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ReliefWeb - Updates

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    Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
    Country: Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan

    Situation Overview

    In 2015, the HRP recorded more than 3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance of whom 2.5 million were targeted to receive assistance. This represents 20 percent of the population of Chad (13.2 million people). The 2016 Plan indicates 2.3 million people in need, of whom 1.8 million are targeted for humanitarian assistance, which highlights the serious levels of vulnerability in the country.

    Chad continues to feel the effects of violence perpetrated by armed groups in the Lake Region, and by conflicts in neighboring countries (Libya, Sudan and CAR). The country hosts 372,438 refugees, including 299,779 Sudanese refugees who have been in the country for over 10 years, 64,673 CAR refugees and 6,531 Nigerian refugees. The crisis in Nigeria has caused the internal displacement of 51,999 people in the Lake region. Chad also hosts more than 100,000 Chadians returnees from CAR and 15,071 returned from Nigeria. Since the Libyan crisis in 2010, Chadian returnees from Libya were integrated into local communities mainly in northern and western Chad or they left.

    Food insecurity and malnutrition remain a chronic problem in the country, particularly in the Sahel. Food insecurity affects about 3.4 million people (25% of the total population), of whom 2.2 million are in need of assistance, and of whom 663,000 are severely food insecure (source: Harmonized Framework 2015). The nutritional situation is also alarming, with rates of global acute malnutrition at 15% at the emergency threshold in 8 of the 33 health districts, and severe acute malnutrition rates above the 2% emergency threshold in 15 health districts.

    The country also faces recurrent and increasingly frequent natural disasters (floods, droughts, destruction of crops by pests) that directly affect the living standards of the people and exacerbate their vulnerability.

    The high prevalence of potentially epidemic diseases such as cholera and measles, and the prevalence of malaria, are causes of increased morbidity and mortality among the population, especially among children under 5 years. Chad is 184th out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), with some of the most alarming social indicators in the world (life expectancy of 49 years, maternal mortality rate of 1,084 deaths per 100,000 live births, 3rd highest in the world).


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    Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
    Country: Nigeria


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    Source: Assessment Capacities Project
    Country: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, occupied Palestinian territory, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, World, Yemen, Zimbabwe

    Snapshot 23–30 March 2016

    South Sudan: Between 20,000 and 50,000 people are now reported to have been displaced in Wau county, Western Bahr el Ghazal, since fighting escalated in February. Houses have been looted and burned and there are reports of killings and rape in the area around Wau town. At least 8,000 people are sheltering in public buildings or with host communities in Mboro town: food, water and shelter are priority needs.

    Sudan: 24,000 people have been displaced by fighting in Jebel Marra in the last month, bringing the total displaced since mid-January to over 129,000. The vast majority are in camps in North Darfur: over 68,000 people have been registered at Sortony UN base and over 39,000 are in Tawila. WASH needs are extremely high: at Sortony the water supply has fallen to just 1.3L per person per day. An additional 70,000 people are thought to have fled to Central Darfur, but access restrictions have made this impossible to verify.

    Côte d’Ivoire: Clashes between Fulani herders and Lobi farmers in the northeastern town of Bouna have led to at least 20 dead and 39 injured. Around 1,200 people reportedly fled to Burkina Faso, while another 2,000 have sought refuge at the UN base in Bouna town.

    Updated: 30/03/2016. Next update: 05/04/2016.

    Global Emergency Overview Web Interface


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    Source: International Crisis Group
    Country: Chad, Nigeria

    The full report is available in: Français

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Chad has become an important partner of the West in the fight against jihadism in the Sahel, but the regime’s stress points are quickly growing and 2016 is proving to be a challenging year. In addition to mounting tensions ahead of the 10 April presidential election and growing social discontent, the country is facing a major economic crisis, growing intra-religious tensions and deadly Boko Haram attacks, even as the movement weakens. The government’s predominantly military approach, pursued at the expense of political and social engagement in areas affected by jihadist violence, risks exacerbating tensions. Meanwhile, as an election approaches that is likely to see President Idriss Déby win a fifth term, many Chadians believe that the absence of democratic change or a viable succession plan could lead to a violent crisis. It is imperative to open political space and create sustainable state institutions capable of gaining the people’s support. This will require a shift in strategy by both national authorities and their international partners.

    Until recently, Chad was considered a poor country, lacking in influence and facing a constant threat of rebellion. But this has changed: Chad normalised relations with Sudan in 2010, began producing oil and became a critical military power in the Sahel-Saharan strip in particular, but also further south, in the Central African Republic (CAR). By deploying its soldiers on multiple fronts, including in a heavily-criticised intervention in CAR, as well as in Mali and more recently in the Lake Chad basin to fight Boko Haram, the regime is pursuing a strategy of military diplomacy, hoping to lead the fight against terrorism in the region. In so doing, Chad has consolidated its alliances with Western countries founded on fighting a common enemy, but which some Chadians view as an insurance policy for a regime that lacks legitimacy. The nature of this partnership, rooted in a long history of close relations with the West, carries significant political and democratic risks.

    Chad remains domestically fragile and is facing an unprecedented security threat. The country, which has traditionally experienced ethno-regional rebellions, is today engaged in a new kind of fight: an asymmetric battle against the violent jihadist movement Boko Haram. Even though the group has not built a constituency in Chadian society, there are undeniably Chadian nationals in Boko Haram’s ranks. After suffering a first attack at the beginning of 2015, Chad’s security apparatus must both prevent terrorist attacks in the capital and tackle a guerilla-style insurgency in the Lake Chad area. Those living in the Lake Chad region are facing deadly Boko Haram suicide attacks and frequent raids, resulting in deaths and massive population displacements. Though military operations by the countries of the region have weakened the group, it remains a serious threat. Meanwhile, instability in Libya continues to be of great concern in N’Djamena.

    The government, fearing further attacks on Chadian soil including in N’Djamena, has adopted a series of measures to strengthen security, adapt the laws at its disposal to address the new threats and further police religious space. While many Chadians, especially in the capital, support these counter-terrorism policies, voices denouncing abuses by security forces during routine checks, as well as arbitrary arrests and summons, are growing louder.

    The country is also facing a major economic crisis due to both the regional spread of Boko Haram attacks, which have hindered trade with Nigeria and Cameroon, and the drop in oil price, particularly damaging given the economy’s strong dependence on oil revenue. As a result, the government has been forced to make budget cuts. Social discontent is growing as the election nears, and many issues have the potential to mobilise the population, including the cost of living, budgetary austerity, corruption and impunity. Protests have taken a more political hue with protesters denouncing President Déby’s candidacy for a fifth term. The political and social climate remains very tense and the state’s repression of demonstrations and harassment of civil society could aggravate it further.

    Finally, the government’s desire to police and control religious space, including banning the burqa and promoting a “Chadian” Sufi Islam, is widely supported but has also met some resistance. This resistance has revealed the strong antagonism between mainstream Sufi currents and fundamentalist minorities against a backdrop of a significant Wahhabi expansion, especially among the youth. While these intra-Muslim tensions are not an immediate threat, in the medium-term they could weaken the country’s social fabric.

    In the face of these accumulating challenges, Chadian authorities must avoid the politics of religious or geographic exclusion. The greatest threat to stability in Chad in the long-term is not Boko Haram – though the determined fight against the group must continue – but a national political crisis, which would create fertile ground for all sorts of violent actors, including jihadists. To avoid this, the Chadian state must open political space and build legitimate and sustainable institutions, capable of outlasting the current regime.

    Nairobi/Brussels, 30 March 2016


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    Source: International Crisis Group
    Country: Chad, Nigeria

    SYNTHESE

    Alors que le Tchad est devenu un partenaire privilégié des pays occidentaux dans la lutte contre le jihadisme dans l’espace sahélo-saharien, les vulnérabilités du régime s’accentuent rapidement et l’année 2016 s’annonce difficile. En plus d’un contexte très tendu avant le scrutin présidentiel du 10 avril et d’une montée de la grogne sociale, le pays fait face à une crise économique majeure, à une fragilisation du modèle religieux et aux attaques violentes de Boko Haram, même si le groupe est affaibli. L’approche principalement militaire, au détriment de l’engagement politique et social de l’Etat dans les zones affectées par la violence jihadiste, risque d’exacerber les tensions. Enfin, à la veille d’une élection qui, sauf surprise, devrait voir le président Idriss Déby reconduit pour un cinquième mandat, de nombreux Tchadiens perçoivent l’absence d’alternance démocratique ou de plan de succession comme les germes d’une crise violente. Il est urgent d’ouvrir l’espace politique et de créer des institutions étatiques susceptibles de recevoir l’appui de la population et de durer. Cela exigera un changement d’approche à la fois des autorités nationales et de leurs partenaires.

    Jusqu’à récemment, le Tchad était considéré comme un pays pauvre, sans influ­ence et constamment sous la menace de rébellions. Mais la donne a changé : le Tchad a normalisé ses relations avec le Soudan en 2010, est devenu un producteur de pétrole et un acteur militaire incontournable, tout particulièrement dans la bande sahélo-saharienne mais également plus au sud en République centrafricaine (RCA). En déployant ses soldats sur différents fronts : en RCA dans une intervention très critiquée, au Mali et plus récemment dans la région du lac Tchad pour lutter contre Boko Haram, le régime joue la carte de la diplomatie militaire et ambitionne de prendre les commandes de la lutte antiterroriste dans la région. Ce faisant, le Tchad consolide ses alliances avec les Occidentaux dans un partenariat fondé sur la lutte contre des ennemis communs, mais perçu par une partie des Tchadiens comme une garantie pour un régime en mal de légitimité. Ce partenariat, qui s’inscrit dans une longue histoire de proximité avec les Occidentaux, comporte ainsi des risques politiques et démocratiques importants.

    Le Tchad demeure très fragile à l’intérieur de ses frontières et fait face à une situation sécuritaire inédite. Habitué aux rébellions à base ethnico-régionale, le pays est aujourd’hui engagé dans un nouveau combat, asymétrique, contre le mouvement violent jihadiste Boko Haram. Bien que ce dernier n’ait pas constitué de véritable base sociale au Tchad, des combattants tchadiens sont présents dans ses rangs. Après un premier choc frontal au début de l’année 2015, l’appareil sécuritaire tchadien doit prévenir les attentats dans la capitale et faire face à une guérilla dans la zone du lac Tchad. Les populations du lac sont ainsi confrontées aux attentats-suicides de Boko Haram et aux fréquents pillages de villages qui font de nombreuses victimes et engendrent des déplacements massifs de populations. Si le groupe est aujourd’hui affaibli par les opérations militaires des pays de la région, la menace demeure. Parallèlement, l’instabilité en Libye continue à susciter de fortes inquiétudes à N’Djamena.

    Craignant de nouvelles attaques sur le sol tchadien, y compris à N’Djamena, le gou­ver­ne­ment a pris une série de mesures pour renforcer le dispositif sécuritaire, adapter l’arsenal législatif aux nouvelles menaces et contrôler davantage l’espace religieux. Si beaucoup de Tchadiens, notamment dans la capitale, adhèrent à cette politique antiterroriste, des voix s’élèvent pour dénoncer les dérives des forces de sécurité lors de contrôles, mais aussi les arrestations et convocations arbitraires.

    Le pays traverse également une crise économique majeure liée à la fois à la régio­na­li­sa­tion des attaques de Boko Haram, qui perturbe fortement ses échanges commerciaux avec le Nigéria et le Cameroun, et à la baisse du cours du pétrole, qui frappe de plein fouet une économie devenue très dépendante des revenus de l’or noir. Ces difficultés contraignent le gouvernement à une politique d’austérité. A l’approche de l’élection, la grogne sociale prend de l’ampleur. Plusieurs thèmes sont mobilisateurs : cherté de la vie, austérité budgétaire, corruption, impunité, et les manifestations prennent même une couleur plus politique avec la dénonciation de la candidature du président Déby à un cinquième mandat. Le climat politique et social est très tendu et la répression des manifestations ainsi que l’arrestation des membres de la société civile pourraient encore exacerber ces tensions.

    Enfin, la volonté du gouvernement de policer et de contrôler l’espace religieux, qui se manifeste notamment par l’interdiction de la burqa et la promotion d’un islam « tchadien », sous-entendu soufi, est plébiscitée mais rencontre aussi des résistances. Celles-ci révèlent des antagonismes profonds entre courants majoritaires soufis et minorités fondamentalistes, dans un contexte de forte expansion du wahhabisme, notamment chez les jeunes. Si ces tensions intramusulmanes ne constituent pas une menace immédiate, elles sont un facteur de délitement du tissu social sur le moyen terme.

    Face à ces défis en cascades, les autorités tchadiennes doivent avant tout éviter les politiques d’exclusion géographique ou religieuse. La menace la plus importante pour la stabilité du Tchad sur le long terme n’est pas Boko Haram, bien qu’il faille combattre ce groupe avec détermination, mais une crise politique nationale qui créerait un terreau fertile pour l’émergence de toutes sortes d’acteurs violents, y compris jihadistes. Pour éviter cela, les autorités tchadiennes doivent à tout prix ouvrir l’espace politique et bâtir des institutions légitimes capables de survivre au régime actuel.

    Nairobi/Bruxelles, 30 mars 2016


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    Source: UN Children's Fund, WASH Cluster
    Country: Cameroon


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    Source: UN Security Council
    Country: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger

    I. Introduction

    1 . The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2227 (2015), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2016 and requested me to report every three months on the situation in Mali, focusing on progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. It covers the period from 17 December 2015 to 18 March 2016.

    II. Major political developments

    2 . While the reporting period was characterized by some progress in the implementation of the peace agreement, maintaining the new momentum that had emerged towards the end of 2015, significant challenges remained. The Government took steps to advance political and institutional reforms, decentralization and the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Government, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the Platform coalition of armed groups constructively participated in all deliberations of the Agreement Monitoring Committee and renewed their commitment to accelerating the implementation of the agreement. Those positive developments notwithstanding, the reporting period also saw continued delays in the implementation of key provisions of the agreement, such as the establishment of interim authorities in the north. This has been the priority of the signatory armed groups.

    Implementation of the peace agreement: political and institutional measures

    3 . On 18 January, in Algiers, Algeria convened a high-level consultative meeting of the members of the Agreement Monitoring Committee to encourage the Malian parties to revive the peace process and implement the agreement without further delay. During that meeting, which was attended by the Government, the signatory armed groups and my new Special Representative for Mali and Head of MINUSMA, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, the international mediation team agreed on the importance of moving forward with the implementation of the security provisions of the agreement, in particular cantonment and mixed patrols. The team strongly encouraged the Malian parties to also accelerate the implementation of other critical aspects of the agreement, especially matters relating to decentralization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, national reconciliation and development in the north. The participants deplored the deterioration of the security situation and stressed the need to enhance communication among the parties on the implementation process. The Government was represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, who reported on the steps taken to advance the peace process, including meetings of the nation al committee for the coordination of the implementation of the peace agreement and measures taken towards the establishment of interim authorities. CMA and the Platform, which had expressed frustration at the slow pace of implementation of the agreement, circulated a document on its status, highlighting shortcomings in the Government’s engagement. The signatory armed groups also expressed hesitation at the idea of proceeding with the cantonment process while progress on political and institutional reforms remained limited. They called for a balanced implementation of the provisions of the agreement.

    4 . Subsequently, the Government took further steps to accelerate the implementation of the institutional reforms envisaged in the agreement. On 19 January, it appointed governors for the regions of Ménaka (formerly part of the Gao region) and Taoudenni (formerly part of the Timbuktu region), which were created through legislation that had been passed in March 2012 but left unimplemented. CMA, the Platform and the traditional authorities of the two regions welcomed the nominations. The effective administration of the two regions still requires the appointment of local authorities, however. On 24 February, the Council of Ministers approved a bill to revise the Local Government Code of 2012 and a decree on the modalities for the implementation of the interim authorities, which remained pending ratification by the National Assembly.

    5 . On 25 January, under the auspices of the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel, CMA and the Platform reached an agreement on representation in the Agreement Monitoring Committee, which had remained a point of contention since the signature of the peace agreement. They agreed to allocate both the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad and the Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques et de résistance II one additional seat each in the Committee and one seat each in one of the subcommittees of their choice under the umbrella of CMA.

    6 . From 19 to 26 February, the Government, CMA and the Platform met in Bamako with a view to accelerating the implementation of the peace agreement.
    After the conclusion of the tripartite consultations, the President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, chaired a meeting with CMA and the Platform on 27 February. The signatory parties announced in a joint statement following that meeting that they had agreed on an implementation timeline for March and April, focusing on the establishment of interim authorities for the north and progress in security conditions, cantonment and the expeditious implementation of the provisions of the agreement relating to the preparations for elections. They also committed themselves to holding a long-planned tripartite reconciliation meeting in Kidal from 27 to 30 March.

    7 . From 9 to 10 March, the Agreement Monitoring Committee held its seventh meeting, in Bamako. It welcomed the joint statement and the planned reconciliation meeting mentioned above. With regard to the latter, it called upon the parties to ensure a successful meeting and to make progress in national reconciliation, as envisaged in the peace agreement. However, it pointed to the absence of progress in taking forward several recommendations made at the previous meeting on the implementation of the agreement, such as the establishment of interim authorities in the north and the launch of mixed patrols by the Operational Coordination Mechanism, and urged the Malian parties to redouble their efforts to deliver results by the time of the next meeting, scheduled for April. The pending establishment of interim authorities remained a contentious issue between the Government and the signatory armed groups, with the latter insisting that they would not commit themselves to participating in the cantonment process unless the Government established the authorities. On the development front, the Committee approved the final report of the joint evaluation mission to the north, which will inform the development strategy for the north being prepared by the Government. It also approved the arrangement brokered on representation in the Committee referred to in paragraph 5 above.

    8 . CMA and the Platform also continued to address unresolved issues outside the formal mechanisms of the peace agreement and within the framework of bilateral arrangements. On 2 February, some 250 armed members of the Groupe d’autodéfense Touaregs imghads et alliés, part of the Platform coalition, entered the CMA stronghold of Kidal with a large number of vehicles. The Secretary-General of the group, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, argued that it had acted on the understandings reached in Anefis i-n-Darane with CMA in October 2015. CMA contested that assertion, alleging the lack of prior notification by the group of its movement. My Special Representative used his good offices to open communication channels among the Government, CMA, the Platform and the international mediation team to de-escalate tensions. On 6 February, CMA and the Platform issued a statement in which they agreed that the Platform would reduce its military presence in Kidal and be included in the administrative structure of the town. On 7 February, the Platform established a regional bureau in Kidal.

    9 . Progress was also made in identifying and registering 33 legislative texts, as required under the peace agreement, with MINUSMA support. On 9 February, the committee established by the Ministry of Territorial Administration in November 2015 to review the electoral legislation and the Charter of Political Parties submitted a report recommending, among other things, the establishment of a single electoral management body and direct universal suffrage for the election of territorial advisers. A subcommittee on institutional and political reforms is expected to review the electoral bill before its submission to the National Assembly in April.

    10 . The legislative by-elections held in Ansongo (Gao region) on 10 and 31 January revealed the security and political challenges facing future elections in the north. Voting was conducted in all six municipalities, except Talatayé.
    Beforehand, CMA wrote to the prefect of Ansongo to strongly voice its opposition to the holding of elections, owing to the lack of consultation. On 9 January, the Malian armed forces escorting the sub-prefect and electoral materials to Talatayé were met with a local protest, prompting the Government to cancel the elections there. On 28 January, CMA issued a press release in which it expressed support for the local opposition to elections in Talatayé, stating that, in accordance with the peace agreement, no elections should be held before the establishment of the interim authorities. While the Mission facilitated dialogue between the Government and CMA to prevent an escalation of tensions, voting was not conducted in Talatayé.

    11 . On 31 December, the Council of Ministers adopted a new decree concerning the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, by which it increased the number of commissioners from 15 to 25 and created regional offices, regional consultative councils and five thematic subcommissions. The increase in the number of commissioners was aimed at addressing claims by CMA and the Platform that they were underrepresented in the Commission.

    12 . MINUSMA continued to support the Ministry of National Reconciliation and the national federation of women’s organizations and trained 120 traditional, religious and other community leaders in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu with a view to fostering a better understanding of the peace agreement. On 18 December, the President signed a decree providing for a 30 per cent quota for the appointment of women in national institutions and legislative bodies, following the adoption of the bill by the National Assembly during the previous reporting period. Notwithstanding the signing of the decree and the efforts of the Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children and Families to promote the effective participation of women and young people in the implementation of the agreement, their involvement remained limited.

    Other political developments

    13 . Since my previous report (S/2015/1030), owing to persistent security concerns, there has been little change in the number of government officials present at their duty stations in northern Mali, except for the deployment of a prefect to Ténenkou, in the Mopti region. The overall number of government officials absent from their duty stations at the sub-prefect level remained at some 49 per cent. In Gao, there was no increase in the number of sub-prefects deployed to the region (4 of 16). In Timbuktu, the number of sub-prefects stood at 13 of 31, given that 7 retired and others abandoned their duty stations in the light of security concerns.

    In Mopti, although all eight prefects were in place, security threats forced 20 of the 55 sub-prefects to work from their regional offices. No government official was deployed to Kidal. Some communities in the north, especially in Kidal, where traditional judges (cadis) are most prominent, expressed their preference for traditional justice mechanisms.

    14 . On 15 January, the President reshuffled the Cabinet, increasing the number of ministers from 31 to 32 and the number of women from five to six. It was the third reshuffle since the appointment of the current Prime Minister, Modibo Keita, in January 2015.

    15 . The international community devoted considerable attention to Mali and the peace process during the reporting period. The Security Council visited Mali, including Mopti and Timbuktu, from 4 to 7 March. On 12 February, during his visit to the country, the President of Germany announced the deployment of up to 650 soldiers to MINUSMA. On 19 February, also in the context of a visit to Mali, the Prime Minister of France expressed continuing support for the peace process and indicated his country’s willingness to maintain the presence of French forces in order to sustain counter-terrorism efforts.

    Regional cooperation in the Sahel

    16 . Following the deadly terrorist attacks in the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso on 20 November and 15 January, respectively, the Heads of State of the Group of Five for the Sahel met on 31 January on the margins of the twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union, in Addis Ababa, to discuss joint efforts to tackle common security threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, radicalization and violent extremism. On 4 March, during a meeting in N’Djamena, the ministers of defence of the Group of Five for the Sahel discussed military, security and intelligence mechanisms to tackle the threat of terrorism. The creation of a specialized rapid reaction force was also considered.


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    Source: Médecins Sans Frontières
    Country: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

    Large-scale humanitarian needs go unmet as millions displaced by the ongoing crisis

    With more than 2.7 million people uprooted from their homes, the Lake Chad basin is currently home to one of the African continent’s biggest humanitarian crises. The region is reaching breaking point due to attacks by the Islamic State’s West Africa Province group (ISWAP), also known as Boko Haram, and a strong military response which has been launched to curb the violence.

    The conflict originally stemming from Nigeria has expanded across borders to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, causing widespread displacement and suffering. Multiple suicide bombings and attacks are now occurring almost daily. Indiscriminate violence perpetrated by armed belligerents from all sides has direct consequences for the already vulnerable civilian population.

    Falmata, 45, lives alone with her eight children in a refugee camp in southern Niger after having fled her village in northern Nigeria, during a violent attack by ISWAP (Boko Haram).

    “When Boko Haram came to our village, they were shooting in all directions. I counted 18 bodies around me but we managed to escape. We arrived here with empty hands, we had no time to take anything.”

    “The violence is only serving to aggravate a pre-existing crisis,” says Isabelle Mouniaman, MSF programme manager for Nigeria. “This is a region already suffering from poverty, extreme vulnerability, food insecurity, recurring disease outbreaks and an almost non-existent health system. People are in need of basic amenities such as food, water and shelter and healthcare.

    ”Many of the displaced have found refuge with host communities, putting a heavy strain on their already limited resources. There are few functioning health facilities available and insecurity prevents people from accessing essential services. State services, already running at low capacity, as well as agricultural activities and cross-border trade have been dangerously disrupted.

    In response to the continued displacement and humanitarian needs, MSF is significantly scaling up its medical activities and assistance to people in the Lake Chad region.

    NIGERIA

    Since 2014, around one million people have sought refuge from violence in Borno state in north-eastern Nigeria. The large majority lives without sufficient food, clean water or adequate healthcare services.

    “We need more support,” says Chibuzo Okonta, MSF emergency project manager. “We have repeatedly called on other humanitarian and aid organisations to assist displaced people in Borno state but the appeal has gone unanswered.”

    In the state capital, Maiduguri, MSF teams support State Ministry of Health health centres in Maimusari and Bolori, providing treatment for malnutrition and malaria and assisting deliveries. In 2015, some 116,260 outpatient consultations were carried out.

    Last September, MSF also began managing the emergency room in Maiduguri’s Umaru Shehu Hospital, where an MSF surgeon now also carries out trauma surgery—in many cases for people wounded in violent attacks. MSF also monitors sanitary and health conditions in 15 camps that currently house some 100,000 internally displaced people (IDPs), one-quarter of whom are believed to be children under five. In nine of these camps, MSF has trucked in clean water, drilled boreholes, constructed latrines, and installed water pipes and tanks. Since January, MSF has also been running the outpatient clinic in the Dalori 2 camp.

    Further west, in Yobe state, some 195,000 people have fled violence and have settled in host communities and four camps in the area. MSF is providing medical care in the health centre in Kukarita. In January and February 2016, MSF teams carried out more than 4,000 consultations there. Last year, 240,000 litres of water were provided every day in the camps. Since February, MSF has started treating children for malnutrition in Damaturu hospital.

    CAMEROON

    There are currently some 61,000 refugees and 158,000 IDPs and returnees in the Far North region. The majority of IDPs live dispersed in host communities in areas that receive little humanitarian assistance.

    “The situation is very volatile with increasingly frequent suicide bombings, attacks and military counter-offensives, trapping the population in the middle,” says MSF Head of Mission Hassan Maiyaki. “Security is a major obstacle for the provision of aid in this area, but we are doing what we can to scale up our activities.”

    Since February 2015, MSF teams have been providing essential healthcare services to displaced and local populations in different locations in the region.

    MSF delivers medical care and water and sanitation activities at the UNHCR-managed refugee camp in Minawao. The camp is situated in a desert-like area where water is scarce. MSF is currently providing some 55 percent of the water in the camp catering for its 55,000 residents. A total of 29,077 consultations were carried out in the camp in 2015, and some 6,861 during the first two months of 2016.

    MSF is also providing paediatric and nutritional care to the displaced and resident population in the towns of Mokolo and Mora. Around 41,000 IDPs live in the area, but there are few functioning health facilities available.

    Children under five are treated at the district hospital in Kousseri, where teams also provide surgical support. Around 840 surgical acts, including caesarean sections, were carried out in 2015. MSF has also started providing healthcare services to displaced and host communities in three villages in the vicinity of Kousseri.

    MSF continues to provide support to local health authorities to help respond to large influxes of wounded following violent attacks. On 17 February, MSF teams treated 75 wounded after a suicide bombing rocked the town of Mémé.

    CHAD

    Around 6,300 Nigerian refugees and 43,800 displaced Chadians are struggling to survive in the face of insecurity in the Lake area.

    “The situation remains unpredictable,” says Federica Alberti, MSF’s Head of Mission in Chad. “On top of high insecurity, people face dire health conditions such as recurrent peaks of malnutrition and malaria and a high risk of epidemics. As people continue to flee their homes, pressure is being placed on precarious food resources and an already weak health system.”

    MSF has been working in the Lake area of Chad for one year now. Teams based in the towns of Baga Sola and Bol run mobile clinics providing basic healthcare to the displaced and resident populations. In February, teams carried out 6,980 consultations. MSF is also supporting the health centre in Tchoukoutalia.

    New pockets of displaced people are gathering in Djamaron, north of Liwa, around 100 kilometres from Baga Sola. In February in response, MSF launched new mobile medical activities to reach this vulnerable population.

    Psychologists also provide mental healthcare in MSF’s mobile clinics as well as in the Dar es Salam refugee camp. In February, a total of 136 consultations were carried out.

    In addition to its medical activities, MSF is continuing to distribute relief items – in January, teams provided kits containing plastic sheeting, mosquito nets, soap, towels and blankets to some 2,600 people, as well as water treatment kits for 500 families.

    Teams also supported the local hospital in Mani to treat wounded following a suicide attack on 31 January.

    In Bol, MSF works in collaboration with local health authorities to provide maternal and child healthcare at the district hospital.

    NIGER

    More than 300,000 Nigerian refugees, internally displaced and returnees have sought refuge in Diffa, southern Niger, due to continued violence in the area.

    “The already vulnerable situation of the population in Diffa, who are facing current peaks of malnutrition and malaria, has further deteriorated due to the ongoing violence,” said MSF program manager Luis Encinas. “More and more of our patients are describing a devastating situation.”

    People live in very precarious conditions and basic needs such as shelter, food, clean water and access to medical care remain unmet.

    In Diffa town, MSF is supporting the main maternal and paediatric health centre, providing care for children under 15. In January 2016, more than 146 deliveries were carried out.

    MSF is working in the district hospital in Nguigmi, and in several health centres in the surrounding area. MSF also is providing medical care and water and sanitation activities in Assaga Camp, which hosts some 12,000 Nigerian refugees, and in Yebi, where some 30,000 people have sought refuge. In 2015, MSF carried out more than 142,000 medical consultations in the region.

    MSF teams have also conducted a measles vaccination campaign in Assaga Camp, and vaccinated more than 79,000 people against cholera in the district of Bosso.

    MSF began its emergency intervention in the Lake Chad region in 2014 and is currently present in several locations in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. MSF employs 1,223 staff in its projects throughout the region.


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    Source: International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies
    Country: Kenya, Somalia

    Appeal History:

    • A preliminary emergency appeal was launched on 19 October 2011 for 27,618,017 Swiss franc (plus an estimated 3,050,000 Swiss franc for emergency response units) to assist 60,000 beneficiaries for 12 months.

    • Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF): 500,000 Swiss franc was initially allocated from the Federation’s DREF to support the National Society set up the operations in Dadaab refugee camp.  An Emergency Appeal was launched on 29 November, 2011 for 26,154,197 Swiss franc to assist 76,000 beneficiaries for 12 months.

    • Operations update n°1 was posted 25 January, 2012 to inform of progress of the operation.  An 8-month summary update was issued on 2 September 2012 to update on operational progress 8 months into the operation implementation.

    • The emergency appeal was revised on 2 January 2013, seeking to reduce budget to 10,439,107 Swiss franc and extending the operation for a further 12 months to October 2013.

    • A 12-month summary update was issued on 14 January 2013 and provided the yearly progress report.

    • Operations update n°2 was issued on 15 January, 2013 and operations update n°3 was issued on 27 May 2013, with a progress report against the planned outcomes.

    • The emergency appeal was revised again on 11 July 2013. The revision recognised that the previous Emergency Appeals only catered for the 2012 proposed budget, while the revised budget combined both 2012 and 2013 budgets totalling 21,427,140 Swiss franc. It also extended the operation to the end of 2013.

    • The operation through a revised emergency appeal of 11 February, 2014 was extended by a further 12 months and the budget was slightly increased to CHF 22,939,815 to assist 120,000 beneficiaries, including 100,000 refugees in Ifo 2 camp and 20,000 from the host community.

    • Operations update n°4 informed of a further appeal extension for 6 months to end of June 2015.

    • This final report consolidates all the achievements of the response operation over a period of 3 1/2 years.

    The IFRC, on behalf of the Kenya Red Cross, would like to thank all those who have contributed to this Emergency Appeal.


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    Source: Shelter Cluster
    Country: Mali

    NEED ANALYSIS

    • The crisis that occurred in Mali in 2012 led to displacement in high numbers, both inside the country and in the sub-region, 350,000 persons were internally displaced, while 175,000 were refugees. 

    • Even if the security situation is still volatile, some Malian refugees have been coming back home since 2013. The government of Mali estimates that some 40,000 Malian refugees have returned, while UNHCR had verified more than 17,500 as of the end of 2015. According to the January DTM report there are nearly 50,000 persons still internally displaced in Mali.

    • In The HRP 2016 (Humanitarian response plan), the shelter cluster estimates, 450.000 people in NFI needs, and 167.000 people need of shelter assistance.

    • In 2016, the cluster target 91,000 persons to be assisted with NFI and 17.000 vulnerable persons will receive shelter assistance.


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    Source: World Food Programme
    Country: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

    Highlights

    • Humanitarian crisis hits area with structural agricultural deficit

    • Border closing affects food flows and transports costs in countries surrounding Lake Chad

    • Devaluated Naira and informal exchange rate affect trade in the area

    Background and objectives

    Considering the recent humanitarian crisis and the increased displacement in the region, the Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) unit of the WFP Regional Bureau for West Africa, in collaboration with ACF and other partners, launched a regional market assessment around the Lake Chad basin. The assessment was conducted in four countries in the surrounding zones around the Lake : Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon.

    The main objective aimed at addressing urgent information needs, to support the national and regional humanitarian response, and strengthen market baselines across the four countries.

    The study assessed the market situation of the on-going crisis and subsequent market disruptions, comparing current findings to previous market data. The main focus was on cereal and livestock sectors. In some areas, like Nigeria, the non-food sector was also included.
    Country missions gathered varying market trends in the current context, positive (e.g. lower fuel prices) and negative (e.g. border closures), and identified priorities for humanitarian and development action.


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    Source: World Food Programme
    Country: Mali

    Points Saillants

    État d’approvisionnement des marchés:

    • L’état d’approvisionnement des marchés est globalement bon dans l’ensemble à travers le pays.

    Tendance des prix des céréales et du bétail:

    • Tendance des prix au producteur en légère hausse de +4% par rapport à janvier 2016, à la baisse par rapport à la moyenne de 5 dernières années sauf pour le riz local.

    • Tendance des prix à la consommation des céréales en légère hausse pour le mil, le sorgho et le maïs, stable pour le riz local.

    • Tendance à la baisse par rapport à la moyenne des 5 dernières années.

    • Prix en hausse pour les ovins (+9%) et les caprins (+6%) par rapport à la même que l’année passée.

    Termes de l’échange (ToT) petits ruminants/céréales :

    • De façon globale, les ToT sont en amélioration à Gao (+5%), Mopti (+2%) et à Tombouctou (+4%) en février 2016 par rapport à la même période l’année passée.

    Contraintes liées au fonctionnement des marchés :

    • La situation sécuritaire reste volatile.

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    Source: Government of Japan, International Organization for Migration, UN Development Programme, World Food Programme, UN Children's Fund
    Country: Chad, Japan

    N’DJAMENA– Le Gouvernement du Japon mobilise plus de 8,45 million de dollars US pour les projets de l’Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM), le Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM), le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD) et le Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'Enfance (UNICEF), afin de fournir une assistance au Gouvernement du Tchad dans l’amélioration des conditions de vie de ses populations les plus vulnérables. Cette contribution vise principalement les personnes déplacées, les retournés et les communautés autochtones ayant des besoins en matière de réinsertion économique et sociale, de sécurité alimentaire, de nutrition, d’éducation, de protection, d’une amélioration des accès aux services de santé, à l’eau, l’hygiène et l’assainissement.

    Selon l’Ambassadeur du Japon, S.E. Kunio OKAMURA, « Cette contribution exprime la solidarité de la population japonaise envers le Gouvernement et la population tchadienne qui font face à la menace terroriste de Boko Haram». La République du Tchad est un pays qui contribue beaucoup à la stabilité et à la paix de l’Afrique à travers son engagement très actif au Mali et tout récemment dans la lutte contre Boko Haram. C’est pour cette raison que le Japon a décidé de concrétiser sa solidarité auprès du Gouvernement de la République du Tchad et ses populations face aux difficultés qu’ils rencontrent pour appuyer tant les retournés, que les déplacés et les réfugiés.

    Le Coordonnateur Résident du Système des Nations Unies au Tchad, M. Stephen Tull, « remercie chaleureusement le peuple japonais pour son don, qui va permettre à l’ONU et à ses partenaires d’intensifier leurs actions envers les populations vulnérables de la région du Lac Tchad et de promouvoir la cohésion sociale. » Les projets financés par le Japon ont pour objectif de soutenir le Tchad dans la gestion des réponses d’urgence aux personnes retournées et déplacées, le renforcement de la sécurité, de la résilience et de la prévention des conflits:

    • OIM : 1.3 million de dollars US pour «La stabilisation sociale au Tchad par l’autonomisation des jeunes à risque dans la région du Lac ».

    • PAM : 1.75 million de dollars US pour «Fournir une aide alimentaire vitale aux ménages directement touchés par la crise de Boko Haram au Tchad».

    • PNUD:2.4 millions de dollars US don 1.5 million pour le « Programme d’Appui au Cycle Electoral Tchadien (PACET) » et 900 mille pour le « Projet de prévention de la radicalisation et de lutte contre le terrorisme. »

    • UNICEF : 3 millions de dollars US pour «Fournir une assistance vitale aux populations touchées par le conflit de Boko Haram au Tchad ».

    Ce nouveau financement permettra à l’OIM de mettre en œuvre des solutions durables pour assurer la réinsertion socio-économique des jeunes à risque et de stabiliser les communautés de la région du Lac ; d’une part à travers la création d’emplois et d’autre avec la mise en place d’actions communautaires. Ce projet se base sur le modèle appliqué avec succès pour la réinsertion de 2000 retournés Tchadiens du Soudan et de la République Centrafricaine depuis 2014. Il vise également à améliorer le sentiment de sécurité des habitants de la région avec l'installation de lampadaires alimentés par des panneaux solaires qui ont été fabriqués par les retournés du Soudan.

    Le PAM fournit une assistance aux déplacés, réfugiés et populations hôtes dans la région du Lac afin de subvenir à leurs besoins alimentaires et nutritionnels immédiats mais aussi de renforcer leur résilience et de protéger leurs moyens d’existence. Avec un don de 1.75 million de dollars US, le PAM se propose de distribuer des vivres à environ 44.000 personnes déplacées, qui n’ont plus les moyens de nourrir leurs familles. Ce projet contribue à promouvoir la stabilité sociale de la zone affectée par l’insécurité.

    L'objectif global du programme du PNUD est de contribuer au renforcement de la démocratie pluraliste et à la promotion d’un état de droit au Tchad. Il vise à renforcer les capacités du système juridique et institutionnel tout en s’assurant que les principes de l’égalité et des droits fondamentaux sont pris en compte dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le programme va également mettre l’accent sur la prévention de la radicalisation de la jeunesse par des actions devant modifier les comportements et attitudes violentes et la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes.

    L’UNICEF au Tchad se propose d'aider 202.000 personnes (y compris les personnes déplacées, les réfugiés et les communautés hôtes) à travers un projet multisectoriel d’un an qui a pour objectif général de fournir une assistance humanitaire pour la protection et la survie des populations touchées par la violence de Boko Haram, par le biais des services et fournitures d'urgence.

    Pour des informations supplémentaires, veuillez contacter:

    • Sawako Yoshino, Attachée, Ambassade du Japon/ Yaoundé : +237 22220 6202 ;
      info@yd.mofa.go.jp

    • Yoko Fujimura, Chef de Programme, OIM/ N’Djamena : +235 62933452 ;
      yfujimura@iom.int

    • Nathalie Magnin, Chargée de relations publiques, PAM/ N’Djamena: 66 99 30 40 ; nathalie.magnien@wfp.org

    • María Fernández Ruiz de Larrinaga, Chief of Communication, UNICEF / N’Djamena :
      +23566360042

    • Nartamadji Assingar Isabelle, Chargée de Communication, PNUD / N’Djamena ;
      +23566295351 ; isabelle.assingar@undp.org


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    Source: Interchurch Organisation for Development Co-operation
    Country: Mali

    Producing and marketing 20 tons of beeswax: that’s the aim for which ICCO Cooperation and the private company Olvea Burkina Faso, have been awarded a grant by USAID/Mali. The coming two years ICCO and Olvea will provide technical assistance to 3,000 women active in beeswax.

    The beeswax project aims to stimulate entrepreneurship of these women by guaranteeing a market for organic beeswax. ICCO Cooperation will work with a business development service provider to train the women in beeswax (and honey) production best-practices. The women will be trained on how to separate the beeswax and honey.

    The project will take place in the Feed the Future Zones of Influence (ZOIs) of Mali with special focus on the Sikasso Region. The women will produce organic beeswax for a niche, lucrative, and growing market in Europe, which in addition to shea harvesting and commercialization will help them to diversify their income. The project will also reverse the negative effects of decreasing pollination populations.

    OLVEA also contributes financially to this project. In addition, USAID/Mali will provide an additional grant that will support a study on the effect of honey-bees on shea trees- to be led by The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF).

    The women will own and manage the beehives. They will also be responsible for the harvest and will sign commercial contracts with Olvea BF. The honey will be sold both locally and internationally. The beeswax will be shipped to Olvea’s factory in Burkina Faso where it will be refined and packaged using modern equipment and techniques.

    The women cooperatives will be organized and registered in formal groups. ICCO will assess the organizational, management, and governance capacity of the cooperatives. The assessment will help in developing a capacity building plan for each cooperative which will serve as a basis for improving the management and governance of the cooperatives.

    The aim is to produce and market at least 20 tons beeswax by the end of the project.


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    Source: International Organization for Migration, Shelter Cluster
    Country: Mali


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    Source: Famine Early Warning System Network
    Country: Senegal

    Rice, millet, sorghum, and maize are the primary staple foods in Senegal. Groundnuts are both an important source of protein and a commonly grown cash crop. Imported rice is consumed daily by the vast majority of households in Senegal particularly in Dakar and Touba urban centers. Local rice is produced and consumed in the Senegal River Valley. St. Louis is a major market for the Senegal River Valley. Millet is consumed in central regions where Kaolack is the most important regional market. Maize is produced and consumed in areas around Kaolack, Tambacounda, and the Senegal River Valley. Some maize is also imported mainly from the international market. High demand for all commodities exists in and around Touba and Dakar. They are also important centers for stocking and storage during the lean season. The harvests of grains and groundnuts begin at the end of the marketing year in October; and stocks of locally produced grains are drawn down throughout the marketing year. Senegal depends more on imports from the international market for rice than from cross border trade which mainly includes cattle from Mali and Mauritania that supply Dakar and surrounding markets.


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    Source: Famine Early Warning System Network
    Country: Senegal

    Key Messages

    • Les récoltes moyennes à bonnes des contre saison maraichères se poursuivent dans le pays. Il en sera de même pour le riz de contre saison en juin-juillet qui connait un grand essor. Les revenus moyens et les opportunités de travail qui s’offrent contribueront à améliorer la disponibilité alimentaire et les revenus des ménages pauvres. Par conséquent, la plupart des zones sera en situation d’insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC).
    • L’approvisionnement des marchés en céréales restera suffisant pendant l’année alimentaire partout dans le pays grâce à la production de céréales supérieure à la moyenne qui engendre des prix inférieurs à la moyenne pour les céréales. Le prix du riz brisure ordinaire, principale céréale consommée est inférieur de 6 pour cent par rapport à la moyenne; ce qui favorisent un accès moyen des ménages à cette denrée.
    • Les conditions d’élevage sont moyennes à supérieures à la moyenne à travers le pays ; ce qui augure une soudure normale pour le bétail de mars à juin 2016. Les revenus issus de la vente de bétail et des produits animaux procurent des revenus moyens qui favorisent l’accès des ménages éleveurs aux marchés.
    • Les ménages pauvres du nord-est du pays qui ont connu une baisse de production agricole et les ménages victimes des inondations de juillet à septembre 2015 à travers le pays ont recours de façon atypique à plus de migration et de mains d’œuvre pour satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires et reconstituer les biens perdus. Par conséquent, ils seront en insécurité alimentaire de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) de juin jusqu’aux prochaines récoltes en octobre.

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    Source: Famine Early Warning System Network
    Country: Mauritania

    Key Messages

    • La récolte des cultures tardives et de décrue est actuellement achevée. Malgré la forte pression aviaire et le décalage du calendrier cultural après l’installation tardive de l’hivernage, les productions céréalières sont supérieures à celles de 2015. Cette situation favorable, renforcée par de bonnes conditions pastorales et le fonctionnement régulier des marchés, fait que la plupart du pays restera en situation d’insécurité alimentaire aiguë Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) jusqu’au septembre.

    • Les pâturages restent encore satisfaisants dans toutes les zones de moyens d’existence, mais des difficultés d’accès à l’eau, causées par des déficits pluviométriques localisés, ont commencé deux mois plus tôt qu’en année moyenne (mars au lieu de mai) dans le nord du pays réorientant ainsi les transhumances vers le centre du pays et le nord de la zone agropastorale. Des déficits de pâturages y sont en conséquence probables dès avril.

    • Des déficits de protection de moyens d’existence causés par des ventes, des pertes et l’endettement pendant les deux précédentes années déficitaires, entrainent des situations de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) chez certains ménages d’agropasteurs pauvres de l’Adrar, de l’Inchiri, du Gorgol, du Tagant et du Brakna jusqu’au septembre. Seuls ceux des zones oasiennes de ces régions, pourront se retrouver, dès juillet, en Phase Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) grâce aux récoltes de dattes.


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    Source: Famine Early Warning System Network
    Country: Chad

    Key Messages

    La production nationale définitive est en baisse de 9 pour cent par rapport à la moyenne. Les régions les plus affectées sont dans le Sahel: Wadi Fira (-57 pour cent), Kanem (-54 pour cent), Batha (-53 pour cent), BEG (-27 pour cent), Guera (-26 pour cent), et Sila (-24 pour cent). Suite à l’épuisement précoce des stocks, certains départements sahéliens seront en Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) jusqu’à septembre. Certaines régions soudaniennes qui sont aussi affectées seront en Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) jusqu’en septembre.

    Les soudures pastorales et agricoles sont précocement installées en fin février/début mars dans la zone sahélienne au lieu d’avril et juin respectivement en année normale. Les ménages agriculteurs connaissent un épuisement précoce des stocks (mars au lieu de juin). Les animaux parcourent des grandes distances pour accéder au pâturage et à l’eau, entrainant ainsi une dégradation de leurs conditions physiques. A cet effet, le revenu des ménages pasteurs est en baisse, ce qui entrainera un déficit de consommation. Les ménages pauvres des départements du Nord Kanem, BEG, et Batha qui sont dans la zone de transhumance ont actuellement un accès limité aux aliments qui va persister jusqu’à juin. Mais la disponibilité alimentaire pourrait s’améliorer grâce aux prémices du mois d’aout-septembre, et des céréales sauvages au niveau des ouadis. En plus, la disponibilité laitière va permettre une amélioration de la consommation alimentaire, et ces zones seront en condition Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) à partir de juillet.

    La faible pluviométrie de 2015 et le faible niveau de pâturage des deux départements de Biltine et Dar Tama (Wadi Fira) ont donné lieu à un épuisement précoce des stocks (fin mars au lieu d’avril) et une baisse des revenus issus de la vente de bétail. Les ménages deviennent dépendant des marchés et font face à une légère hausse des prix. A cet effet, les ménages font face à une consommation alimentaire limitée et sont en Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC).
    Les prix des céréales (mil, sorgho et riz) hormis celui du maïs sont stables comparés à la moyenne quinquennale dans la plupart des marchés. Malgré une production nationale en dessous de la moyenne, le bon niveau de stock résiduel et les importations du riz et de la farine de blé maintiennent la disponibilité alimentaire à un niveau adéquat à l’exception des zones en Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC); ce qui maintient la plupart des zones en situation Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC).


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    Source: Famine Early Warning System Network
    Country: Burkina Faso

    Key Messages

    La grande majorité des ménages pauvres continue de recourir à leur propre production pour la consommation. Les dernières productions agricoles ayant été globalement similaires à la moyenne quinquennale, permettent à la grande majorité des ménages pauvres de disposer encore d’un stock suffisant pour couvrir leurs besoins de consommation jusqu’à la période habituelle de soudure (Juin à Septembre).

    L’offre en produits alimentaires (céréales et produits maraichers) est satisfaisante sur les marchés et la demande normale, ainsi les prix des céréales de bases sont stables par rapport à la moyenne des cinq dernières années. De ce fait, les revenus moyens tirés principalement de l’orpaillage, de la vente d’animaux et des produits maraichers, permettent aux ménages d’avoir des revenus leur permettant un accès aux marchés pour l’alimentation.

    Dans la zone agropastorale nord du pays, la situation alimentaire des animaux devient de plus en plus difficile avec l’entame de la période de soudure pastorale. Le tarissement progressif des points d’eau et l’amenuisement des stocks fourragers ont conduit à une transhumance relativement précoce des troupeaux. Toutefois, cette situation n’affectera pas significativement la classification de la situation alimentaire des ménages dans la zone qui demeurera en insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC).


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