A UN Civil Affairs Handbook also contains a framework for prioritizing and sequencing this engagement, although its recommendations remains limited in practice.

This focus of MINUSMA is likely to continue given the conclusions of a Department of Peacekeeping Operations strategic review in March 2016, which highlighted the mission’s need to “prioritize its support to the Government in the implementation of key provisions of the [peace] agreement, in particular those related to the gradual restoration and extension of State authority.” The latest Secretary-General’s report on Mali highlighted that there had been some limited progress on this task. This includes the establishment, on January 19, of the two new administrative regions of Menaka (formerly part of Gao) and Taoudeni (formerly part of Timbuktu); the promulgation, on May 10, of a local communities code, linked to the establishment of interim authorities in the Gao, Kidal, Menaka, Taoudenni, and Timbuktu regions; and the appointment of new governors of Kidal, Menaka, and Taoudenni on March 31, in response to ongoing security challenges, though Taoudenni’s governor is currently in Timbuktu and Kidal’s remains in Gao.

Nonetheless, progress in extending local administration in the north of Mali remains key. At present, the state’s efforts there have mostly focused on increasing security measures in order to protect infrastructure construction. Although this expands the state’s visibility, it does not automatically increase its authority. As the Capstone report outlined, states “derive authority both from their ability to perform their functions effectively and their ability to perform these functions legitimately.”

In Mali, public trust has been weakened by failures in implementing previous peace agreements, the historically feeble presence of the state in the north, violations committed by the army and other public institutions, and an ongoing lack of security, which have only created feelings of exclusion and injustice.

Prior to the 2012 crisis that pitted northern and southern forces against each other, Mali had seen four other rebellions that gave rise to four different peace agreements. All included provisions for decentralizing state services and reinforcing representation of northerners in the central government. All failed to deliver on this promise. In the most recent process, international mediation appeared to replicate past mistakes, by favoring yet another decentralized governance structure that has until now failed to take root.

As highlighted by an International Crisis Group report from 2015, it is important not to try to rebuild the institutions of a “sick political system.” The peace agreement should have reflected the aspirations of northern populations for change and recognized that functions traditionally assigned to the state can also be carried out by a combination of informal, ad hoc, traditional, or religious entities, which already enjoy a certain level of legitimacy within their communities. One way of achieving this would be nominating local authorities by consensus between the national government and communities themselves. The challenge is to find a way to marry traditional forms of representation with an embrace of democracy.

With this in mind, the government and armed groups took a big step forward on June 15 when they agreed to establish interim administrative authorities in northern areas. This could be more representative of the region’s interests and bring a broader array of people into the equation. The long-delayed move was initially planned for three months after the signature of the peace agreement and provides a much-needed avenue for finding further political solutions to Mali’s insecurity and development issues. It also points the way forward for a rejuvenated MINUSMA, working in support of the state.

Redefining MINUSMA’s Role

The new mandate of the UN mission could explicitly mention that the provision of people-centered development services be part and parcel of the extension of state authority, rather than an add-on track of secondary priority. Alternatively, the work of the mission with the UN Country Team—which is tasked largely with development-related tasks, while MINUSMA focuses on political and security aspects—should be expanded, creating a fully integrated strategy. This would help mitigate the limitations of the state-centric and prescriptive approaches to peacebuilding pursued thus far.

Such a mandate would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the newly adopted overarching framework of “sustaining peace” within the UN system. It would make room for inclusiveness of civil society and traditional leaders in decisions that affect their lives. These connections were unfortunately lacking from a recently established international commission of inquiry, as well as a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission in Mali.

MINUSMA could also work with the government of Mali to make consultation with local communities a common practice, including before the reestablishment of state officials and institutions. The National Conference planned for later this year creates an opportunity—provided that the event is sufficiently inclusive and consultative—to address legitimacy and trust deficits by relaunching the discussion around the foundation of governance in Mali.

Furthermore, establishing a compact between MINUSMA and the government, an idea which has been raised in discussions in Mali and UN headquarters in New York, could also include more participation of local communities, although the feasibility of this remains to be seen. It is time to put politics back into stabilization efforts and to make Mali a model of extending state authority, within the context of improved state-society relations and people-centric peace operations.

Delphine Mechoulan is a Policy Analyst in the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.

Originally published by the Global Observatory.

Chad faces a numerous simultaneous and inter-connected humanitarian crises in a broader context of chronic vulnerability.
Insecurity in the region has caused significant population movement from neighbouring countries (Sudan, CAR, Nigeria) as well as internal displacement.
Meanwhile, millions are affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, especially in the Sahel belt. In terms of health, the prevalence of some epidemics (measles, malaria) persists. Lastly, recurrent natural disasters such as droughts and floods are exacerbated by the El Niño phenomenon.

Key Messages

• Les cumuls des pluies enregistrées jusqu’au 30 juin ont permis de réaliser les semis dans 85 pour cent des villages agricoles contre 50 pour cent en 2015 à la même période. Les travaux agricoles de semis et de labours procurent des revenus moyens pour les ménages pauvres et favorisent des conditions d’insécurité alimentaire aiguë Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) dans la plupart du pays qui vont continuer jusqu’au moins en janvier 2017.

• Les marchés sont bien approvisionnés à la faveur d’un bon fonctionnement des flux internes et d’une bonne circulation des céréales favorisée par le taux d’échange Naira nigérian/FCFA à l’exception de la région de Diffa. Les prix des céréales sont stables entre mai et juin et se situent globalement en dessous de la moyenne quinquennale sauf sur quelques marches qui affichent des hausses saisonnières normales en période de soudure.

• Suite à l’installation timide de la campagne de la saison des pluies en zones pastorales, l‘insécurité alimentaire aiguë de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) va persister jusqu’en août 2016 chez les ménages pauvres pastoraux soumis à une soudure plus précoce et plus longue cette année. Toutefois, les apports de l’hivernage amélioreront les conditions pastorales en septembre et favoriseront une insécurité alimentaire aiguë Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) jusqu’au moins janvier 2017.

• Les attaques récentes dans la région de Diffa aggravent les conditions difficiles de sécurité alimentaire et augmentent le nombre de déplacés internes estimés à environ 250.000 personnes par OCHA en juin 2016. L’accès aux aliments et aux principaux moyens d’existence reste limité pour la plupart des ménages pauvres et déplacés. La situation de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) ou de Stress (Phase 2! de l’IPC) va probablement persister jusqu’en janvier 2017.

Key Messages

• L’installation de l’hivernage en juillet, améliorant les conditions pastorales, accentuera la hausse du prix des animaux et renforcera la production laitière. Les activités agricoles vont générer, entre juillet et août, des revenus moyens et conduire à des productions agricoles au moins moyennes. Le gouvernement, suite à la subvention des intrants agricoles et la disponibilité du crédit agricole, vise l’exploitation céréale supérieure à la moyenne quinquennale. Une situation Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) restera pour la plupart du pays jusqu’au moins en janvier.

• Les prix du bétail sont toujours dans une tendance haussière qui va s’accentuer avec les demandes des prochaines fêtes religieuses. Les termes de l’échange continueront d’évoluer en faveur des ménages, renforçant ainsi leur capacité d’accès aux denrées alimentaires commercialisées. A l’exception des prix des riz soumis à des fréquentes fluctuations depuis février, ceux des autres produits alimentaires devraient être stabilisés à leurs niveaux actuels jusqu’en janvier, par les récoltes et un approvisionnement satisfaisant des marchés.

• Le niveau de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) affectant les ménages pauvres de l’Inchiri et l’ouest de la zone agropastorale (les moughataa de Moudjeria et de Monguel et quelques poches dans le Brakna) évoluera vers une insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) dès septembre avec les nouvelles récoltes. Toutefois, les impacts des atypiques ventes et pertes animales pendant les années précédentes ainsi que la hausse du prix du riz fragilisent cette situation.

Key Messages

• La campagne agro-pastorale 2016-2017 s’est installée normalement sur l’ensemble du pays suite à une pluviométrie régulière depuis le début de juillet; Ce qui a conduit aux semis généralisés dans toutes les zones agricoles qui ont atteint par exemple plus de 70 pourcent dans le Sila et une partie du Ouaddaï (Assoungha et Abdi), qui rend la campagne plus performante jusque-là comparée à une année normale et renforce la situation Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) dans la plupart du pays.

• Les animaux commencent à retrouver leur embonpoint grâce à l’émergence de pâturage observé dans toute la zone agropastorale. Les transhumants suivent leur mouvement saisonnier normal et leur sécurité alimentaire s’améliore à travers les revenus des produits laitiers. Grace à une consommation alimentaire adéquate, la plupart des ménages pasteurs sont en Phase Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC).

• Les marchés céréaliers sont bien approvisionnés par rapport à la normale suite à l’approvisionnement régulier à partir de différentes zones de production. Les stocks commerçants continuent à satisfaire les besoins des consommateurs grâce à l’offre régulière assurée par les grossistes. Les prix des céréales en juillet sont globalement stables pour le maïs et le riz, puis en baisse pour le mil et sorgho comparée à la moyenne quinquennale.

• Suite aux exactions persistantes de Boko Haram, la fuite des populations du Lac Tchad continue vers les grandes villes jugées plus sécurisés et des villages comme Kiskra, Ngouboua, et Tchoukoutalia ont été abandonnés en juin/juillet. Selon le chef de la Société pour le Développement du Lac (SODELAC) à Bagasola, des familles résidantes à Bol ont accueilli des familles entières de déplacés et leur poids pèse très lourd sur les moyens d’existence des ménages autochtones. Par conséquence, la zone reste en Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC).

Regional mixed migration summary for May 2016 covering mixed migration events, trends and data for the West Africa region (Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Liberia).

Throughout this report the term migrant/refugee is used to cover all those involved in the mixed migration flows (including asylum-seekers, trafficked persons, smuggled economic migrants, refugees). If the caseload mentioned refers only to refugees or asylum-seekers or trafficked persons it will be clearly stated.

Movements Toward Europe: Between January and May 2016 West African migrants and refugees made up 55% of arrivals by sea to Italy. An estimated 5,668 Nigerians, 3,023 Ivoirians, 3,025 Guineans and 2,645 Senegalese arrived by sea to Italy using the Central Mediterranean Route since January 2016

FOOD SECURITY SNAPSHOT

• Adequate rains so far have facilitated plantings and crop development in most regions
  
• Millet prices up on previous year
  
• Humanitarian assistance continues to be needed, including for Nigerian and Malian refugees

Good rains since beginning of cropping season provided adequate soil moisture reserves

Rainfall has been adequate since the start of the growing season, allowing land preparation and plantings to progress. Cumulative rainfall as of early July was above average in 60 percent of the meteorological stations, and 91 percent of villages had finished their plantings by the first dekad of July, compared to about 68 percent last year. Crops are emerging and already tillering/leafing in several regions. Pastures have improved significantly in the main agro-pastoral and pastoral zones.

An above-average crop was gathered in 2015. The aggregate cereals production in 2015 was estimated at some 5.4 million tonnes about 11 percent above the 2014 output and 14 percent above the average of the previous five years. Production of millet, the most important staple crop, increased slightly by 3 percent compared to 2014.

Cereal prices showed seasonal increases in most markets

Niger is highly dependent on imports of coarse grains (millet, sorghum and maize) from its neighbours Nigeria and Benin to cover its cereal requirements. Reflecting ample regional supplies, cereal markets have been well supplied and prices remained mostly stable until April 2016. However, cereal prices showed seasonal increases in most markets in May and June. As a result, millet prices in Niamey in July 2016 were 14 percent above their year-earlier levels.

Continued assistance still needed for vulnerable people, including refugees

Niger hosts a large number of refugees due to the continuing civil conflict in neighbouring Mali and Nigeria. The influx of refugees increased dramatically over the past few months following the deterioration of the security situation in north eastern Nigeria. Over 114 000 people are estimated to have left Nigeria for the Diffa Region of Niger; while an additional 60 000 Malian refugees are still living in Niger. The refugee crisis has exacerbated an already fragile food situation. Niger has been struck by successive severe food crises in recent years that resulted in the depletion of household assets and high level of indebtedness. The food security situation has remained difficult in several parts of the country due to the lingering effects of the previous crises and the impact of recent years’ erratic rains on crops and pastures in some regions. Several segments of the population still need food and non-food assistance to restore their livelihoods and enable them to have better access to food. Over 657 000 people are estimated to be in Phase 3: “Crisis” and above, according to the last analysis of the “Cadre Harmonisé” (Harmonized Framework) conducted in the country.

Retarder le début de l’allaitement augmente de 80 % le risque de décès des nourrissons

N’Djaména, 1 AOUT 2016 – Au Tchad, selon la dernière enquête MICS, 97 % des enfants de moins de six mois sont allaités au sein mais moins d’un pour cent (0,3 %) n’a reçu que le lait maternel.

Le lait maternel constitue la principale source de nutriments pour l’enfant. Pendant les six premiers mois, l’allaitement exclusif, c’est-à- dire sans aucun autre ajout – excepté les médicaments - est recommandé par le Ministère de la Santé Publique, l’OMS et l’UNICEF. Le lait maternel transmet à l’enfant les anticorps de la mère et tous les éléments nutritifs nécessaires. En plus, le lait maternel, étant stérile, permet d’éviter la diarrhée et d’autres maladies tout en renforçant les liens psychoaffectifs entre la mère et l’enfant.

« Faire trop attendre les nouveau-nés pour le premier contact avec leur mère diminue les chances de survie des nourrissons, limite la production de lait maternel et réduit les chances d’un allaitement exclusif », déclare France Bégin, Conseillère pour la nutrition à l’UNICEF. « Si tous les bébés étaient alimentés avec rien d’autre que du lait maternel à partir de l’instant où ils naissent jusqu’à l’âge de six mois, plus de 800 000 vies seraient sauvées chaque année. » Les mille premiers jours de l'enfant, de sa conception à sa deuxième année de vie, sont cruciaux pour son devenir. À cet âge, une nutrition inadéquate réduit fortement les chances de survie de l'enfant, tout en affectant à long terme sa santé et son développement intellectuel.

L'allaitement maternel initié dans l'heure suivant la naissance et exclusif pendant six mois est une façon efficace pour un coût financier raisonnable. La mortalité est 14 fois moins élevée chez les nouveau-nés exclusivement nourris au sein.

« Le lait maternel est le premier vaccin d’un bébé, la première et la meilleure protection qu’il a contre les maladies », affirme France Bégin. « Les nouveau-nés représentent près de la moitié des décès d’enfants de moins de cinq ans. L’allaitement précoce est donc une question de vie ou de mort. »

Au Tchad, la situation nutritionnelle des enfants continue d’être préoccupante avec une prévision de plus de 410 000 cas de malnutrition aigüe globale dont 216 000 de cas modérés et 194 000 cas sévères.

Au cours des quinze dernières années, les progrès pour que plus de nouveau-nés soient mis au sein dès leur naissance ont été lents, selon l’UNICEF. En Afrique subsaharienne, où la mortalité des enfants de moins de cinq ans est la plus élevés au monde, les taux d’allaitement précoce n’ont augmenté que de dix points depuis 2000 en Afrique de l’Est et en Afrique australe mais sont restés inchangés en Afrique de l’Ouest et en Afrique centrale, y compris au Tchad.

Note aux rédactions

La Semaine mondiale de l’allaitement est célébrée chaque année du 1 er au 7 août dans plus de 170 pays pour promouvoir l’allaitement et améliorer la nutrition des enfants en bas âge du monde entier.

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À propos de l’UNICEF

L’UNICEF promeut les droits et le bien-être de chaque enfant, dans tout ce que nous faisons. Nous travaillons dans 190 pays et territoires du monde entier avec nos partenaires pour faire de cet engagement une réalité, avec un effort particulier pour atteindre les enfants les plus vulnérables et marginalisés, dans l’intérêt de tous les enfants, où qu’ils soient.

Pour en savoir plus sur l’UNICEF et son action, veuillez consulter le site : www.unicef.org Suivez-nous sur Twitter et sur Facebook.

Pour plus d’informations, veuillez contacter :

Maria Fernandez I Chef de la Communication I UNICEF Tchad

+235 66 36 00 42 I mfernandez@unicef.org I www.unicef.org/chad

By Daniel Muchena, Country Director, Plan International South Sudan

The violence in South Sudan is leading to a children’s crisis.

Having just marked its five years of independence, the world’s youngest nation is still grappling with its complex history and an uncertain future.

We gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011 as the outcome of a 2005 agreement, ending Africa's longest-running civil war. Over 99 percent of South Sudanese voted for independence in a historic referendum.

However, five years on, violence is still rife and our country is still struggling. The recent spate of violence that left many dead highlighted yet again how fragile the peace is in South Sudan. Sadly, it’s the children that are suffering the most.

The recent turn of events places already vulnerable children at further risk of abuse and exploitation.

In situations of conflict, there is gross violation of children’s rights - especially their rights to education, health care and protection as well as participation in issues that affect their lives.

The renewed fighting is very worrisome as the situation for children is likely to worsen, making an already difficult situation even more challenging.

New wave of violence

Children below the age of 18 account for over 53% of the people in South Sudan. Due to the conflict, the majority of children are out of school and this new wave of violence is set to exacerbate the situation further.

Girls and young women have been among the worst victims of violence. Several were raped and assaulted in the recent spate of fighting.

Risks such as child marriage, being forced into labour and recruitment into armed groups remain high for children. On the other hand, there are concerns on the general health and wellbeing of children. Malnutrition rates among children in South Sudan are above the global threshold.

As Country Director of child rights organisation Plan International South Sudan, I visit communities regularly. The people I talk to say they value their independence – but it’s come at a steep price.

Much of the government’s resources have been consumed by the armed conflict. A large share of the donor funds, since December 2013, have been channelled to life safe interventions, leaving little for wider development.

Very little has been invested in primary areas, such as the education sector. This is further impacting the children, particularly girls.

Supporting children

Development and humanitarian organisations, like Plan International, are making efforts to ensure children are supported and protected from the dangers around, and also they have an opportunity to get an education.

Plan International is joining calls for lasting solutions to safeguard the lives of innocent children caught up in the fighting, as well as providing life-saving support in the conflict areas of Lakes and Jonglei states, including food assistance and agricultural support.

As a whole, we want to see this country succeed so that children and young people can enjoy a brighter future.

For the past three years, we have been providing educational and psychosocial support for children in conflict areas so they can deal with the violence they’ve witnessed and regain a sense of normality by attending our ‘child-friendly spaces’, where they can play and be around other children. We are running dedicated education programmes for former child soldiers and children who have missed years of schooling for various reasons, including displacement due to violence.

In the stable states of Central and Eastern Equatoria, we are working hard to provide educational support as well as livelihood assistance and training on disaster risk reduction and child protection.

To ensure the country can develop, it is essential young people have opportunities to develop their skills so they can get a job and contribute to their country in the future. We are particularly focused on training female teachers, with the view to encourage girls to take education seriously. The female teachers will serve as role models as well as provide a safe environment where the girl child will relate their social issues freely.

Having so fiercely fought for independence, we all desperately want the situation in South Sudan to improve – this is a country that deserves to succeed and is endowed with lots of resources both human and material. We don’t want our children to grow up in fear. We want them to grow up feeling safe and hopeful about the future as well as make their own choices.

To achieve that, the government must commit to improving the economy, provide social services, increase food production, create new jobs and, most importantly, invest in the education of children.

While refugees and humanitarian crises are not new for South Sudan, I can’t stress enough that it is children that suffer the most in these situations. That’s why their need for education, protection and psychosocial care, must be central to relief and recovery efforts and any further violence must stop.

The children of South Sudan and are looking upon their leaders, government and the international community. They want a nation where they can learn, lead, decide and thrive. This is one dream that must become a reality.