Despite the signing of a peace agreement in June this year violence continues in the north of Mali and sporadically in other parts of the country. Disarming rebel groups and rooting out criminal networks are the immediate priorities of the government of Mali and the international community, which do not always see eye to eye. The African Union (AU) and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) have been involved in the peace process ever since war broke out in 2012.
On 20 June 2015, the last major rebel group finally put pen to paper on the Algiers Agreement, a peace plan designed to end the conflict in Mali and heal the great north–south divide that has been such a source of instability since independence in 1960.
The government, along with militias ostensibly loyal to it, had already signed in May, but the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) held out for more concessions.
The plan worked. The CMA, which, in its previous iteration (as the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad) initiated the civil war in 2012, succeeded in having its fighters included in a security force for the north and won guarantees from the government that residents of the region would be better represented in government institutions.
Both the government and the international community welcomed the plan. ‘Hand in hand, let us make Mali better, more brotherly, more united than ever,’ said President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta on the conclusion of the deal. ‘Long live a reconciled Mali! Long live peace!’
The achievement of the peace plan was regarded by many as an unexpected twist, underlining yet again Mali’s seemingly unlimited capacity to surprise. In this country making predictions is a mug’s game – which only makes planning for the future even more difficult. Besides, as always, signing things is easy, but implementing them is another story altogether.
‘It is important not to have unrealistic expectations regarding the peace agreement. Its main objective is to lay down the framework that will enable the Malian parties to find a sustainable solution to the crisis. Consequently, the agreement does not cover either the structural causes or the root causes of the crisis, nor the different dimensions of the crisis. The Malian crisis goes beyond the distribution of political power between the different regions. The crisis facing the country extends to other important challenges such as drug trafficking, poor governance, lack of legitimacy and endemic corruption in all state institutions,’ said Ibrahim Maiga, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies.
The PSC Report travelled to Mali in late August to assess the country’s progress. In the last few months there has been a noticeable increase in international media reports of violence and confrontation, specifically terrorist attacks. Most significant was the attack in early August on the Byblos Hotel in the central town of Sevare, which left 13 people dead, including five officials from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
Increasing violence
Other incidents in the last month alone include a ‘heavy arms attack’ on a Malian army checkpoint, which killed two; an ambush of an army camp at Gourma-Rharous, which killed 10; another ambush of a checkpoint on the Diabaly-Nampala road in the Niono district, which killed two; and an attack by gunmen on Gaberi village, killing 10 civilians. In many cases the assailants remain unidentified.
As Bruce Whitehouse, a Bamako-based anthropologist, explained on his blog, the recent spate of attacks is a worrying sign that violence is actually spreading in the wake of the Algiers Agreement: ‘[T]he “bad guys” who, for the most part, once contained their nefarious activities to Mali’s unruly northern reaches – particularly the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal – have penetrated into the rest of the country. Of Mali’s nine administrative regions plus the District of Bamako, each has now been the scene of at least one terrorist attack, and most have seen terrorist violence within the last 90 days.’
In light of this, the PSC Report wanted to obtain a first-hand, on-the-ground perspective on the current situation. Is the Algiers Agreement holding? How fragile is the peace? Is Mali on the brink of civil war again and, most importantly, is there anything that the AU and specifically the PSC can do about it?
Conversations with government officials, representatives of the AU and the UN, leading civil society figures, academics and Western diplomats – most of whom would only speak candidly if their anonymity was guaranteed – created a picture of a country that has made significant progress since the crisis of 2012, but which remains dangerously volatile. Complicating the situation is the fact that the threats come from several different directions and the various actors involved in finding a solution are not necessarily all trying to solve the same problem.
Clashing priorities
The first major challenge is managing – and eventually disarming – the various armed groups operating in central and northern Mali. Generally speaking, these fall into three broad categories: separatist rebels seeking an independent state in the north (the would-be state of Azawad), mainly under the banner of the CMA; militia groups opposed to the separatists, negotiating as the Platform movement, over which the government has some limited authority; and radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There are overlaps among these categories and some groups that fall outside them.
An exploration of ways of dealing with these armed groups reveals a divided approach between the government and the international community. Prior to the Algiers Agreement the government had been advocating a hard line against the separatist rebels, favouring a military solution. This perhaps explains a widely held perception, expressed by several interviewees, that the government is supporting, or even financing, the Platform militias. ‘In this context, terrorism is a secondary priority for the government: it’s a problem, but you can’t fix terrorism until you’ve fixed the political situation. Having said that, there is a political and ideological connection between some of Mali’s armed groups and al-Qaeda, Islamic State, etc. But it is not an operational connection,’ said a source in MINUSMA.
The international community is much more focused than the government on the terrorism element. Major regional and international powers, particularly Algeria and France, are worried that the vast, unprotected deserts of northern Mali have been and will continue to be used as a base for terrorist organisations wishing to destabilise the region as a whole. That is presumably why Algeria insisted on being allowed to lead the international mediation team and why France created Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorism force of 3 000 soldiers designed to combat terrorism in the Sahel. At present France takes the lead in almost all counter-terrorism operations in Mali (the Malian government does not have the capacity to do so, and MINUSMA wants to avoid direct combat operations). Operation Barkhane is the follow-up to Operation Serval, which stopped terror groups from advancing to the capital, Bamako, in January 2013.
‘Algeria wants security in the north at all costs. And I have to be honest, most of the international community agrees. Security is the priority,’ a Western diplomat confirmed. This clash of priorities may have important ramifications when it comes to the allocation of scarce time and resources. For example, the government regularly criticises MINUSMA for not being active enough in confronting rebel groups. Not that there is much the government can do about this: in key areas of the north, most notably Kidal, it has no real presence and must rely on MINUSMA to carry out some of the functions of the state.
‘Government reach is limited. There is still no government presence in Kidal. The Mali government is not in control of north and is entirely reliant on Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA, who have different interests,’ complained a senior government official. The government’s authority is also limited by control issues with the military, which is notoriously unwilling to be deployed into dangerous areas. Incidents such as the killing of more than 100 Malian soldiers during a massacre in Aguel’hoc at the beginning of the war, in January 2012, have contributed to this reluctance.
Broad mandate
France’s interests are clear: Operation Barkhane is explicitly about counter-terrorism. But it is not always as easy to work out the motivations for MINUSMA’s decision-making. The mission’s mandate is broad, even though the United Nations (UN) Security Council did attempt to narrow it down in June 2014: ‘[T]he Security Council amended the mandate of the Mission and decided that it should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country,’ said MINUSMA in a statement.
Although MINUSMA is one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping missions in the world (with 10 207 uniformed personnel and an annual budget of US$628.7 million), this is a daunting list of duties. Complicating things further is the mission’s large and unwieldy leadership team – a function of the quotas for fair geographic representation – which can disagree at times over how to interpret the mandate.
The highest-profile example of these internal divisions came in late August, when Arnauld Akodjènou, the mission’s Deputy Special Representative in charge of political affairs, resigned – allegedly in response to criticism both internally and externally (from the government and rebel movements) of his decision to establish an exclusion zone around Kidal.
MINUSMA’s difficulties are exacerbated by the severity of the working conditions in the north. Although staff at the Bamako headquarters enjoy air-conditioning and access to a swimming pool and golf course, peacekeepers in the field must contend with the extremely hot, dry climate and the thick dust that accumulates quickly, often making equipment (especially electronic equipment such as laptop computers) unusable. It is also dangerous: since its inception in 2013, MINUSMA has suffered 56 fatalities.
It is in managing the conflicting priorities of these various actors that the AU is probably able to make the greatest impact. Although the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) is vastly under-resourced and under-staffed compared to MINUSMA, Pierre Buyoya, the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, is playing an active – and, by most accounts, effective – role in political negotiations. Mali’s government believes the AU can provide much-needed support to argue the government’s case on the international stage and to make sure that it is not only the interests of the major powers that are taken into account.
Drug wars
Increasingly, however, decision makers in both Mali and the international community are realising that the political situation is only half the problem – and therefore a political solution is only half a solution. The other major factor is that northern Mali has become increasingly popular as a route for drug smuggling from South America into Europe. These routes are also used for human trafficking and to smuggle cheap, illegal goods from southern Algeria’s preferential tax zone into Mali. Because of its illicit nature, quantifying the flow of narcotics across the Sahel is impossible, but analysts agree that the drug trade and political instability are intricately linked: the drugs help to fund the armed groups, which must also resist state control in order to protect their illegal profits.
‘It is easy for criminals to claim the political discourse to excuse their activities, and to prevent a stronger state from clamping down,’ said Ibrahim Iba N’Diaye, a professor at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure in Bamako. N’Diaye explains that elements of the state are involved too. ‘There is some government implicated, especially military, in the drugs trade.’
Trade routes have always been northern Mali’s economic lifeline. In such a harsh, inhospitable environment there are few other economic opportunities. Historically, traders would transport commodities such as salt and gold; these days it is cocaine and hashish. The narco-trafficking is largely controlled by the various armed groups, but ordinary northerners benefit too – and this makes it difficult for them to welcome a political settlement wholeheartedly. ‘So, while people want doctors and teachers back, they don’t necessarily want police or borders or the full state apparatus – that would be bad for business,’ said N’Diaye.
The drug trade may be contributing to the instability in other ways too. Sources in MINUSMA said they are worried that South American drug traffickers may also bring lessons in political resistance; the worst-case scenario is that Mali’s armed groups will start learning from Colombian groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), if they have not done so already. FARC members are experts in blending politics and criminality, with devastating long-term consequences for the state.
‘Organised crime, including drug trafficking, is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges that Mali will continue to face in the short and medium term. Resolving this problem is one of the main preconditions for settling the Malian crisis … A number of recent initiatives taken at national and regional level have contributed to strengthening the legal arsenal and the material means to fight drug trafficking. However, the results that have been achieved until now do not match the expectations, considering the resources deployed. The involvement of certain politicians, security officials and businessmen in the traffic is a major hindrance to effectiveness,’ said Maiga.
No time to relax
Although Mali’s progress since the 2012 crisis is encouraging, there is clearly plenty to be worried about. One can take one’s pick from a variety of destabilising factors, such as the failure by all concerned parties to implement the Algiers Agreement (the terms of which have already been repeatedly tested by aggressive rebels and sluggish government implementation); the presence on Malian soil of radical Islamists; the diverging aims of the Malian government and the international community; and the growing economic dependence on narco-trafficking in the north.
Against this background it is vital for the AU to keep a close watch on the situation and use its influence to protect Mali’s long-suffering citizens in the best way possible. This is not the time to relax – the crisis is far from over.