Faits saillants
La situation relative au Criquet pèlerin est restée préoccupante en mars dans les aires de reproduction hivernale le long des deux rives de la mer Rouge avec la poursuite des opérations de lutte contre des bandes larvaires et des essaims.
Today, the European Union and its partners, Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council, Lutheran World Federation, Association of Volunteers in International Service and Windle Trust have launched the Support to Education for Refugees in Dadaab (SERD) Programme. This 36 months EU funded programme aims at providing increased access to quality of formal, non-formal education and vocational training opportunities for Somali children who reside in the world's biggest camp.
The Somali children and youth living in those camps have been living up to now without any perspectives. Lots of them have never seen Somalia and are virtual prisoners in overcrowded camps where education is limited and where illegal income-earning opportunities are an attractive alternative while skilled youths are willing to go back to Somalia to take part in the reconstruction of their country. According to recent UN reports, only 57.000 of Dadaab’s 221.000 school-age children and youth are enrolled in school. The number of students who actually complete school is much lower as the dropout rates are very high especially for girls.
The new EU grant worth 3.5 million EUR will improve school level infrastructure, increase the number trained teachers, build school management capacities and expand vocational training opportunities. The action will also explore innovative approaches to basic education provision such as integrated pre-schools, Accelerated Learning Programmes and mobile schools. And through a complementary Somali-wide education programme, the Education Synergies (SWES), the EU will support limited number of scholarships to secondary leavers in Dadaab to pursue university education.
Girls, who are greatly disadvantaged in the formal education system, both in the camps and in host communities, will be specifically targeted. The programme aims at enhancing their chances in attending, participating and persisting in school.
The EU support to education for Somali refugees in Dadaab is anchored in the Joint Strategy for Education in Dadaab 2012-2015 and which seeks to accelerate provision of quality education in Dadaab refugee camps and surrounding host communities. The EU support will be implemented in close coordination with UNHCR, UNICEF and other education partners to maximize benefits for target beneficiaries in the camps. END
For more information:
Magali Uytterhaeghe
Press and Information Officer
Delegation of the European Union in Kenya
Somalia Unit
P.O. Box 45119
00100 Nairobi
Tel: +254.20.271.28.30
Fax: +254.20.271.09.97
Cell: +254.717.10.44.14
Email: Magali.UYTTERHAEGHE@ext.eeas.europa.eu
Website: http://www.eu-somalia-unit.eu
“The political process is lagging dangerously behind the military effort” is the key sentence in a new report by the UN Secretary-General on Mali. The primary problem underlying the Mali crisis has been poor governance and a lack of human security. The French-led military intervention has pushed back violent extremism which, however, has been an outcome rather than a root-cause of the crisis. It is indeed urgent to now focus on the restoration of the unity of the Malian state based on credible national institutions working for all Malians.
The Secretary-General’s report suggests two options for proceeding in Mali. The UN can work alongside the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), or AFISMA can be “re-hatted” as a UN mission under Chapter VII. The report proposes the establishment of a force of 11,200 UN peacekeepers, as well as the deployment of a special counterterrorist unit. Initial discussions in the Security Council on March 28 seemed to indicate support for the establishment of a full-fledged UN peacekeeping force, though at present this has not yet been decided.
The situation in Mali remains extraordinarily complicated, and reshaping the international engagement into a UN peacekeeping operation will not be easy. What are the main issues the Security Council need to consider in response to the Secretary-General’s report?
First, the UN has to take a clear position on the need to fundamentally reform the Malian military. Since March 2012, the Malian military has staged a coup, unseated the interim-president, fought internal battles, and conducted a number of documented violations of human rights against ethnic and religious minorities. Above all, why did the Malian military, when it mattered most, fail to protect the people and territorial integrity of Mali?
Just after the French invasion, Gen. Carter Ham, the head of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), made a blunt admission regarding the failure of years of US military training to instill respect for human rights in the Malian army, saying that most US training for the Malians focused on tactics, strategy, and "technical matters."
The Secretary-General’s report does recognize the “major long-term challenge” of transforming the Malian military. However, it also calls for “rapidly building the capacities” of the Mali defence and security forces and welcomes the recruitment of 3,000 additional troops. The European Union is expected to make a major contribution to the necessary trainings, which started last week.
At this critical moment, the UN should acknowledge the extent to which the Malian military are a part of the problem and prioritize structural reform over technical training. If there is no such message and plan from the international community, the Malian military will gladly enjoy the benefits of new hardware and trainings, but continue to feed the instability in Bamako and elsewhere.
Second, the UN needs to take distance from the idea that elections in Mali can be held in July this year. The July timing is part of a road map for transition, as approved by the Mali Parliament in January. The Secretary-General’s report is ambiguous on this issue as well. On the one hand, the report sees elections in July as “extremely difficult,” especially in the north. On the other hand, the idea is not rejected, and the report recommends “as a matter of urgency” the creation of a “political atmosphere conducive to credible and peaceful elections” within the April to July 2013 time frame.
Mali is at the onset of a herculean effort to bring together different communities through a process of national mediation and dialogue. Apart from the priority to restore relationships within society first, the voter registration and technical preparations for elections will take months. It is unthinkable that meaningful elections can take place by July this year, and the UN should not support any such expectations.
Third, the mandate and status of the parallel force to be established in addition to the UN stabilization mission needs to be clarified. The UN is anticipating continued attacks on the UN mission by non-state armed groups, or “asymmetric threats” in the language of military planners. These threats would need to be dealt with by a parallel force operating in Mali, but “possibly in the region,” conducting major combat and counterterrorism operations, “beyond the scope of the UN mandate and capability.”
The solution resembles the recent approval by the Security Council to establish a designated “intervention brigade” within the purview of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the description of the parallel force is vague in the report on Mali. If this force is going to be crucial for the success of the UN effort, we need to know more about it. What is this force expected to accomplish, how big does it needs to be, and within which territory and under whose responsibility and leadership will it operate?
Fourth, the recognition of the regional nature of the crisis leaves room to increase the role of ECOWAS and the African Union as the primary bodies to take responsibility for resolving the conflict. The risk of the UN taking over the lead of the international intervention is that it will not have the breadth, the political will, or the resources necessary to sustain a long-term solution. Regional intergovernmental bodies are better suited to do that, and they deserve a more prominent role than ascribed to them in the Secretary-General’s report.
Fifth, the report recommends a national dialogue “without delay.” Civil society is expected to make an important contribution in this regard by helping to build the necessary trust and cohesion. However, the report fails to recognize that here, too, the regional framework is important, as the communities to be reconciled live well beyond and across Mali’s borders. Strengthening the regional approach to the Mali crisis is essential.
Emmanuel Bombande is the Executive Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), and Chair of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). Peter van Tuijl is GPPAC’s Executive Director.
Originally published in the Global Observatory
Burkina Faso: UN Expert calls on the UN, the EU and the international community to provide the technical, material and other support necessary to safeguard Burkina Faso against the external and internal security challenges it faces in light of the conflict in Mali and other parts of the sub-region.
Introduction
The Special Rapporteur thanks the Government of Burkina Faso for the invitation to conduct a country visit at this time, and for the constructive and co-operative way in which all Government representatives approached the mission. He particularly commends the transparency shown by Ministers and their officials during their engagement with him, which allowed a frank and open dialogue on the current terrorist threat to Burkina Faso, and the measures necessary to address this threat in a manner consistent with the rule of law and the protection of human rights.
During the course of his visit the Special Rapporteur had productive meetings with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Human Rights, the Minister for the Territorial Administration and Security, the Minister in charge of Relations between Institutions and Political Reforms, and the Minister of Justice. He also met with the Attorney General, the President of the National Authority for the Treatment of Financial Information, the High Authority for the Control of Arms, and high level representatives of the National Commission against Proliferation of Small Arms. During a visit to the National Assembly the Special Rapporteur met with the President and Vice-President of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and the President of the Committee on Human Rights. He also met with the Vice-President and Rapporteur of the National Committee on Human Rights, a quasi-autonomous body that was recently given legislative underpinning so as to conform with the Paris Principles for national human rights institutions.
The Special Rapporteur also met with lawyers, judges, non-governmental organizations and representatives of the international community including the Ambassador of the United States of America, the Ambassador of France, and the Ambassador and Head of Delegation for the Mission of the European Union in Burkina Faso.
In addition, the Special Rapporteur conducted a visit to the Maison d’Arrêt et de Correction des Armées which houses members of the armed forces and the gendarmerie detained on remand or convicted of military offences, including many of those currently awaiting trial for offences connected with the army mutiny of April 2011. He had the opportunity of discussing the challenges faced by staff and inmates, and met privately with a number of detainees. He also visited Maison d’Arrêt et de Correction d'Ouagadougou and was given a comprehensive account of the systemic problems in the penal system of Burkina Faso.
The Special Rapporteur also consulted with relevant UN agencies operating in Burkina Faso including those involved with the influx of refugees from the conflict in Mali. He wishes to express his thanks to the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Burkina Faso for providing logistical support throughout his mission.
Preliminary Assessment
Burkina Faso is a land-locked country situated in Central West Africa with a population of just over 17 million with the population growing at a rate of 3% per annum. The country does not have extensive natural resources or a strong industrial base. A large part of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. The main cash crop is cotton-growing. Since 2004, restrictions on inward investment have been very significantly relaxed, which has resulted in an increase in the exploration and mining of gold, which is now the country’s main export revenue.
Burkina Faso has extensive borders with a number of States affected by conflict in recent years including Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Niger. Its GDP is approximately $24.03 billion. According to the UNDP human development report 2013 approximately 45% of the population lives on an income level under the World Bank poverty line. The highest rate of unemployment is among the age group 18-25. Approximately 60% of the population is Muslim, with the remainder made up of Catholic (20%), animist (15%), and Protestant (5%). The population includes more than 60 different ethnic groups and there are more than a 120 different languages spoken. The official language is French.
Despite the apparent geographical vulnerability of Burkina Faso, the country has not so far suffered from serious internal armed conflict or from acts of terrorism. All those who spoke to the Special Rapporteur ascribed this to the country’s long history of promoting inter-faith tolerance and dialogue, a tradition which is described as a part of the national consciousness. The rate of inter-faith and inter-ethnic marriage is high, and it is common for the children of one faith to be educated in schools run by religious organizations other than their own. The people of Burkina Faso attach considerable importance to the principle of respect for alternative faiths and cultures. This is reflected in Government policy at the highest level. In April 2011, for example, the Human Rights Ministry published its Stratégie Nationale de Promotion d’une culture de la Tolérance et de la Paix au Burkina Faso; and in January 2012 the Ministry published it Manuel de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits entre Agriculteurs et Éleveurs, aimed at the resolution of long running disputes concerning land usage in rural areas.
Since the early 1990’s the Presidency of Burkina Faso has acted as mediator in regional disputes and armed conflicts between and within the States’ in the region, facilitating peace negotiations in a variety of situations including conflicts involving the Toureg peoples of the sub-region. Most recently, during 2012, the President and Foreign Minister played a central role in the efforts by ECOWAS to mediate the conflict in Northern Mali, hosting negotiations between the Government and rebel factions in Ouagadougou. During that process the President drew a clear distinction between national rebel forces such as MLNA and Islamist insurgents from outside Mali such as MUJWA. Following the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013 Burkina Faso provided a contributory contingent of 700 soldiers to the ECOWAS force operating in the country.
Some interlocutors considered that this might represent a threat of reprisal against Burkina Faso from MUJWA, Ansar Dine or AQIM, and noted that at least one group had previously announced an intention to mount a reprisal attack against a number of major cities in different parts of the sub-region, including Ouagadougou. Government sources however noted that domestic intelligence and security arrangements, in the capital and elsewhere in the Burkina Faso, had been considerably strengthened since January 2013, and consider the threat of an externally planned terrorist attack is currently well-contained.
The first human rights obligation of any State is to protect the lives and physical safety of its people, including citizens and all those within its jurisdiction. The Government attaches very considerable importance to this obligation and rightly recognizes that this obligation involves a careful assessment of the external and internal security threats, and requires a State to tackle not only the manifestations of terrorism but also its root causes.
Following the last visit of the Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, Burkina Faso enacted Loi No. 060-2009, 17 Decembre, 2009 Relative a la Repression D’Actes and Loi No. 061-2009, 17 December 2009, Relative a la Lutte Contre le Financement du Terrorisme. The former law defines and prohibits acts of terrorism in Burkina Faso. It adopts a definition of terrorism which broadly corresponds with international standards, although the offence of l’association de malfeaiteurs, which derives from French law, has in some countries been used to prosecute individuals with only the most the tenuous connection with alleged terrorists. However, since no individual has so far been arrested or charged within Burkina Faso for any offence under the 2009 counter-terrorism legislation, there is no evidence so far to suggest that this very broad offence has been, or would be, misused by the authorities. The legislation also prescribes a range of terrorist offences relating to civil aviation, maritime navigation, fixed platforms and public transport, offences against internationally protected person, kidnapping, offences connected with the use of dangerous materials, and acts concerned with the provision of material support to terrorism, including the provision of arms for the purpose of terrorism, and for recruitment or training of individuals in acts of terrorism. The legislation provides for a range of penalties up to and including life imprisonment.
The 2009 terrorist financing legislation is designed to give effect to UNSC Resolution 1373 and to the obligations of Burkina Faso under the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, 9 December 1999. To date, the Government has signed and ratified 12 out of the 16 international anti-terrorism instruments. Those remaining to be signed and ratified are the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the 2005 amendment to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.
Government sources provided the Special Rapporteur with a realistic and transparent assessment of external and internal threats Burkina Faso is facing. As to the former, the country’s border security is a matter of very considerable concern to the Government. The border with Mali is 1200 kilometres long and is not marked by any natural or man-made physical boundary. Along approximately half its length the border is in direct contact with the conflict zone in northern Mali. The border as a whole is highly porous and difficult to secure. The Burkinabe army is 10,000 strong, but more than 2,000 troops are currently committed to military operations in other States including Sudan, Guinea Bissau and Mali, placing considerable strain on Burkinabe military resources.
In response to the existence of external threats on its borders, the Government has created a dedicated counter-terrorism force, and has stationed 1,000 troops (army and specialist gendarmerie) in the northern part of the border with Mali. There have so far been a small number of cross-border incidents in the north, including the kidnapping of two French nationals who were abducted and taken across the border with Mali where they were executed. There remains an ever-present risk that groups such as AQIM and MUJWA may transit across Burkina Faso from Mali and Niger and carry out kidnappings and similar attacks in the Sahel.
There have also been a number of sporadic and so far relatively minor border incursions by insurgents from Mali into the territory of Burkina Faso along these southerly sections of the border. There is no evidence that any of these groups has so far established an operational base within the territory of Burkina Faso, but the need for international support to police the border is urgent and imperative. The southerly part of the border with Mali is poorly protected, and is dependent upon intermittent manned border posts, with ground patrols and a limited amount of air support from the Burkinabe Air Force.
Taken as whole, border security represents a considerable vulnerability for the country. The Government has received a certain amount of bilateral support in its efforts to secure the border, but this has been largely confined to capacity-building, training and the supply of a limited amount of equipment. The Government considers that further international assistance is essential to the maintenance of its border security. Government security sources stressed to the Special Rapporteur that in order to guarantee the protection of the population the army needed additional material and other support including, in particular, communication, observation and radar equipment as well as additional vehicles.
During his meeting with the National Commission against Proliferation of Small Arms, the Special Rapporteur was informed that poor border security also represented a major obstacle to the suppression of arms trafficking. The Commission estimates that there are approximately 2 million unlawful light weapons in circulation within the borders of Burkina Faso, including automatic weapons and light missiles. For a country with a population of just over 17 million, this represents a significant threat to security and is evidence of continuing cross-border arms trafficking. Prior to the conflict in Mali the Commission estimated that inward trafficking represented a significant problem, with 39% of weapons coming from Ghana, 6% from Mali, and 19% from Cote d’Ivoire. A recent initiative to monitor and suppress arms trafficking across the Malian border since the start of the conflict had to be abandoned due to lack of funds. The Commission has been working with a number of organisations promoting arms control, including Amnesty International, to shape the recently adopted UN Arms Trade Treaty. However senior members of the Commission emphasised to the Special Rapporteur that improved border security was essential to the suppression of the proliferation and cross-border smuggling of light weapons capable of use in armed conflict.
As a result of the conflict in Mali, Burkina Faso is home to approximately 48,000 refugees who have fled the fighting and are currently living in refugee camps close to the northern border in Mentao and Ferrihao as well as the province of Kadiogo. The Government has taken considerable care to screen refugees and to disarm them before admitting them to refugee camps. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur was informed that a significant number of former combatants associated with Ansar Dine and other groups involved in the conflict in Mali are among the refugees within its borders, and are organised into identifiable groups. Government officials maintain a close watch on these groups and individuals in order to identify and prevent security risks that may arise from their presence on the territory of Burkina Faso.
The Special Rapporteur notes that whilst the conflict in Mali has not so far spilt over to the territory of Burkina Faso, there is a risk that it may do so. Burkina Faso is in need of further international support and assistance in order to be able to guarantee the security of the border and the safety of its citizens and others within its territory. Whilst the primary need is for support in connection with border security some interlocutors suggested that improved intelligence systems training would also be useful. At present it appears that any report of abnormal activity is escalated to Ministerial level. Many of these reports turn out to be unfounded, with a consequent diversion of resources. It was suggested by one interlocutor that international assistance would be useful in introducing the systematisation of intelligence evaluation so that only reliable threat reports are escalated to Ministerial level. Again, this points to the need for additional international support.
Turning to internal risks, Pillar I of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, most recently re-affirmed by the General Assembly in June 2012 emphasises that conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism include not only long-running regional conflicts such as that in the Sahel, but also social, political, economic and educational exclusion, shortcomings in good governance, and the persistence of unresolved human rights violations.
Within Burkina Faso, poverty, as well perceived inequality are sources of increasing levels of frustration among poorer sections of the population, as evidenced by civil unrest and the army mutiny in 2011. The Special Rapporteur heard from civil society representatives that there is a perception among disadvantaged sections of the community that the wealth generated by mining has been unfairly distributed, that land disputes have generated a sense of frustration, and that there are signs of mounting political dissatisfaction and unrest.
Viewed objectively, the underlying problem is one of poverty. In recent years, GDP has increased at a growth rate of approximately 5% per annum, but at the same time the population growth has been in the region of 3%. Some consider that growth of this level ought to have been reflected in at least some reduction in absolute poverty levels which have in fact remained relatively static. On the other hand, the Prime Minister informed the Special Rapporteur that a recent job creation initiative had allocated CFA 10 billion for the creation of 60,000 new jobs. All interlocutors, however, agreed that there is evidence of growing frustration and social dissatisfaction, particularly amongst the young, which has the potential to lead to radicalization and even violent extremism.
The Special Rapporteur was informed of some minor, but unprecedented, incidents that some have suggested are “early warning signs” pointing to the emergence of religious intolerance in some sections of society. Examples cited to the Special Rapporteur included threats that were reportedly made to a senior Imam following a meeting with a Catholic Archbishop in Ouagadougou as of an ongoing process of inter-faith dialogue between religious leaders; and an incident in which a number of Muslim families had removed their children from a Christian school in protest at the fact that a religious emblem (a cross) was introduced into the school uniform. It appears to the Special Rapporteur that these incidents may have attracted disproportionate attention in the media and among the political classes in Ouagadougou due to the importance attached to the Burkinabe tradition of religious tolerance and inter-faith co-operation. Nonetheless, the very fact that these incidents have attracted so much attention is some evidence of social fragility and perceived vulnerability.
Whilst incidents such as these have caused unease, and are closely monitored by Government and civil society, the Special Rapporteur agrees with most interlocutors that they do not amount to proof of any discernable shift of attitudes among any section of the population towards religious intolerance or radicalization. The attention attached to them is perhaps best seen as evidence of sensitivity of the population, the Government and the media to signs of intolerance. Moreover, the Government pursues an active programme of inter-faith co-operation. Under the Constitution, the institutions of state are committed to secularism (Article 31), but freedom of thought and plurality of religion are guaranteed (Article 7). In September 2012 the Ministry of Relations between Institutions and Political Reforms sponsored a forum for dialogue between faith leaders aimed at examining the relationship between religious and State institutions, and promoting tolerance and understanding between them.
The Special Rapporteur was informed that over the past year a number of Imams and scholars from outside the sub-region had entered Burkina Faso for religious purposes and had been preaching at local mosques. The Government monitors their activities and preachings and is satisfied that none has so far crossed a line from inflammatory rhetoric to the incitement of acts of violence.
There was a consensus among all interlocutors that the Burkinabe tradition of inter-faith tolerance, dialogue and peace-building represented a significant defence against the growth of violent religious extremism, and that there was currently no evidence of a significant trend in this direction. On the other hand, all interlocutors also agreed that poverty, social and educational exclusion, and frustration, combined with the presence of armed groups and ideologues operating in the sub-region mean that there can be no grounds for complacency. The Government is very much alive to the need to address social concerns and to improve local governance, but is severely constrained by the scarcity of economic and other resources.
The most visible and persistent human rights violations in Burkina Faso affect those who are deprived of their liberty. Allegations persist of torture and ill-treatment by the gendarmerie during the stage of detention at a maison d’arrêt prior to first appearances in court. The Special Rapporteur did not hear any direct evidence of such incidents during his visit, but notes that this issue will form part of the examination of the country’s UPR report by the Human Rights Council later this month.
The Special Rapporteur did, however, see and hear first hand evidence of the conditions of detention in military and civilian prisons. The total prison population is in the region of 5660, including approximately 160 military prisoners detained as a result of alleged involvement in the 2011 army mutiny (which was reportedly motivated by perceived inequalities in pay and conditions, rather than broader political considerations).
During his visit to the military prison in Ouagadougou (Maison d’Arrêt et Correction Militaire d’Ouagadougou) the Special Rapporteur was informed that there is a severe shortage of medical support and supplies for sick prisoners. He was also informed that the majority of those detained as a result of the mutiny have been in pre-trial detention for more than two years, and still do not have a date fixed for their trial. The conditions of detention were extremely basic, but morale among the prisoners appeared to be generally satisfactory and the relationship between prisoners and prison staff appeared polite and friendly. The Special Rapporteur conducted a number of private and confidential interviews with detainees, none of whom reported ill-treatment or made any complaint about their conditions of detention other than the absence of medical treatment and the length of pre-trial detention.
However the position in the civil prison system is radically different and grossly inadequate. The Special Rapporteur visited the Maison d’Arrêt et Correction d’ Ouagadougou, inspected the premises, and spoke at considerable length with the senior staff who were transparent and forthright in expressing their concerns about the conditions in which prisoners were being held. The Special Rapporteur was impressed by the professionalism, care and commitment of the senior staff, including the Regional Director for the Ouagadougou district who is responsible for the supervision of 16 prisons. It appeared clear that the staff were striving to do their utmost to provide a constructive and healthy environment for the prisoners, and were frustrated by their inability to afford humane conditions of detention.
The facility currently houses 1281 prisoners, including adult males and females and juveniles. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the adult male facilities were currently approximately 250% over-capacity, with many sleeping more than six to a cell. The sanitation was extremely poor, and the fabric of the prison was in an observably poor state of disrepair. The Special Rapporteur was informed that there was an almost total absence of medication for the treatment of infections or diseases which, in view of the overcrowding and poor sanitation, were commonplace. The medical infirmary was an empty building, without medical staff or equipment, and senior prison staff expressed grave concern about the health implications for prisoners. The prison had only one functioning pick-up truck for transporting prisoners to court or hospital and this was on loan from the Ministry of Justice. The authorities depended heavily on Catholic and other religious charities for donations and support to run even the most basic of services. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the conditions in the MACO were typical of most prisons in Burkina Faso. He considers these conditions of detention to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment and stresses the imperative need for urgent action.
On the second day of his visit the Special Rapporteur discussed the situation with the Human Rights Minister who fully acknowledged the scale of the problem and pointed out that it could only be partially alleviated by the building of more prisons. During his meeting with the Prime Minister towards the end of his visit the Special Rapporteur was informed that the Human Rights Minister had put forward a proposal for the establishment of a commission to examine solutions to the crisis in the Burkinabe prison system which had been approved the previous day by the Cabinet and the President. The Special Rapporteur welcomes this initiative and stresses its urgency. He recommends that the commission should urgently examine solutions that involve a change in judicial remand and sentencing policy, and stresses that finding a solution to this serious crisis is a joint responsibility of government and judiciary which can only be solved by a partnership between the two. In the MACO approximately 40% of those in custody were held on remand pending trial. An immediate means of easing the crisis would be to ensure that any person on pre-trial remand for a non-violent offence should be urgently considered for conditional release. In the short to medium term, however, the solution must lie in a comprehensive review of sentencing policy to ensure that the judiciary do not impose terms of imprisonment which the Government is unable to administer in humane conditions.
Provisional conclusions and recommendations
At the end of his visit the Special Rapporteur said:
“Burkina Faso has so far escaped the threat of terrorist attack, the spread of armed conflict across its borders, and the religious intolerance, radicalization and violent extremism among its population. But it remains vulnerable to all these threats due to its geographical proximity to the conflict in northern Mali, the length and insecurity of its borders with Mali and Niger, the economic instability of the country and its lack of natural resources, and the social and political tensions that have been evident in recent years, particularly amongst the youth population aged 18-25 which suffer the highest levels of unemployment, as well as the fact that nearly half of the population falls beneath the poverty line.”
“The country has so far proved to be resiliently committed to peaceful negotiation and co-existence within a sub-region that has been riven by conflicts in neighbouring states including Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Mali. Burkina Faso has acted as chief peace negotiator for many of the major conflicts in the region. This is largely due to a long and deeply-held tradition of religious and ethnic tolerance, dialogue and co-operation among its people.”
“It would, however, be naïve to assume that the country is not at risk. It is essential that a vulnerable State in such an exposed geographical location, has the tools at its disposal to ensure the security of its borders, to maintain the security of inward investment that it is essential to its development, and to address the economic, social, political and human rights concerns that can so easily become conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, as foreseen in Pillar I of the UNs Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.”
“Burkina Faso has for a number of years been the beneficiary of considerable overseas development aid. For the 5 year period from 2008 to 2013 the EU provided €700 million in development aid. The EU budget for the period 2014 to 2019 is currently under review. The economic crisis in the Eurozone, and the austerity measures that have been introduced in many European States pose a threat to international aid budgets. However, the Special Rapporteur strongly urges the EU, and other international donors, to maintain and indeed to increase levels of international support for Burkina Faso. Such support should be targeted at measures that contribute to securing stability and social justice, to the protection of the country’s borders, to the alleviation of poverty, to the resolution of the crisis in the penal system, to the protection and promotion of human rights, and to the promotion of inward investment and job and wealth creation.”
“Burkina Faso plays a critical role in promoting peace and dialogue within the sub-region. It will almost certainly occupy an important mediating position in the forthcoming negotiations concerning the future of Mali, and will significantly contribute to the maintenance of any settlement that is reached. In performing this role Burkina Faso needs the active support of the UNDP and the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Sahel.”
“Any significant terrorist attack on the infrastructure or security of Burkina Faso would undermine social cohesion within the country, impair inward investment, and further de-stabilise the region. The international community needs to ensure that the material and other resources necessary to protect this small and peaceful State, from both external and internal threats, are made available to it as a matter of regional priority.”
NAIROBI, 12 April 2013 (IRIN) - Chad is grappling with an influx of refugees and returnees into its south-eastern regions, mainly from neighbouring Sudan, and others from the Central African Republic (CAR) following a series of inter-ethnic clashes in Darfur and a recent coup in the CAR, respectively.
At least 74,000 people have fled into Chad from Darfur in the past two months, 50,000 of them in the past week alone, sparking the largest influx of refugees from Sudan into Chad since 2005, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).
Waves of refugees
In March, the first wave of 24,000 people fled from Darfur and arrived in Tissi, a remote area in Chad’s southeastern Sila Region; 8,000 were Sudanese and 16,000 Chadians. Most of them are women and children.
"Under every tree, there are women and children who are trying to protect themselves from sunshine," Abdellahi Ould El Bah, a UNHCR programme officer on mission in Tissi, told IRIN.
UNHCR staff on the ground say they “found women and children very scared, exhausted with haggard eyes”.
In Tissi, basic amenities are lacking
“People lack everything and are living in very dire conditions. They need food, water and shelter. People are obliged to drink water from the river,” Aminata Gueye, the UNHCR representative in Chad, told IRIN. “Those who are wounded need healthcare, while health centres or clinics in Tissi [are] not functional.”
Access to Tissi by air is impossible, meaning aid workers have to spend eight hours by road, and they have to cross 21 wadis (seasonal rivers).
With insecurity rife, more refugees are expected. "We fear a new wave of refugees in the next few days, as there are reports of continuing violence on the side of Darfur," said Gueye.
Most recently, clashes have been recorded between the Misseriya and Salamat ethnic groups in Um Dukhum, Darfur, with dozens of deaths reported.
On 12 April, UNHCR started the relocation of at least 8,000 Sudanese refugees from Tissi, to the Goz Amir and Djabal refugee camps in Sila Region. The relocation is expected to help in the provision of assistance to the new arrivals and to improve their security.
Local authorities have provided some 100 ton of food for the new arrivals, with UNHCR and partners coordinating efforts to provide emergency assistance in Tissi.
Refugee population already large
The new refugee influx constitutes a huge challenge for UNHCR, which was already facing limited resources as it provided protection and assistance to the large numbers of refugees in Chad. Months earlier, UNHCR and the governments of Chad and Sudan had started discussions on the return of Sudanese refugees to Darfur.
"Under every tree, there are women and children who are trying to protect themselves from sunshine" Eastern Chad is already home to about 300,000 refugees from Darfur and thousands of others from CAR. Chad has, since December 2012, received at least 4,000 new refugees from CAR, in addition to some 65,000 already there, according to a 6 April update by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Besides the new refugees, Chad is also grappling with the returns of hundreds of Chadian migrants released from detention centres in Libya.
“It is with great concern that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is monitoring the multiple migration crises currently developing along the Chadian borders. IOM is already responding to the influx of 1,200 extremely vulnerable Chadian migrants returning to Chad after having been released from detention centres in Libya.
“At the same [time], IOM is in the process of providing life-saving assistance, including homeward transportation, to over 17,000 Chadian migrants, [that] are fleeing the intercommunity violence in Sudan, that are arriving in remote border towns in Chad without means to support themselves,” Qasim Sufi, IOM chief of mission in Chad, told IRIN.
Measles outbreak
Medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is treating the wounded in Tissi, with serious cases being referred to the towns of Goz Beida or Abéché.
At the same time, teams are trying to contend with an outbreak of measles in a nearby area: “In Saraf Bourgou only, our team has confirmed 35 cases of measles, which represents 25 percent of consultations,” said Alexandre Morhain, MSF’s head of mission in Chad. “The disease has already killed seven children, five of whom were under five years old.”
An emergency measles vaccination campaign is expected to be launched in Tissi, with severe acute malnutrition cases and paediatric emergencies also being treated.
According to MSF, the situation of the refugees there is precarious as the rains approach. “We need to act now, because within two months it will be impossible to access this area by road.”
aw/rz
12 April 2013 – The United Nations today reaffirmed its determination to back the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) after a terrorist suicide bombing killed three Chadian members of the force, which is helping national efforts to recover the northern Sahara region of the trouble-wracked country from insurgents.
At the same time UN humanitarian officials warned that the food situation in the north of the West African country is alarming, while an international humanitarian aid appeal is grossly underfunded.
“The United Nations condemns the bomb attack which has also injured several members of the same contingent serving under the AFISMA Force,” the UN Office in Mali (UNOM) said in a statement on the attack, which occurred in Kidal, in the far north-east of the country.
“These terrorist acts, however, shall not undermine the United Nations’ determination to support AFISMA in its effort to restore peace and territorial integrity in Mali,” it added, expressing its deep sorrow at the deaths.
In his most recent report on the situation in Mali last week, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed two options for UN engagement in the country, where renewed fighting since January 2012 has uprooted hundreds of thousands of people and prompted the Government to request assistance from France to stop the military advance of extremist groups.
Under the first option, a UN multidimensional integrated political presence would operate alongside AFISMA, which the Security Council authorized in December, at the request of the Government, to support national efforts to recover the north from the insurgents.
The second option involves the establishment of a UN multidimensional integrated stabilization mission under Chapter VII, which authorizes the use of force, alongside a parallel force. In addition to a political mandate, the mission would carry out security-related stabilization tasks, protect civilians and create the conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.
Also today, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) has allocated $16 million over the past few weeks to kick-start life-saving humanitarian projects in Mali.
It noted that Mali is at the beginning of the lean season and the food situation in the northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal is alarming.
The Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal for Mali has only received about a quarter of the $410 million requested. The CERF’s allocations are therefore critical stop-gap measures pending more substantial funding for the appeal.
By Laure Poinsot
A new report by UNICEF to be issued on 15 April reveals the high prevalence of stunting in children under 5, but also outlines the tremendous opportunities that exist to make it a problem of the past.
MONGO, Chad, 11 April 2013 – The father wipes his eyes with the sleeve of his white boubou.
“We did all we could,” says Dr. Kaimbo. “Unfortunately, the boy was too weak.”
Vicious circle of disease and malnutrition
Days like today weigh heavily on Dr. Kaimbo, who is part of a UNICEF-supported programme aimed at saving the lives of children affected by nutrition crisis in Chad. The programme is funded, among others, by the European Union humanitarian aid department (ECHO).
Chad experiences chronic drought, among its harsh and erratic climatic conditions. The country is also faced with massive developmental challenges. Nearly 20 per cent of children die before their fifth birthdays. During periods of drought, many children suffer from severe acute malnutrition.
“[I]t’s not just drought and famine that causes malnutrition,” says UNICEF Chad Representative Bruno Maes. “There are three big factors in the vicious circle of disease and malnutrition. One is food insecurity due to bad harvests and rising food prices. Second is the poor health services. And the third is the parents’ lack of knowledge about food and basic hygiene. Then there’re also the risks associated with child marriages and polygamy.”
Scaling up the response
In response to nutrition crisis in Chad and the Sahel Belt region, UNICEF, the Government of Chad and partners such as ECHO have scaled up services and facilities to treat the growing number of children affected by malnutrition. “The number of treatment centres has doubled, from 210 to 425,” says Mr. Maes. “Two hundred thirty paramedics have been trained and despatched; hundreds of tonnes of supplies and materials have been delivered to reach as many children as possible.”
UNICEF recruits, trains and deploys paramedics. It also supports establishing therapeutic nutrition centres and outpatient nutrition centres, setting up nutrition outreach efforts and purchasing supplies.
Health official in the Guera region Dr. Honoré Dembayo says that these efforts have helped to alleviate some of the shortages of medicine and healthcare staff. “All this explains the good results seen in Guera – a cure rate of over 75 per cent.”
Screening and treatment for malnutrition
The success in Guera region is largely the result of careful screening of children at the community level and at health centres to make sure they receive the treatment they need – when they need it. Children are tested for malnutrition by checking their height and weight, the circumference of their mid-upper arm and any swelling. Depending on the results, they may be admitted into the nutrition programme.
The children then take an appetite test. They are given ready-to-use-therapeutic food made up of a peanut butter paste enriched with sugar and vitamins.
“Children who struggle to eat [the therapeutic food] have reached a highly advanced stage of malnutrition,” says UNICEF Nutrition Officer Jean-Pierre Mansimadji Mandibaye. “They are immediately taken to hospital, because their lives are in danger.
“The others can benefit from our programme and receive packets of therapeutic product. They must return every week until they’re cured.”
Outreach in communities
Once the children are back home, outreach volunteers monitor progress throughout the treatment period. They also teach families about good hygiene and nutrition, to keep the problem from recurring.
“It’s a lot of work, but I’m proud of saving children,” says Abderrahim Massadi, an outreach volunteer in Koulji, 15 km from Mongo.
There are 250 families in the village of Koulji, including about 1,500 children. One of these children is Saidja’s son. The little boy has successfully completed his treatment, and now Saidja is applying the skills she’s learned to keep him healthy. With support from the outreach volunteers, she has learned to make a healthier porridge for him, using fresh ingredients when she can afford them.
“I put in millet, some beans, a bit of peanut butter and sugar,” she says. “Since I started making him this porridge, he doesn’t get sick anymore. They also taught me to use soap to wash his hands and mouth before meals, and how to properly clean the kitchen utensils.”
Updated: 12 April 2013
UN Women calls for greater participation of women to achieve peace in Sahel and urge world leaders to protect and advance women’s rights
“In Mali as well as in the Sahel, women are among the most affected by the crisis. They are also those with the strongest understanding of conflict dynamics. But yet, we remain confined at home and excluded from decision-making,” said Aiziza Mint Kadra, former Deputy Mayor of the historical city of Timbuktu in Mali as she shared her story with regional and international experts.
Fleeing her town when it was taken by the rebel forces in mid-2012, Aziza soon became an active mediator and an advocate for women affected by conflict. She encouraged rebel leaders to engage in peaceful dialogues and guided fact-finding missions to review the situation of refugee camps.
Ms. Kadra’s story was echoed by many of the participants at the High-Level Conference on Women’s Leadership in the Sahel region held on 9 April who shared their own experiences of conflict and recovery. At the meeting, women from the Sahel region called for greater participation in all international forums and peace talks to resolve the crises in the Sahel. They also urged the international community to dedicate more funds to advance women’s rights and empowerment in the region.
“I was deeply moved by the accounts I heard from women about the exceptional physical and human insecurity women experienced during the recent conflict in northern Mali, and about the problems of chronic poverty and marginalization elsewhere. As they pointed out, there are political, environmental, developmental, and humanitarian crises in the Sahel that demand urgent remedy all with a marked impact on women, often worsening the inequalities between women and men,” said Ms. Lakshmi Puri Acting Head of UN Women and Assistant Secretary-General. “In addition, women spoke of an increasingly restrictive social environment limiting their mobility, productivity, and ultimately, their capacities to function as effective leaders and defenders of women’s rights,” she added.
Organized by the European Union, the Office of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel and UN Women, the Conference gathered some 40 women ministers, activists and experts from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, as well as representatives from the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Brussels, Belgium.
Aminata Diallo, who stood as the first woman candidate for the last presidential elections in Mali and who plans to stand again this year if elections are held as planned, stressed that the participation of women is fundamental to development. “If half the Sahel population is marginalized, it will never achieve development. Peace has to enable development and the end of women’s suffering,” she said.
The key recommendations put forth by the women from Sahel at the Conference included: inclusion of women in all national, regional and international forums convened to resolve the Sahel crisis while ensuring that at least 30 per cent of participants in decision-making and politics are women. Secondly, the women called for allocating a minimum level of 15 per cent of all national and international budgets for development and peacebuilding on promoting gender quality and advancing women’s rights in the Sahel. And third, they called for increased visibility and respect for women’s roles as leaders and resolvers of crises – including in the media and among traditional communities.
Additional recommendations included the implementation of regional solutions involving all regional and international entities and most importantly to ensure a participatory process with people from the Sahel. The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and mechanisms of transitional justice to end impunity for perpetrators of gender-based violence was also prioritized.
During the Conference, women interacted with Catherine Ashton, High Representative from the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel and Lakshmi Puri, Acting Head of UN Women and Assistant Secretary-General.
Welcoming the decision by Special Envoy Prodi to establish a women’s advisory group, Ms. Puri said: “I cannot imagine a more valuable source of guidance for the Envoy, and I know that the EU and the UN stand ready to support viable solutions that promote inclusivity, resilience, and peace. Women of the Sahel have tremendous capacities to bring solutions in situations of instability.”
She noted that UN Women is offering technical and financial support to a range of initiatives intended to build women’s influence on crisis response processes in the region. These range from support to regional women’s peace networks, such as the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the ECOWAS Region, to support for important national initiatives to ensure peaceful political processes, such as the Women’s Election Situation Room in Senegal that ensured fair and peaceful participation for women in the 2012 presidential elections.
In Mali alone, UN Women has supported training for women leaders in mediation skills and has ensured their access to visiting mediators and envoys, brought gender and women’s rights training to the Malian military, supported market engagement by internally displaced women, and conducted some of the very first studies of the extent of conflict-related sexual violence in the North of the country. As one woman participant noted, UN Women “est toujours prêt et toujours là” (is always ready and always there) for women from the Sahel.
The recommendations of the Conference will contribute to the High-Level Conference of Donors for the development of Mali, to be held in May in Brussels.
NIAMEY, 14 avril 2013 (IRIN) - Le conflit qui a éclaté au Mali début 2012 a fait ressurgir les nombreux souvenirs de rébellions et de demandes d’autonomie qui ont marqué l’histoire touarègue. Chez les voisins du Niger, les Touaregs semblent avoir établi une relation plus stable avec le gouvernement. Bamako aurait-elle des leçons à tirer de cette expérience ?
L’histoire postcoloniale touarègue a été marquée, au Mali comme au Niger, par une série de soulèvements alimentés par un sentiment d’abandon et de marginalisation de la part du gouvernement central et par des revendications concernant les échecs de la mise en œuvre des accords de paix.
Trois ans après l’indépendance du Mali par rapport à la France, proclamée en 1960, les Touaregs ont déclenché une rébellion qui a été écrasée par l’armée. Mais de nouveaux soulèvements ont suivi dans les années 1990, puis en 2006, en 2008 et en 2012, malgré la signature d’un accord de paix capital en 1992. La dernière crise au Mali a été déclenchée par un coup d’État perpétré par des militaires mécontents de l’incapacité du gouvernement à mater une récente insurrection touarègue.
Le Niger a lui aussi été secoué par des rébellions touarègues dans les années 1990 et en 2007, mais les deux parties ont signé un accord de paix en 1995.
Or, si les Touaregs du Mali et du Niger ont peu ou prou les mêmes revendications d’intégration politique et sociale et de développement territorial et économique, le contexte géographique, démographique et politique est bien différent.
Déterminés à maintenir la paix
« Le gouvernement nigérien cherche manifestement à se montrer pour le moins conciliant. Les Touaregs du nord du Niger ont [en outre] fourni des efforts plus concertés pour tenter de négocier », a dit Andrew Lebovich, conseiller et chercheur spécialisé dans le Sahel de l’Initiative pour une Société Ouverte en Afrique de l’Ouest (OSIWA).
Selon Mohamed Ag Ewangaye, directeur de la Haute autorité à la consolidation de la paix (HACP) nigérienne, bien que les accords de paix soient loin d’être pleinement appliqués et que les conditions qui ont déclenché les précédents conflits soient toujours d’actualité, les Touaregs du Niger sont déterminés à instaurer la paix.
« Les causes de la révolte subsistent. La mise en œuvre des accords de paix est loin d’être réussie », a pourtant dit à IRIN M. Ewangaye, lui-même touareg.
« Si nous nous attardions toujours aux détails de l’attitude du gouvernement [...] Si nous nous lancions constamment dans des récriminations, il n’y aurait pas de paix. Il faut parfois donner une chance à la paix et nous rétablir petit à petit, car c’est une entreprise de longue haleine », a ajouté M. Ewangaye.
Contrairement aux Touaregs du Mali, qui se concentrent dans le Nord, ceux du Niger sont répartis dans tout le pays, ce qui a facilité l’irrédentisme.
« Les Touaregs du Niger ne sont pas confinés dans une seule région et ne peuvent donc pas réclamer la sécession comme au Mali », a dit M. Ewangaye.
« La société nigérienne est davantage imprégnée de culture touarègue. Les Touaregs sont dispersés dans presque tout le Niger, ce qui n’est pas le cas au Mali. L’ensemble du Niger est comme le Nord-Mali en ce qui concerne la répartition de la population », a remarqué M. Lebovich.
Les rébellions touarègues des années 1990 ont par ailleurs eu des conséquences très différentes. Au Mali, elles ont opposé les Touaregs aux autres communautés et entravé les tentatives de paix. Au Niger, par contre, le conflit a fini par diviser les Touaregs, a dit Yvan Guichaoua, maître de conférence à l’université d’East Anglia.
Échec des accords de paix
La stabilité à long terme au sein de la population touarègue du Mali comme du Niger est cependant mise à mal par l’application seulement partielle des accords de paix et, plus récemment, par la présence de groupes extrémistes liés à Al-Qaïda dans la région. (Selon les observateurs, la présence de ces mouvements a modifié les politiques mises en place par les gouvernements en matière de sécurité et leur comportement face aux mouvements touaregs, dont certains ont été accusés d’être en relation avec Al-Qaïda.)
« Les accords de paix au Mali et au Niger étaient relativement similaires : développement économique, réformes militaires, intégration et décentralisation. Mais ils ont échoué et les violences ont repris en 2007 au Niger et en 2006 au Mali », a dit M. Guichaoua.
Le Mali et le Niger ont cependant pris des mesures différentes à la fin de ces rébellions.
Au Nord-Mali, un Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement du Nord-Mali (PSPSDN) a été lancé en 2011, fondé sur l’idée que la sécurité favoriserait le développement. Mais la population de la région était tellement hostile à l’armée, que le programme n’a fait que susciter la colère.
« Bamako a fait moins bonne figure [que le Niger] en adoptant explicitement un programme de sécurité tout en oubliant les mesures [de développement] du Pacte national [de 1992], » a dit M. Guichaoua.
Le président nigérien Mahamadou Issoufou, en revanche, a nommé des membres de la communauté touarègue, comme Brigi Rafini, à des postes clés du gouvernement dans le souci d’apaiser les sentiments de marginalisation. « C’est une stratégie à court terme. À plus long terme, il faut relancer les trois volets de mesures [des accords de paix] », a-t-il expliqué.
« Dans les deux pays, les politiques [de paix] n’ont pas été pleinement appliquées. Au Mali, elle a été écartée par un programme de sécurité en la forme du PSPSDN et, au Niger, aucun changement structurel n’a été mis en œuvre non plus, mais la résolution de la crise y a été abordée de manière plus intelligente », a dit M. Guichaoua à IRIN.
Modes de lutte changeants
Les dirigeants touaregs du Mali et du Niger ont également des influences très différentes sur leur pays respectif.
Après avoir accepté de mettre un terme aux hostilités à la fin de l’an 2000, par exemple, le commandant touareg malien Ibrahim Bahanga n’a pas rendu les armes. Au Niger, par contre, les dirigeants touaregs ont plus ou moins accepté les accords négociés par le dirigeant libyen de l’époque, Mouammar Kadhafi, qui incluaient le désarmement, a dit M. Guichoua.
Selon M. Ewangaye, de la HACP, la lutte des Touaregs nigériens se poursuit, mais leurs méthodes ont changé.
« La lutte armée était une étape de la protestation contre leur situation. L’accord de paix est une nouvelle étape qui ouvre la voie à la reconstruction nationale. Il existe toujours des raisons de se soulever, mais le mode de lutte a changé », a-t-il dit.
ob/rz-ld/amz
BAMAKO/GAO, 15 April 2013 (IRIN) - Hundreds of northern Malians - many of them ethnic Tuaregs - have been detained by the Malian army since the French military intervention to oust Islamist groups from northern Mali began in January 2013. Many of the detainees have complained they had no idea why they were captured and were not given access to lawyers; others alleged torture.
Two ethnic Tuareg men, whose cases were being followed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), have just died.
IRIN spoke to human rights groups, detainees, gendarmes and military officers to find out the status of conflict-related detainees.
Documented abuses
Two ethnic Tuareg men, who were arrested in February and tortured by Malian soldiers in the town of Léré, in Timbuktu Region, have died in detention at the Central Prison in the capital, Bamako, according to an 11 April HRW communiqué.
The two were transferred to Gendarme Camp 1 in Bamako, where they received some medical attention, and were transferred to the Central Prison in Bamako in late March.
“The men were in very bad shape. One of the men was repeatedly abused, suffering severe hematoma and possibly a broken rib. While detained by the army, he had been injected with a caustic substance,” said Corinne Dufka, a senior West Africa researcher at HRW.
“They did not receive the treatment they needed, and the previous torture and ill-treatment clearly contributed to their deaths.”
HRW had interviewed and documented the torture inflicted on a total of seven men. The organization said most of the abuses they documented were committed while the prisoners were still in military custody but stopped when they were transferred to the gendarmerie.
“Detainees described being beaten and kicked, burned, injected with a caustic substance, and threatened with death while in army custody,” said Dufka. “Detainees were only randomly questioned, and often while tortured. One man described a treatment similar to water-boarding while held by rank-and-file soldiers.”
The seven men were taken to Markala, in Gao Region, where they were photographed with assault rifles, ammunition and other alleged proof of their association with armed groups. Most of them denied any such association and said the arms and other items were not theirs, though some admitted they had either fought for or assisted the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), according to Dufka.
None of the detained had seen a lawyer or knew the full extent of the charges against them.
Detainees have also been subjected to mock-executions, according to local and international human rights groups, among them HRW, Amnesty International and the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH).
How many detained?
Following the start of the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013, the Malian army arrested dozens of men all over the country on suspicion of supporting the Islamist groups that took control of the north in 2012. Most of the men were taken in central and northern Mali as Malian and French forces advanced north.
Kadidia Sangare Coulibaly, president of CNDH, told IRIN the arrests accounted for the disappearances of many members of ethnic minority groups during the first weeks of the French-led intervention.
“It is likely that some of these people, of whom we still have no news, were arrested on suspicion of supporting the Islamists,” she said.
The police in Gao and Bamako, state prosecutors and lawyers in Bamako, and humanitarian organizations with access to the detainees are all unable to say how many were arrested since the intervention.
Captain Banfa, with the gendarmes in Gao, said that as far as he knew, 300 people were arrested in Gao, 70 of whom were later transferred to the state prison in Bamako. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says the countrywide figure is 300.
State prosecutor Mohamed Dicko, in Bamako, said he had received 109 cases from the Bamako gendarmerie of arrests for aiding the armed Islamists groups, a number likely to increase as more detainees are transferred to the capital.
“So far, 200 people have been arrested and transferred to the central prison in Bamako. Among them, 27 have been released,” Dicko said, noting 26 men were arrested by the French army.
Some 45 detainees are being held by the MNLA, which is in control of parts of Kidal Region, according to Wolde Gabriel Saugeron, the ICRC spokesperson in Geneva.
Six of the people detained across the country are children whose cases are currently being followed by UNICEF, according to Dicko.
Fear of reprisals
Alasane, a Tuareg pastoralist from a small village just outside the town of Timbuktu, told IRIN over the phone, “I’ve heard about innocent people who were arrested, killed and thrown down wells. The victims mainly belonged to minority groups, and I knew it was a risk for me coming to the market.”
He withheld his last name out of fear of reprisals from government troops.
In March, when he heard the French army was working with the Malians, he decided to bring his animals to the market in a town close to where troops were fighting.
“I had no choice. I needed the money to survive. A cow goes for 100,000-200,000 CFA (US$200-400). If I sell a few of them, I can make enough to provide for my family,” he said.
Coming back from the market, he was stopped and interrogated by a group of soldiers. He was later brought a cell with another prisoner, Moussa Ibrahim. Rather than being swiftly transferred to the gendarmerie in Timbuktu, the men remained with their military captors. Alasane was later released.
ICRC has been able to visit detainees in central Bamako, Kidal, Mopti and Sévaré to monitor their treatment and conditions of detention, and to pass on messages to their families.
Discipline
Human rights groups have urged the gendarmerie to be present during all major round-ups of suspects, and to provide legal representation for the prisoners, sound investigations into their charges, and the right to compensation for those abused or robbed and to the families of those who died while in custody.
Likewise, military officers should more closely monitor their soldiers’ behaviour, said HRW. “A clear military hierarchy to ensure discipline in low-ranking soldiers is needed. We do not believe the abuse is systematic. Many people were also arrested without being abused,” said Dufka.
A lieutenant colonel in the army, who asked to remain anonymous, told IRIN, “The army has been systematically marginalized by political leaders over the past 30 years. We have lost our cohesion, our sense of discipline - arguably the foundation of a good army - and our morale.”
Some of the alleged abuses that soldiers carried out were undertaken by bandits pretending to be soldiers, he told IRIN, but he noted, “The last time most of these soldiers received training in international human rights was 10 years ago.”
He confirmed that a commission has been set up to investigate allegations of abuse.
Col Didier Dacko, in Gao, told IRIN that when accusations of prisoner mistreatment emerge, the suspected soldiers are immediately transferred to Bamako, where staff investigate the allegations and decide whether the soldiers should be prosecuted.
Thus far, six soldiers have been transferred to Bamako, according to the Ministry of Justice in Bamako.
A European Union training team has started training the first four - out of a total of eight - of Mali’s army battalions. Over the next four months, each will be trained in organization, intelligence, communications and logistics; this will be followed by a move to restore the command and control structure, said Lt Col Philippe de Cussac, who is with the training mission.
Support is needed not only to improve discipline in the army, but also to boost the judiciary, which Dufka pointed out is awarded just 0.5 percent of the government’s annual budget.
Given the lack of available lawyers, many of the detainees are likely to remain locked for some time to come.
kh/aj/rz
This issue of ACLED Conflict Trends marks a year since ACLED began publishing monthly updates summarising and analysing real-time data on conflict in the African continent. Past issues of Conflict Trends are available online at acleddata.com where analysis has included regional conflict trends, the highest violence states at present and in historical perspective, and states displaying unique or paradigmatic violence profiles. Special issue topics have included the urbanization of conflict, electoral violence, violent Islamist groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, and profiles of some of the most dominant violent groups including Boko Haram and Al Shabaab.
This issue of Conflict Trends focuses on recent developments in Central African Republic (CAR), Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and South Sudan. The special focus section this month provides a conceptual and methodological overview of ACLED terminology and categorisation of violence, and its relevance to the analysis and understanding of discrete patterns and dynamics of conflict.
Elsewhere on the continent, violence declined in Sudan after a period of relatively elevated conflict there, as in Namibia after a period of unrest. Conflict escalated in Egypt, while levels remained largely unchanged in DR-Congo, Zimbabwe and Somalia.
L'Essentiel
Un dernier espoir pour des filles en détresse
L’Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali à Bamako (AJDM) est une organisation humanitaire qui vole au secours des filles migrantes y compris celles déplacées suite aux conflits au Nord du Mali victimes des abus sexuels, viols et violences. Fondée sur des valeurs de justice et de solidarité, l’AJDM fournit un accompagnement psychosocial pour soulager les douleurs morales et physiques liées aux traumatismes, mais aussi pour renforcer la capacité de résilience des victimes.
Deux centres d’accueil et d’hébergement temporaire, créés en 2005 et 2008, assurent la prise en charge alimentaire, médicale et l’appui psychosocial, qui sont souvent des aides ménagères ou vendeuses ambulantes. Il s’y ajoute maintenant des filles déplacées suite aux conflits au Nord du Mali. Les deux centres ont une capacité d’hébergement de 17 et 20 filles et hébergent entre 40 et 100 filles chacun par an. A cause des conflits, la demande a doublé dépassant de loin l’offre. AJDM est actuellement financée par deux partenaires, une ONG suisse et une luxembourgeoise.
L’accueil et la prise en charge des filles dans les centres AJDM sont assurés par les assistantes sociales de jour et de nuit, appuyées par un médecin. Les activités des assistantes sociales couvrent l’accueil, l’hébergement, l’orientation, la référence, l’appui alimentaire, médical et psychosocial, y compris la réunification et l’insertion socioéconomique.
L’accompagnement psychosocial de l’AJDM ouvre aux survivantes la voie à l’espoir, à la reconstruction et à un projet de vie que l’ONG accompagne jusqu’au retrait des victimes de la précarité et de la vulnérabilité.
Une fille déplacée nous a confié son calvaire : «J’ai fui les rebelles à Douentza, ma ville d’origine. Je suis arrivée tard dans la nuit à Bamako. Ne sachant pas où aller j’ai dormi sur les bancs à la gare où des inconnus m’ont violé. J’ai pleuré et ils ont pris la fuite et c’est ainsi que j’ai contracté ma grossesse. J’ai enfin trouvé un travail comme ménagère, mais huit mois après je ne pouvais plus travailler et ma patronne m’avait renvoyée dans la rue, c’est de là qu’une camarade m’a conduite au centre d’AJDM. Au centre, j’ai bénéficié d’une prise en charge alimentaire, médicale et psychosociale qui a transformé ma détresse en espoir ».
Malgré ces efforts, beaucoup d’autres demandes d’accueil et d’hébergement restent non satisfaites faute de places et d’infrastructures. C’est pourquoi l’Association cherche d’urgence un appui pour l’obtention d’un autre centre plus spacieux et confortable pour une prise en charge adéquate des nombreuses victimes.
Heavy fighting continued throughout Syria, with shelling reported from all but two of the Governorates in the country. The violence in densely populated places, including Aleppo, Homs, Deir-ez-Zor, Idleb and central Damascus remained intense. More than 400,000 people have fled Syria since 1 January, bringing the total number of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries to around 1.32 million as of 14 April, according to UNHCR.
In the north of Mali, France led a major offensive on 9 April in an attempt to establish control over the northern territories before the deployment of UN peacekeepers and as French troops start withdrawing. Meanwhile, the security situation remains volatile with continued asymmetric attacks carried out by Islamist militants in the main northern towns.
Fresh tribal clashes in central and southern Darfur in Sudan erupted despite the signing of a peace treaty between leaders of the Misseriya and Salamat tribes on 10 April. Some 50,000 refugees arrived in Chad following the clashes in the past week alone, marking the largest influx of refugees from Sudan to Chad since 2005, according to UNHCR.
The humanitarian crisis linked to violence and the related power struggle in the Central African Republic is now affecting the whole population of 4.6 million people in the country, according to UNICEF. More than 2.3 million of these are children. In Bangui, violent clashes erupted between supporters of the new authorities and armed youth loyal to the former President Bozizé, killing 20 people.
By Moustapha Diallo, IFRC
A few months ago, several humanitarian organizations suspended their activities in northern Mali when cities such as Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal were still under insurgent control. The Mali Red Cross Society, with support from its Red Cross Red Crescent partners, and a few other organizations, braved the danger posed by the conflict to provide lifesaving assistance to thousands of people who remained in the north, and to those who ran to safety in the central and southern regions of the country.
In Mopti, in central Mali, where over 40,000 people have sought refuge, the society has been one of the leading agencies in humanitarian operations.
“We were overwhelmed by the sudden and massive influx of people fleeing from the north. The streets were crowded with people,” says Moumouni Damango, regional president of the crisis committee in Mopti. “The Mali Red Cross Society was the first humanitarian organization to come alongside us, bringing its experience and support.”
In the early hours of the crisis, hundreds of Red Cross volunteers were mobilized to provide first aid and to transport those who were sick to health facilities. They worked tirelessly to accommodate the displaced, provided them comfort and ensured they had shelter.
Given the deterioration of sanitary facilities and challenging hygiene conditions due to overcrowding, volunteers were also mobilized to raise awareness about hygiene, provide drinking water and organize demonstration sessions on water treatment.
“The displaced people now make up more than 7.5 per cent of the population of Mopti. Imagine the pressure in terms of water and latrines needs,” said Dr Mahamane Koumaré, Regional Director of Health in Mopti. “Fortunately, thanks to the Red Cross, prevention activities have proven successful. We have not recorded a single case of cholera in an area where it is endemic."
Since the crisis erupted, the Mali Red Cross Society, with support from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Committee of the Red Cross, Movement partners and other organizations, has distributed hundreds of tons of food to displaced people and host families. Essential items including tents, tarpaulins, mosquito nets, soap, and kitchen sets were also provided.
The needs of displaced populations and host families remain enormous. Living conditions are poor. Many are still traumatized from what they have witnessed and wait for a better security situation before returning home.
For those who want to return now, the way back will not be easy. Without assistance from the Red Cross, the UN and others it will be difficult to return and rebuild their lives in the villages they left. Plans are underway to ensure help is there when people do return.
The Mali Red Cross Society recently conducted an assessment to identify what people will need. Indications are they will need everything: shelter, water, food, health care and support in re-establishing their livelihoods. “One of the new areas of focus in our work will consist of putting in place a programme of assistance and support to returnees in the north," said Mamadou Traore, Secretary General of the Mali Red Cross Society. “To achieve this however, we will need the support of all. The needs are too great for us to do it alone.”
04/15/2013 15:41 GMT
N'DJAMENA, April 15, 2013 (AFP) - Chad's parliament voted overwhelmingly Monday for a gradual withdrawal of troops from Mali where 36 have died in a French-led campaign to oust armed Islamists from the north of the country.
Lawmakers were nearly unanimous in asking government to withdraw its 2,250 troops "within a reasonable timeframe".
Speaking at the session, Prime Minister Dadnadji Djimrangar said: "We paid a heavy price for this noble mission."
Experienced soldiers from the regional military heavyweight Chad who are used to fighting in harsh desert terrain played a key role in helping French troops battle Islamists insurgents in northern Mali.
France in January swept to the aid of Mali's ill-disciplined and poorly trained army and, with the aid of other African troops, has largely succeeded in driving Islamist insurgents from the north.
However pockets of resistance remain, particularly in the Gao region. At least three Chadian soldiers died Friday in a suicide bombing in Kidal, northeast of Gao.
In addition to the 36 dead and 74 wounded, Chad spent 57 billion CFA francs (87 million euros, $114 million) for its three-month contribution to the campaign, Djimrangar said.
Chadian President Idriss Deby told French journalists on Sunday: "The face-to-face war with the jihadists is over. The Chadian army has no real competence to confront an unknown. The Chadian soldiers will return to Chad; they have accomplished their mission."
He noted that Chad would contribute troops to a UN force in Mali if asked.
Paris pulled out 100 soldiers ahead of schedule a week ago as part of a phased withdrawal of the majority of its 4,000 troops.
France has said it will leave 2,000 soldiers on the ground throughout the summer, reducing its presence by the end of the year to a "support force" of 1,000 fighting alongside the UN-mandated army of some 11,000 troops.
Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal fell in March 2012 to Tuareg rebels who took advantage of the chaos following a coup to declare independence for the entire desert north before losing control to Islamist insurgents.
yas/gd/fb
Faits saillants
Des attaques sporadiques continuent de fragiliser la situation sécuritaire dans le nord et limitent l’accès à certaines zones tout en augmentant le flux de déplacés vers le sud.
Le début de la saison agricole va entraîner des retours momentanés difficiles à évaluer pour l’instant mais qui vont sûrement demander un support humanitaire et provoquer la séparation des familles.
Les maisons en banco (terre crue) au nord vont manquer d’entretien pour la deuxième année consécutive en plus des pillages et des vols de matériaux et éléments de construction. On estime que 30% des maisons ont subi des dégradations importantes.
