Bamako, Mali | AFP | jeudi 30/04/2015 - 13:05 GMT

Trois personnes ont été tuées et 28 autres blessées jeudi dans le nord du Mali par l'explosion d'une mine au passage de leur minibus près de Gao, a appris l'AFP de sources concordantes.

"Ici à l'hôpital de Gao, nous avons reçu trois corps de civils et 28 blessés", a déclaré une source hospitalière, faisant état de six blessés graves.

Selon un des survivants interrogé par l'AFP, le minibus se dirigeait à une foire hebdomadaire à 25 km de Gao, la principale ville du nord du pays, lorsqu'il a sauté sur une mine.

"Il y a eu un bruit et c'était la panique. trois personnes ont été tuées", a-t-il indiqué.

Dans un rapport publié le 14 avril à la suite d'entretiens en février/mars avec plus de 150 victimes et témoins à Gao et Bamako, l'organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) déplorait que "deux ans après l’intervention militaire menée par la France dans le pays en crise, il règne toujours une anarchie et une insécurité généralisées".

"La criminalité endémique, les attaques perpétrées par les groupes armés et les abus commis par les forces de sécurité constituent un risque pour les citoyens ordinaires au centre et dans le nord du Mali", selon Corinne Dufka, responsable de HRW pour l'Afrique de l’Ouest, citée dans le document.

Le nord du Mali est tombé au printemps 2012 sous la coupe de groupes jihadistes liés à Al-Qaïda après la déroute de l'armée face à la rébellion à dominante touareg, d'abord alliée à ces groupes qui l'ont ensuite évincée.

Les jihadistes ont été dispersés et partiellement chassés de cette zone par une opération militaire internationale lancée en janvier 2013 à l'initiative de la France, et toujours en cours.

Mais l'insécurité perdure dans des zones entières échappant encore au contrôle du pouvoir central, notamment les attentat-suicide, la pose d'engins explosifs et les enlèvements.

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© 1994-2015 Agence France-Presse

Overview

In the Central Africa Region, the year 2014 was marked by significant displacement of people in the Central African Republic (CAR), following continuous acts of violence and political instability. Most of these refugees and migrants moved into Cameroon, Republic of Congo (RoC), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), while some internally displaced persons (IDPs) were identified and supported by the IFRC and the CAR Red Cross in CAR.

The emergency appeal operation to assist these CAR refugees and host populations in the East region of Cameroon also came to an end at the end of 2014. A preliminary final report of the operation has been published.

Nigerian refugees fleeing armed attacks also fled into Cameroon. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing the spill over of this violence into Cameroon were also identified and are being supported in Cameroon.

Preparedness actions were also taken to guard against the spread of the Ebola Virus Disease in Cameroon, CAR and DRC. So far, no case of the disease has been reported in any of these countries. Cases of cholera were also reported in the Far North and North regions of Cameroon, and immediate IFRC-Cameroon Red Cross actions taken to stamp them out.

The only natural disaster reported in the region during this reporting period was flooding in the North region of Cameroon. A DREF was issued and victims assisted accordingly.

The Global Fund funded malaria project also continued unperturbed in CAR.

Various national society and IFRC human, material and financial resources were deployed to meet the needs of those rendered vulnerable by all the aforementioned mishaps.

The main obstacle to the implementation of these actions was insecurity, especially along the Cameroon-CAR Cameroon-Nigeria borders, where armed groups operate. Cases of insecurity were also reported in the CAR, where the movement of humanitarian staff became a risky venture at certain periods of the day.

Les populations de la commune de Fifo et de Bambara Maoudé vivent d’élevage, d’agriculture et de commerce. Ces deux localités abritent les foires les plus importantes de la zone fréquentées par des ressortissants des communes voisines, de Tombouctou et Mopti, et même de Koutiala (en 4ème région, beaucoup plus au sud). Conséquence de la crise de 2012, cette partie du cercle de Gourma Rharous connait un banditisme résiduel caractérisé par des braquages, des enlèvements de biens et des assassinats.

C’est dans ces deux localités que le bureau de l’Information Publique de la MINUSMA, de concert avec l’UNPOL et le bureau des Droits de l’homme de Tombouctou, a mené du 21 au 23 Avril dernier une série d’activités visant à faire connaitre le Mandat de la MINUSMA et le rôle du personnel en uniforme, dans les localités de Fifo et Bambara Maoudé, cercle de Gourma Rharous, au total, ce sont près de 350 leaders communautaires qui ont été sensibilisés, dont 200 à Fifo et 150 à Bambara Maoudé. Parmi ceux-ci, les chefs de villages et fractions environnants, les leaders religieux, les leaders des regroupements de jeunes et des femmes.

A Fifo, les participants ont émis le vœu d’avoir un détachement de l’armée malienne dans leur localité. Certains ont dénoncé le fait que les populations sont souvent victimes de vols à mains armées. Au cours d’une réunion similaire tenue également dans leur localité, les habitants de Bambara Maoudé, ont eux insisté sur l’absence d’aide humanitaire, le manque de points d’eau potable ainsi que le problème de l’emploi des jeunes.

« Aujourd’hui, nous sommes édifiés sur le travail de la MINUSMA, que nous ne connaissions pas bien avant. Cette initiative nous aide à comprendre le cadre d’intervention des casques bleus et le rôle de la composante civile de la mission avec toutes ses sections» a expliqué Abidine Ould Sidi Mohomed, conseiller de fraction Ahel Abidine de la localité de Fifo, tout en soulignant son souhait que «ces visites soient plus régulières ainsi que les patrouilles, parce qu’avec cette présence les gens se sentent pris en considération et plus sécurisés».

Les journées de sensibilisation se sont clôturées par un match de football, organisé dans la commune de Bambara Moudé avec l’ensemble des jeunes des différentes communautés. Cela s’inscrit dans la campagne «Opération sport : Unis pour la paix » qui promeut la cohésion sociale intercommunautaire, notamment entre les jeunes, acteurs clé de la paix.

«Depuis l’occupation, la méfiance être les communautés s’est propagée. Cette activité permet aux jeunes de se retrouver et de réfléchir à des solutions visant à réconcilier les cœurs et les esprits de toutes les générations» a déclaré Alpha Bocar, président du conseil local des jeunes de Bambara Maoudé, tout en remerciant la MINUSMA.

Cette session de sensibilisation a été réalisée dans le cadre des missions conjointes que la MINUSMA, à travers ses composantes civiles, policières et militaires, mène régulièrement dans la région pour évaluer la situation sécuritaire et mieux répondre aux besoins de protection des civils.

By Katarina Höije

BAMAKO, 30 April 2015 (IRIN) - The last few years in Mali have been busy: an independence declaration, a coup, a mutiny, a northern takeover by Islamist groups, a French military intervention, a hostage crisis, a guerrilla campaign, a preliminary peace deal, and finally, in February, a ceasefire.

Given all the turmoil, it is little surprise the last two entries – the peace deal and the ceasefire – are now under grave threat.

Tuareg rebels have long fought for independence, or at least greater autonomy, for the large part of northern Mali they call Azawad. The rebels are dragging their feet on signing the latest peace deal and fresh clashes have prompted UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to warn that the situation is in danger of unravelling:

Here’s a look at how we got here and what we can expect to happen next:

HOW WE GOT HERE

The familiar pattern for decades has been Tuareg rebellion, then peace talks, growing dissatisfaction and ultimately renewed conflict. The stakes were raised, however, when many Tuareg rebels fought as mercenaries during the Libyan civil war in 2011 and returned with greater experience and weaponry.

Displeasure at president Amadou Toumani Touré’s handling of the rebellion led to his ouster in a March 2012 coup, which opened the door to Tuareg fighters seizing several northern towns and cities with the help of a growing number of Islamist insurgent groups.

The Tuareg declared independence for Azawad only to see the Islamists begin imposing sharia law. The interim government cried for help and the French military launched Operation Serval aimed at ousting the Islamist militants from northern Mali. The mission ended in July 2014 when France replaced it with a Chadian-based counter-terrorism operation across the Sahel region.

Maenwhiile, in May 2014, Tuareg rebels had retaken the northern city of Kidal. The defeat and the rebels’ subsequent push south towards the regional capital Gao and Menaka, close to the border with Niger, convinced the Malian government to launch a fresh bid for peace.

President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and international observers were hopeful that a deal might finally be reached last month, following eight months of intense negotiations.

But the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), a coalition of Tuareg rebel factions and Arab and Fulani separatist groups, refused to sign, saying the accord failed to meet their demands for a “geographic, political and juridical entity.”

WHAT’S ON THE TABLE?

The latest accord would, broadly speaking, give greater powers and resources to the north but stops short of granting it full political autonomy.

It emphasises reconciliation within Mali, which should remain a united, secular nation rather than allow for an independent entity made up of the three northern regions: Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.

"It’s a compromise that falls short" It proposes giving more powers to elected regional assemblies and leaders in the north, as well as allowing for greater representation of northerners in governmental institutions.

Mali observers say the agreement’s use of the term “secular identity” appears designed to water down rebel aspirations.

“It’s a compromise that falls short of the rebels’ goals of either an independent Azawad or a sharia-based Mali,” Benjamin Soares, a senior researcher at the African Studies Centre in Leiden, told IRIN.

WHERE EXACTLY ARE WE?

Bruce Whitehouse, a cultural anthropologist at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania, believes the government and the rebels are as far apart as ever.

“There are factions on both sides opposed to making any concessions whatsoever,” he told IRIN. “We've known all along that a large portion of the separatist groups' rank-and-file would never settle for anything less than independence. Meanwhile, opposition to the agreement has been getting more strident in Bamako.”

While the government and northern rebel groups prevaricate, the security situation continues to deteriorate.

“Any further delay in signing and implementing the peace agreement can only benefit terrorist groups, whose threats on the ground are increasing... [with] the population being the primary victim,” Radhia Achouri, a spokesperson for MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, told IRIN.

Main mediator Algeria, MINUSMA, the African Union, France, and Mali’s neighbours all regard the peace deal as a vital first step towards restoring order and security in the north.

The delay has resulted in renewed fighting between insurgent groups and the Malian army, inter-communal clashes, the withdrawal of security forces from several areas, and a resurrection of attacks on humanitarian workers and civilians.

Growing frustration over failures to find a solution to the crisis is also fuelling Islamist extremism. Security sources in the region say groups like Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have stepped up their recruitment of unemployed young people who are fed up with the current situation.

WHAT NEXT?

The UN Security Council has urged the three main separatist groups to sign the deal no later than 15 May or else face sanctions.

On Monday, a spokesperson for the CMA said the rebels were prepared to sign the deal, which was drawn up at meetings in Algiers in February, but that further talks were needed first.

One of the key differences between this and past peace agreements is the strong involvement of the international community, which has played a larger role during the negotiations and promises to carry that through in any upcoming implementation phase.

"Reaching an agreement is the easy part" Gilles Yabi, with West African think tank WATHI, said pressure was definitely being applied on the different parties by the international community, especially Mali’s neighbours. “Whoever fails to sign the agreement brokered in Algiers will be seen as the one who halted the peace process,” he told IRIN.

But even if the peace deal is signed by 15 May, this is only the first step. Accords in the past have taken more than three years to implement, only to break down again as different factions vie for influence.

“Reaching an agreement is the easy part, it’s implementing it that will be difficult, and why previous peace agreements have failed,” Yabi told IRIN.

Disarmament and reintegration of Tuareg fighters into the national army could help speed up the process. However, the ongoing clashes and government attempts to mobilise Tuareg and Arab militias loyal to Bamako have severely damaged trust between the parties.

“Even if the armed groups sign the accord, which includes disarmament within one year, it is unlikely the rebels will disarm before political reforms are in place,” Yabi said, expecting the basic structural changes alone to take up to 18 months.

Whatever happens over the next few weeks, Mali’s peace process faces a long road ahead.

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Maiduguri, Nigeria | AFP | Thursday 4/30/2015 - 16:02 GMT

The risk of disease is rising in camps for people displaced by Boko Haram violence because of deteriorating sanitary conditions, relief workers in northeast Nigeria said Thursday.

Abba Yerima, who runs a camp in the Borno state capital of Maiduguri, said more than 6,500 people were currently living at a facility meant for 2,000.

"The toilets are very few... forcing people to defecate in the open air," he said at a meeting with the national emergency agency, which called for urgent action to prevent a potentially deadly disease outbreak.

"We are still appealing to (the) government to build more toilets in the camp to save the situation," Yerima added, referring to the prospect of an outbreak, possibly including cholera.

The Boko Haram conflict has forced 1.5 million people from their homes, with hundreds of thousands seeking refuge in a series of camps set up across the northeast.

The military has reportedly liberated scores of towns from rebel control and indicated people could begin returning home.

But local leaders insist the security situation across the region remains precarious, cautioning people to wait before trying to resettle.

Overpopulation in some camps is therefore likely to continue for several months at least.

The regional head of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Mohammed Kanar, said the agency will increase supplies of "soaps, toiletries, disinfectants and other necessities to prevent disease outbreak".

The huge influx of displaced people in major northeastern cities has strained resources across the region.

While some are living in camps, other displaced people are staying with relatives, putting pressure on family budgets in the deeply impoverished region.

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© 1994-2015 Agence France-Presse

YAOUNDE — Cameroon is home to about 200,000 Central African Republic (C.A.R.) refugees who fled the carnage in their country. As the C.A.R. prepares for next week’s National Reconciliation Forum, VOA spoke to some refugees in Cameroon to learn what they expect from the initiative.Belmonde Houze, a 35-year old emissary and cleric from the C.A.R., spoke to his country's refugees in Cameroon's capital, Yaoundé, about the reconciliation process to recover from more than two years of sectarian violence.

But his audience was mostly pessimistic.

One of these refugees is car washer Ansleme Blaise Kaminga who says he is still traumatized by the brutal murder of his wife and three children in Bangui. He is not interested in a reconciliation which he believes may free those responsible for the bloodshed.

He says no matter the outcome of the reconciliation process, he will never return to his country because he’s lost all of his family.

David Zamngang, is a former student at the University of Bangui and is now a night watchman in Yaounde. For him, the most important priority is getting a credible government so that the healing begins at home rather than as an initiative of the international community.

He says any country that wants to develop must start by organizing elections in which its citizenry freely choses who will represent them. He says he also expects accountability from holders of public office.

Hawker Simon Pierre Magdongu, who also fled from the University of Bangui where he studied history, is not hopeful. He says his country has a history of political division and he doesn’t see solutions.

He says what the world is expecting from C.A.R. interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, has never been achieved under her predecessors. He has no plans to return home because of galloping youth unemployment and poor pay for the few who have jobs.

Groundnut retailer Djenge Dianne, who fled Bangui a year ago, says she doesn’t think reconciliation is possible.

She says she has seen so many reconciliations but her country has never been at peace since she was born. She says no reconciliation can replace all her family and friends killed by ruthless people.

One of the few voices of hope among those VOA spoke to was a refugee who took part in the violence.

Gilliberi Dimanga, who says he fought with one of the rival factions before escaping to Cameroon, says it is high time to stop the rivalry and work for the development of their war ravaged country.

He says he regrets he was deceived into killing innocent people and adds that he is praying for peace and wants his fellow citizens to show the courage needed for reconciliation.

Aid workers here say they are hoping for major progress so refugees can return home. Ngu Paul Simon, with the NGO “Friends of Refugees” or FOR, says some refugees are ready to return.

"Some of the refugees have come to us asking for transport to go back to their country when they so desire and most of them either want to go to school and so on so we sponsor them," said Simon.

Conflict began in C.A.R. in 2013, after mostly Muslim Seleka rebels overthrew the government, leading to reprisals from Christians who formed anti-balaka militias. Most of the victims were civilians.

Current efforts to reconcile rival factions are sponsored by the European Union and the United Nations.

An agreement on the framework for a Joint Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program in early April marked a major step forward. However, mid-month, Colombia’s peace process suffered a serious blow when Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) fighters killed government soldiers in an ambush; and fighting resumed in Ukraine between the military and separatist forces. The announced end of Saudi Arabia’s five-week airstrike campaign in Yemen on 21 April brought few tangible results: missile strikes continued as the humanitarian situation became increasingly dire. Violent protests erupted in Burundi late month ahead of crucial presidential elections in June, and in Chad where popular discontent spilled over into violence. South Sudan and Kashmir saw their worst violence in months, while an earthquake in Nepal on 25 April killed thousands, amid the country’s ongoing political impasse.

In Burundi, the 25 April official announcement of President Nkurunziza’s candidacy for June presidential elections triggered mass protests. At least six were killed in clashes with police, and around 20,000 have fled across the border to Rwanda. After days of deadly unrest, on 29 April Burundi’s Senate requested that the Constitutional Court examine the legality of Nkurunziza’s attempt to secure a third term. In its latest report on Burundi’s elections, Crisis Group warned that a return to violence risked threatening the 2000 Arusha peace agreement, and called for Burundi’s partners to engage more pro-actively with the electoral process to prevent rising tensions as well as pressure all Burundian political parties to reaffirm their commitment to the Arusha agreement’s principles.

On 21 April, Saudi Arabia announced an end to its five-week bombing campaign in Yemen against the Huthis and security forces aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Despite this, Saudi-led air attacks have continued, and even intensified in southern and western provinces. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has taken advantage, seizing Al-Mukalla town in Hadramout. The air campaign thus far has succeeded in militarising the Yemeni power struggle, contributed to a humanitarian disaster, and undermined any chance of political settlement. Yet a political settlement remains key: an immediate, complete and unconditional ceasefire – that includes the Saudi-led coalition – followed by UN-led peace talks with backing from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Western allies, is essential to reversing Yemen’s current path (see our latest report and commentary).

After months of good news, the Colombian peace process suffered a serious setback when FARC guerrillas killed eleven soldiers and wounded another twenty in an ambush in Buenos Aires in Cauca region on 14 April. President Santos declared the attack a violation of FARC’s December 2014 unilateral ceasefire, and announced the resumption of airstrikes, just days after renewing his March decision to temporarily suspend bombings. The attack had no discernible immediate impact on ongoing negotiations, but raised risks of new military escalation and triggered a political backlash against the peace process. In our statement we urge​d​ the government to resist mounting political pressure to set a deadline for the Havana talks, and called on both sides to find ways to stabilise FARC’s ceasefire and minimise the chance of a future incident.

Shelling resumed along the front line separating Ukraine’s military from separatist rebels around 12 April, breaking over a month of calm. Fighting intensified during the month, particularly near Mariupol and outside Donetsk city, and comes despite claims by both sides to have pulled back their heavy weaponry in compliance with the February Minsk agreement. The humanitarian situation in the east continues to deteriorate, exacerbated by the government’s economic blockade of separatist-controlled areas. (See our report and statement on Ukraine).

South Sudan saw renewed clashes in Upper Nile and Unity states – the most serious since August – while severe economic strain is only increasing the likelihood of further conflict. On 21 April, fighting between government troops and a previously allied local ethnic (Shilluk) militia broke out in Upper Nile’s state capital Malakal, displacing over ten thousand mostly Shilluk civilians. A few days later, government forces attacked opposition controlled areas in and around Unity state’s capital Bentiu, and clashed with Sudanese rebels in Pariang county. Meanwhile, tensions escalated on the Sudan–South Sudan border as both governments traded accusations the other was supporting rebel groups (see our recent report). Sudan’s air force bombed reported Sudan Revolutionary Front areas in Bahr el Ghazal and, following a cross-border JEM rebel attack, threatened the rebels’ bases in South Sudan. (See our recent statement)

Elsewhere, in Chad, popular discontent flared. On 25 April, the death of a suspect in police custody sparked riots and clashes between security forces and protesters in the southern city of Kyabe that left four dead. Earlier in the month, teachers and civil servants again went on strike to protest non-payment of their salaries. A powerful earthquake struck Nepal 25 April causing widespread devastation and a humanitarian emergency. Over 5,500 people were confirmed dead at the time of publication, with numbers expected to increase, and 1.4 million are reportedly in need of food aid. The disaster struck amid the ongoing impasse between Nepal’s political parties on the overdue draft constitution. Kashmir witnessed the sharpest rise in violence in months. Violent protests erupted after the Indian army reportedly killed two men in southern Kashmir on 13 April, a militant and his non-combatant brother. A 16-year-old boy was shot dead by police during a protest outside Srinagar on 18 April.

Iran and the P5+1 (EU3+3) on 2 April announced a landmark initial agreement on the key parameters of a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. The agreement marks the first step toward a nuclear accord that could end the prolonged standoff between Iran and the international community and open the door to constructive engagement on issues critical to the Middle East’s peace and security. (see our statement, open letter, blog post and commentary)

Les marches des céréales et les prix affichés ont encore un comportement typique

MESSAGES CLÉS

• Au niveau national, les disponibilités alimentaires sur les marchés et dans les ménages restent typiques et à la faveur d’une demande de consommation, encore faible, les prix sur les marchés sont moyens voire bas.

• L’insécurité alimentaire, globalement Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) dans le pays en avril 2015, est toutefois préoccupante dans certaines régions. Les stocks céréaliers vont fortement diminuer d’ici septembre ainsi que le disponible fourrager en mai-juin 2015 dans la zone agropastorale de Ouallam, Tanout et Goure, de la zone agricole de Doungass et de la zone pastorale de Ouallam, Tanout, Abalak et Tchintabaraden. Les ménages pauvres resteront en Stress (Phase2 de l’IPC) et ne pourront pas satisfaire tous leurs dépenses essentielles.

• Une insécurité alimentaire aiguë de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) affecte aussi les déplacés du conflit de nord-est Nigeria présents dans la sud de la région de Diffa. Les pasteurs du nord de Diffa (Nguigmi) sont aussi fortement affectés suite aux opportunités de commercialisation limitées et aux prix élevés des denrées alimentaires. Les zones pastorales de Nguigmi resteront en Crise au moins jusqu’en septembre.

La sécurité alimentaire des pasteurs et agro-pasteurs se dégrade à l’Ouest du Tchad

MESSAGES CLÉS

• Le conflit Boko Haram s’est élargi au Tchad et le nombre de réfugiés, déplacés et retournés est de plus de 40.000 personnes.
  La dégradation de la consommation alimentaire et des moyens d’existence est due à la pression des arrivées. Les ménages hôtes (Lac, Kanem, BEG et Hadjer Lamis) ont des difficultés à générer des revenus agricoles, piscicoles et commerciales à cause de l’insécurité.

• Le niveau de stocks céréaliers des ménages dans la partie Ouest (Kanem, BEG, Lac et Hadjer Lamis), du sud du Guera et de Wadi Fira a baissé et est en dessous d’une année normale. De façon générale, la consommation alimentaire des ménages est légèrement faible et la soudure pastorale a commencé précocement de deux mois. La situation restera en Stress! (Phase 2 ! de l’IPC) grâce aux interventions qui sont en cours.

• Actuellement, les ménages du département de Djourf Al-Ahmar (Ouest de Sila), et du nord Guera ont épuisé précocement leurs stocks et font face à une hausse saisonnière anormale des prix des céréales et une baisse atypique des prix de bétail et resteront en Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC).

• Les réfugiés et retournés en provenance de la République Centrafricaine (près de 150.000 personnes selon les estimations d’OCHA) continuent de bénéficier de l’assistance humanitaire diverse sans laquelle leur sécurité alimentaire sera très inquiétante. Depuis le début de l’année, le PAM continue de d’assurer régulièrement le cycle de transfert de coupons pour les retournés de la République Centrafricaine, assistant plus de 63.770 personnes dans tous les sites des retournés dans le sud.

Réduction des revenus pastoraux à cause des mauvaises conditions d’élevage au nord du pays

MESSAGES CLÉS

• Les mauvaises conditions d’élevage réduisent les productions animales et les revenus issus de la vente du bétail dans certaines zones des régions du nord. Un risque élevé de mortalité du bétail plus élevé que la moyenne est attendue.

• Les ménages pauvres et très pauvres de la bande du fleuve de Gao et de Bourem, la zone des lacs du Goundam, le Haoussa de Niafunké et le Nord de Youwarou en raison de la baisse de revenus et de productions agricoles auront des difficultés à satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires en absence d’appui humanitaire qu’en ayant recours aux stratégies d’adaptation négatives. Ils seront en insécurité alimentaire de type Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) de juillet jusqu’aux nouvelles récoltes à partir de septembre.

• L’excédent céréalier de plus d’un million de tonne permet l’approvisionnement satisfaisant des marchés en denrées partout dans le pays à des prix proches de la moyenne quinquennale et améliore l’accès de la majorité des ménages aux marchés pour leurs besoins en cette période. Par conséquent, la plupart des autres régions du pays devront faire face à l’insécurité alimentaire Minimal (Phase 1 de l’IPC) jusqu’en septembre

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Mali, Mr. Mongi Hamdi, calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities in several locations in the north of Mali.

The SRSG is extremely concerned about the serious violations of the ceasefire taking place in Mali, at a crucial moment in the peace process.

On 27 April, elements of the Groupe d’auto-défense touareg imghad et alliés (GATIA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad – Plateforme (MAA-Plateforme) entered the town of Ménaka, which, under the ceasefire arrangements, is under the control of the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA). Fighting continued in the vicinity of Ménaka on 28 April.

On 29 April, elements of the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) attacked National Guard barracks in Goundam, killing two National Guard members and a child.

Other incidents or confrontations are currently taking place in Léré, Bintagoungou and in the area around Ménaka. MINUSMA is closely monitoring the situation.

“I call on all the actors involved to be reasonable and responsible; the stakes are too high. It is imperative that the parties concerned honour their commitment to peace as well as the Ceasefire Agreement of 23 May 2014 and its modalities of implementation agreed on 13 June 2014, the Declaration of cessation of hostilities signed in Algiers on 24 July 2014 and the declaration signed in Algiers on 19 February 2015,” the SRSG said.

“Through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the entire international community strongly condemns this spiral of violence. MINUSMA is impartial: all parties, regardless of who they are, must honour their commitments and return to their original positions. Let me be very clear on this point: We want the groups concerned to honour their commitments and to return to their positions, as foreseen by the ceasefire agreement and as they have pledged to do,” Mr. Hamdi continued.

MINUSMA is intensifying and multiplying its contacts at the highest level to reduce tensions on the ground. A meeting of the Commission technique mixte de sécurité (CTMS) will be held shortly to take measures to ensure compliance with the commitments made.

“We hope that reason will prevail. The Agreement which is to be signed is a historic opportunity for peace in Mali, for the benefit of all Malians. All of our efforts are directed towards this. The groups involved in the hostilities on the ground bear a heavy responsibility,” the Special Representative concluded.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Mali, Mr. Mongi Hamdi, calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities in several locations in the north of Mali.

The SRSG is extremely concerned about the serious violations of the ceasefire taking place in Mali, at a crucial moment in the peace process.

On 27 April, elements of the Groupe d’auto-défense touareg imghad et alliés (GATIA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad – Plateforme (MAA-Plateforme) entered the town of Ménaka, which, under the ceasefire arrangements, is under the control of the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA). Fighting continued in the vicinity of Ménaka on 28 April.

On 29 April, elements of the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) attacked National Guard barracks in Goundam, killing two National Guard members and a child.

Other incidents or confrontations are currently taking place in Léré, Bintagoungou and in the area around Ménaka. MINUSMA is closely monitoring the situation.

“I call on all the actors involved to be reasonable and responsible; the stakes are too high. It is imperative that the parties concerned honour their commitment to peace as well as the Ceasefire Agreement of 23 May 2014 and its modalities of implementation agreed on 13 June 2014, the Declaration of cessation of hostilities signed in Algiers on 24 July 2014 and the declaration signed in Algiers on 19 February 2015,” the SRSG said.

“Through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the entire international community strongly condemns this spiral of violence. MINUSMA is impartial: all parties, regardless of who they are, must honour their commitments and return to their original positions. Let me be very clear on this point: We want the groups concerned to honour their commitments and to return to their positions, as foreseen by the ceasefire agreement and as they have pledged to do,” Mr. Hamdi continued.

MINUSMA is intensifying and multiplying its contacts at the highest level to reduce tensions on the ground. A meeting of the Commission technique mixte de sécurité (CTMS) will be held shortly to take measures to ensure compliance with the commitments made.

“We hope that reason will prevail. The Agreement which is to be signed is a historic opportunity for peace in Mali, for the benefit of all Malians. All of our efforts are directed towards this. The groups involved in the hostilities on the ground bear a heavy responsibility,” the Special Representative concluded.

De probables besoins d’assistance alimentaire chez les pauvres du centre et du sud du pays

MESSAGES CLÉS

• Un profond déficit céréalier annuel et une forte baisse de revenus saisonniers ont entrainé des déficits de consommation et de protection de certains moyens d’existence dans les ménages pauvres du centre et sud du pays depuis février. Dans les régions agropastorales du centre-sud qui ont été les plus touchées, l’insécurité alimentaire de type Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) ou pire est attendue entre avril et la fin de la période de soudure en septembre pour les ménages pauvres et très pauvres.

• Les éleveurs pour acheter de la nourriture et de l’aliment bétail, procèdent à d’importantes ventes animales atypiques qui entrainent des déficits de protection de leurs moyens d’existence et de consommation, surtout dans le centre de la zone agropastorale.
  Ces populations seront confrontées à l’insécurité alimentaire de type Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) ou Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC), selon les zones et les périodes.

• Les autres zones de moyens d’existence actuellement en insécurité alimentaire Minimale (Phase 1 de l’IPC) devraient se retrouver, en l’absence d’un choc sur les marchés (alimentaires et de bétail) et/ou sur la mobilité humaine, au plus en Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) entre avril et septembre du fait de la résilience des déficits de production agricoles et des revenus saisonnières qui limitent leur capacité d’accès alimentaire

Le riz local et le sorgho sont les produits alimentaires les plus consommés par les ménages pauvres de la Mauritanie suivis par le blé importé qui est l'aliment de substitution auquel ces ménages recourent le plus. Le riz local est cultivé dans la vallée du fleuve (dans le sud des régions du Trarza, du Brakna, du Gorgol et du Guidimakha). Le sorgho est produit dans toutes les zones de production (sorgho pluvial) et dans les walo et barrages (sorgho de décrue). Toutefois, une importante partie est importée du Mali et du Sénégal. La Mauritanie vit beaucoup plus de ses importations (70 % en bonne année agricole et jusqu'à 85 % en mauvaise année) que de sa production interne. Nouakchott est le principal marché de collecte pour les produits venant de l'extérieur et également le marché de distribution où viennent s'approvisionner les animateurs des marchés de distribution secondaire que sont les autres marchés référenciés. L'huile de cuisson est essentiellement consommée dans les zones urbaines.
La vente des animaux est une mode d’existence dans toutes les zones et une importante source de revenus et de nourriture

Le mil, le maïs, le niébé et le riz importé sont les produits alimentaires les plus importants consommés au Niger. Le mil est consommé aussi bien par les ménages ruraux que les ménages pauvres urbains dans l’ensemble du pays. Le maïs et le riz importé sont plus importants pour les ménages urbains, tandis que le niébé est principalement consommé par les ménages pauvres des régions rurales et urbaines en tant que source de protéine.
Niamey est le marché national le plus important et un centre du commerce international ; elle approvisionne en outre les ménages urbains. Tillaberi est aussi un centre urbain approvisionnant les localités environnantes. Le marché de Gaya est le principal marché urbain pour le maïs avec des liens transfrontaliers. Maradi, Tounfafi et Diffa sont des marchés de regroupement régionaux et des marchés transfrontaliers pour le Niger et d’autres pays de la région. C'est dans ces marchés que vont régulièrement acheter leur nourriture les ménages et les éleveurs des régions déficitaires en céréales du nord. Agadez et Zinder sont également d’importants marchés nationaux et régionaux. Nguigmi et Abalak se trouvent dans des zones pastorales, où la population dépend largement des marchés céréaliers pour leur approvisionnement alimentaire. Ces deux marchés sont particulièrement importants pendant la saison des pluies, lorsque les éleveurs sont confinés dans la zone pastorale.

Le mil, le riz et le sorgho constituent les aliments de base de la majorité de la population malienne. Le mil est l'aliment le plus consommé traditionnellement, mais depuis 2005 le riz est devenu un substitut populaire chez les ménages urbains. Le sorgho est généralement plus important pour les ménages ruraux que pour les ménages urbains. Les marchés inclus sont révélateurs des conditions locales dans leurs régions respectives. Ségou est l’un des marchés les plus importants tant pour le pays que pour la région, dans la mesure où il se trouve dans une très vaste zone de production de céréales.
Bamako, la capitale et le centre urbain le plus étendu du pays, fonctionne comme un marché de regroupement. Elle reçoit des céréales de Koulikoro, Ségou et Sikasso destinées à la consommation et fait également office de marché de regroupement pour les échanges avec les régions nord du pays (Kayes et Koulikoro) et avec la Mauritanie. Les marchés des régions déficitaires du pays (Tombouctou et Gao) reçoivent leurs approvisionnements en mil et en riz de Mopti, Ségou et Sikasso.

L'Afrique de l’Ouest peut être divisée en trois zones agro-écologiques ou en trois bassins commerciaux (bassins de l’ouest, bassin du centre, bassin de l’est). Les deux sont importants pour l'interprétation du comportement et de la dynamique du marché.
Les trois principales zones agro-écologiques incluent la zone Sahélienne, la zone Soudanaise et la zone Côtière où la production et la consommation peuvent être facilement classifiées. (1) Dans la zone Sahélienne, le mil constitue le principal produit alimentaire cultivé et consommé en particulier dans les zones rurales et de plus en plus par certaines populations qui y ont accès en milieux urbains. Des exceptions sont faites pour le Cap Vert où le maïs et le riz sont les produits les plus importants, la Mauritanie où le blé et le sorgho et le Sénégal où le riz constituent des aliments de base. Les principaux produits de substitution dans le Sahel sont le sorgho, le riz, et la farine de manioc (Gari), avec les deux derniers en période de crise. (2) Dans la zone Soudanienne (le sud du Tchad, le centre du Nigéria, du Bénin, du Ghana, du Togo, de la Côte d'Ivoire, le sud du Burkina Faso, du Mali, du Sénégal, la Guinée Bissau, la Serra Leone, le Libéria) le maïs et le sorgho constituent les principales céréales consommées par la majorité de la population. Suivent après le riz et les tubercules particulièrement le manioc et l’igname. (3)
Dans la zone côtière, avec deux saisons de pluie, l’igname et le maïs constituent les principaux produits alimentaires. Ils sont complétés par le niébé, qui est une source très significative de protéines.
Les trois bassins commerciaux sont simplement connus sous les noms de bassin Ouest, Centre, et Est. En plus du mouvement du sud vers le nord des produits, les flux de certaines céréales se font aussi horizontalement. (1) Le bassin Ouest comprend la Mauritanie, le Sénégal, l’ouest du Mali, la Sierra Leone, la Guinée, le Libéria, et la Gambie où le riz est le plus commercialisé. (2)
Le bassin central se compose de la Côte d'Ivoire, le centre et l’est du Mali, le Burkina Faso, le Ghana, et le Togo où le maïs est généralement commercialisé. (3) Le bassin Est se rapporte au Niger, Nigéria, Tchad, et Bénin où le millet est le plus fréquemment commercialisé. Ces trois bassins commerciaux sont distingués sur la carte ci-dessus.

Millet, maize, and sorghum are the most important food commodities for household consumption. Millet is the staple of the most vulnerable households, while maize and sorghum also contribute to the food basket of a majority of all households.
Sankaryare market is the largest and most important market in Ouagadougou and supplies other markets within the country and region. Koudougou is located in one of the most populated areas in the country, where a majority of households depend on the market for their food needs. Djibo is in the highly vulnerable Sahelian zone.
Pouytenga is an assembly market for products from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, and Togo. Solenzo is a rural market located in the middle of a surplus production zone. Bobo Dioulasso is important center for both consumption and production – it functions as both the economic capital of Burkina Faso and is located in an important cereal production zone.

Key Messages

In West Africa, market availability was adequate in March, with supplies from recent 2014/15 harvests and international rice and wheat imports. Staple food prices were stable or declining, except in areas directly and indirectly affected by the conflict in northeastern Nigeria. The recent opening of borders among Ebola-affected countries contributed to improved trade flows in some areas, following disruptions over the second half of 2014.

In East Africa, maize markets were well-supplies decline in Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and surplus-producing areas of Ethiopia with recent harvests and regional trade flows. Markets were likewise well supplied within Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Staple food prices were high and variable in the Greater Upper Nile States of South Sudan. Conflict and insecurity continued to disrupt markets in parts of South Sudan, Somalia, and the Darfur and South Kordofan States in Sudan.

In Southern Africa, regional staple food stocks continued tightening in March as the lean season carried on. Availability remained higher than previous years in South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and most parts of Tanzania due to the above-average 2014 harvest, keeping staple food prices stable or only marginally increasing even though it was the peak of the lean season. In Zimbabwe and Malawi, however, staple food prices increased significantly driven by limited supplies and the lack of green harvests, normally available starting in March, due to late start and poor quality of the current rainfall season. Maize prices were generally lower than their respective 2014 levels and lower than their respective five-year average levels in all monitored countries except South Africa and Zambia where prices were lower than last year’s levels but significantly higher than the five-year average.

Staple food availability remained generally adequate to meet local needs throughout Central America and Haiti. However, market supplies were below-average in Haiti due to the effects of a recent below-average Otoño harvest (October – December) and high demand of seeds to planting, causing atypical price increases for black beans and maize. Maize and red bean prices were stable in Central America due to supplies from the Postrera and Postrera Tardia harvest in Honduras and El Salvador, and from Mexican imports in Guatemala, but remained significantly above their respective 2014 and five-year average levels.

In Central Asia, wheat availability remained good in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Prices stabilized in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan after increasing over the last quarter of 2014.

International maize, rice, and soybean prices were stable while wheat prices declined slightly in March and all were below March 2014 levels due to very well supplied global markets from record or near record global production in 2014. Crude oil prices increased slightly in March, but remained below average.